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    Day 24 Transcript: Holocaust Denial on Trial

    Part I: Initial Proceedings (1.1 to 7.5)

        1996 I. No. 113
      2  Royal Courts of Justice
      3  Strand, London
      4  Wednesday, 23rd February 2000
      6  Before:
    10  Claimant -and-
    13  Defendants
    14  The Claimant appeared in person
    15  MR RICHARD RAMPTON Q.C. (instructed by Messrs Davenport Lyons and Mishcon de Reya) appeared on behalf of the First and
    16  Second Defendants
    17  MISS HEATHER ROGERS (instructed by Davenport Lyons) appeared on behalf of the First Defendant Penguin Books Limited
    18  MR ANTHONY JULIUS (of Mishcon de Reya) appeared on behalf of
    19  the Second Defendant Deborah Lipstadt
    21  (Transcribed from the stenographic notes of Harry Counsell
        & Company, Clifford’s Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4
    22  Telephone: 020-7242-9346)
    23  (This transcript is not to be reproduced without the written permission of Harry
        Counsell & Company)
    .           P-1

      1  <Day 24.
      2  (10.30 a.m.)
      3&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  My Lord, before I call Dr Longerich, there are
      4  three things I think I would like to mention.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I want to mention two things to you too.
      6&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Then judge before counsel.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  All right. One I think I have actually
      8  discovered the answer to, but can you just confirm that
      9  the statements which you rely on for saying that Mr Irving
    10  is a Holocaust denier, are they now collective in K3 and,
    11  if so, are they going to be refined down, as it were, any
    12  more or do I take it that K3 is the selection upon which
    13  you rely.
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  My belief is there was an abstract rather like the
    15  anti-Semitic abstract. It is on Word disk.
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I actually heard that. If, in due course,
    17  Mr Irving and I can be supplied with a copy of it, that
    18  will help a great deal. The other thing is, looking ahead
    19  a little more, and this is for you, Mr Irving, as well is
    20  really looking ahead to final speeches, it seems obvious
    21  that you must both take matters in whatever order you
    22  think is appropriate, but it seemed to me in this
    23  particular case it would be quite helpful to have a
    24  discussion at some stage about a possibly agreed order of
    25  topics to be covered, because it would help me if I knew
    26  what you were moving to. If you were to take things in
    .           P-2

      1  the same order, you do not have to obviously, but do you
      2  follow what I am getting at?
      3&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I do.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  This is quite a difficult case in the sense
      5  of you cannot take it chronologically and it is quite
      6  difficult to interrelate some of the issues.
      7  MR IRVING:  Your Lordship is aware that I propose not
      8  addressing certain issues in my closing speech.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is a matter for you.
    10  MR IRVING:  But I certainly agree that there should be an
    11  agreed order.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think so. That makes it sound a bit more
    13  formal than I was really intending, but if we can set
    14  aside maybe half an hour some time early next week.
    15&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  May I say straightaway my present format is to do
    16  what I call historical falsification first, then because
    17  it goes with Holocaust denial, Auschwitz, and then what
    18  I call racism and then finally political associations.
    19  I will try to order the historical distortions as I did in
    20  cross-examination, and my witnesses have done more or less
    21  in the witness box, to do that chronologically.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  If I can just indicate the problem I have had
    23  is that the issue of Hitler’s knowledge of what was going
    24  on is quite difficult to accommodate within the structure
    25  you have just outlined. That is, I think, the area that
    26  is quite difficult to slot in.
    .           P-3

      1&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Except to this extent, it does not find a place,
      2  or not a significant place, in my format because I do not
      3  believe that it has any relevance except in so far as it
      4  is on the back of that topic that most of the historical
      5  distortions ride.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Quite, but if you limit — I am sorry to go
      7  on about this point; it is quite important to thrash it
      8  out — what one might call the historiographical
      9  criticisms of Mr Irving to the points that are made,
    10  effectively, by Professor Evans, you slightly miss the
    11  whole gamut of the continuum, to use a word we have been
    12  using, of the evidence in relation to that issue. So I
    13  will just mention that as being a possible difficulty.
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It will have a place in the file which — your
    15  Lordship I hope now has, which we have finished, I am
    16  afraid — that was the other thing I was going to say and
    17  apologise — a bit late yesterday. It contains what we
    18  think are the core history documents and that, obviously,
    19  bears on the Hitler knowledge question.
    20  There will be in what I have to say a certain
    21  amount relating to Hitler’s knowledge, Hitler’s authority,
    22  Hitler’s orders, if you like, but only in so far as the
    23  evidence leads to the conclusion reached by Sir John
    24  Keegan, for example, that the idea that he did not know
    25  defies reason.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We will spend a bit more time on perhaps
    .           P-4

      1  discussing that.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  One other thing: as to that Hitler knowledge
      3  question, what Miss Rogers has done is to prepare a
      4  reference, chronological reference document, for what are
      5  the most important — it is not exhaustive — Hitler
      6  statements, in our submission. Can I pass that up?
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Where do you want me to put it? Have you had
      8  this, Mr Irving?
      9  MR IRVING:  No, I have not.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Is there a copy for Mr Irving?
    11&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  N1, I think it is. It is the new file anyway and
    12  it is —-
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is called N1, thank you.
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  There is one other thing I should say. Your
    15  Lordship asked for a note on the admissibility of expert
    16  evidence in written form. I have done a note on that. It
    17  will be ready by 2 o’clock. It is being typed.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Obviously, Mr Irving should have a chance to
    19  look at it before we have any submissions there are going
    20  to be about it.
    21&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I will attach to it, there are some pieces of
    22  paper showing what the statutes and the rules say.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Thank you very much. Mr Irving?
    24  MR IRVING:  My Lord, the only thing I would wish to add to that
    25  is a request that there should be one clear day before the
    26  submission of closing speeches.
    .           P-5

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  There will be more than that, I think.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I need much more than one day.
      3  MR IRVING:  The words “at least” was in square brackets before
      4  “one clear”.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, I do not think we want to have too long
      6  because I am not sure that speeches are necessarily going
      7  to need to go through everything, as it were, in detail;
      8  it is more a question of references, I think, in a way.
      9&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I thought what I would do is a shortish sort of
    10  summary to read out in court with a file, which I would
    11  not read in court, of where necessary detailed reasoning
    12  and references just for your Lordship and, of course,
    13  eventually the public too.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  My feeling is it will be three plus days.
    15  Does that sound sensible to you?
    16  MR IRVING:  That will suit my needs, yes.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is everything you want to say?
    18  MR IRVING:  I think so, yes, my Lord.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So it is Dr Longerich, gentlemen?
    20  Mr Rampton, I have just been told there is an interpreter
    21  as well which rather surprises me because I thought
    22  Dr Longerich was giving expert evidence about the
    23  translation of German words into English.
    24&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes. His English is very good, but there are
    25  times when his thought processes on a sophisticated or
    26  difficult question are in German, and when he feels
    .           P-6

      1  uncertain that he may get quite the right nuance or
      2  emphasis in English, and it is only for that. It is not
      3  going to be a continuous process.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Good,

    Part II: Introduction of Dr. Heinz Peter Longerich (7.6 to 114.17)

    Section 7.6 to 25.6

      5  (Interpreter sworn)
      6  < DR PETER LONGERICH, sworn.
      7  < Examined by MR RAMPTON, QC.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Dr Longerich, do sit down if you would
      9  rather?
    10&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Dr Longerich, are your full names Heinz Peter
    11  Longerich?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Peter Longerich, yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Rampton]: Peter Longerich, sorry. Have you written a report in two
    14  parts for the purposes of this case?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Rampton]: Are you satisfied, so far as can you be, that the
    17  statements of fact contained in those reports are true?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Rampton]: And that, so far as those reports contain expressions of
    20  opinion, those opinions are fair and accurate?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is correct.
    22  Q. [Mr Rampton]: You speak quite softly. I am a long way away at least.
    23  Can you try to speak up?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I will do my best.
    25  Q. [Mr Rampton]: Thank you very much. Please remain there to be
    26  cross-examined.
    .           P-7

      1  < Cross-examined by MR IRVING.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Good morning, Dr Longerich.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Good morning.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just to clarify one matter. Should I address you as
      5  “Professor” or a “Doctor”?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Dr Longerich.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Thank you very much. My Lord, just by way of diversion,
      8  I provided your Lordship the two documents of which you
      9  asked translations. This is nothing to do with
    10  Dr Longerich, but you asked this and I should have drawn
    11  your attention to this. There is the translation of the
    12  Party court in 1939.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I remember, the Bericht.
    14  MR IRVING:  It is the final paragraph which is in endless
    15  lawyer language. That is the official American
    16  translation of it.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I will tell you what, let us come back to
    18  this and then we will at the same time work out where to
    19  put these documents.
    20  MR IRVING:  Precisely, my Lord, and also there is a small
    21  bundle of documents which look like this beginning with
    22  some Gothic script on the front cover.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  With “ausrotten”.
    24  MR IRVING:  With “ausrotten”, yes.
    25  My Lord, just so you know where we are going
    26  today, I will advise your Lordship that I intend to deal
    .           P-8

      1  today largely, and certainly this morning, with this
      2  witness’s statement on the meaning of words, this late
      3  arrival, which I thought would be a useful way to kick off
      4  and then we will turn to this formal reports.
      5  Before we do that, I just want to address one or
      6  two matters concerning, through the witness, conduct of
      7  the case and his credentials. Professor Longerich —-
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Dr Longerich.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: — Dr Longerich, I am sorry. You work for a number of
    10  years at the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte in Munich, did
    11  you not?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This is correct, yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: You have to say yes clearly. A nodding will not do. You
    14  have to say yes otherwise —-
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: — the microphone does not hear it. How many years did
    17  you work at the Institute of History in Munich?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: From 1983 to 1989.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: 1983 to 1989. That was, what, five years then?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: About five years — a little bit more.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: About five or six years. Did you have a special subject
    22  you were working on there?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I worked on a project called condition of the files of the
    24  Party Chancellory.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: The Martin Bormann files, the files of the Party
    26  Chancellory?
    .           P-9

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes I edited the second part of this edition.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. The Party Chancellory files no longer existed and
      3  they were reconstituted, is that right?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is an attempt to reconstruct the lost files of the
      5  Party Chancellory, so I edited about 80,000 pages of these
      6  documents.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: A spectacular task. So that gives you a very good
      8  overview over the whole of the domestic life of Nazi
      9  Germany?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it gave me a good insight into the day to day
    11  operation of the bureaucracy in the Nazi State.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: And into the kind of language they used?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, of course.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: And into the hierarchy and the various rivalries and
    15  disputes?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Exactly.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was friction between the top Nazis a major element of the
    18  Third Reich?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Absolutely.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: [German] — in other words —-
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: — jealousies between the different ministries and
    23  agencies?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In-fighting and these things, yes.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would you, from your knowledge of other governments, think
    26  it was more or less than other governments around that
    .           P-10

      1  time, British government or the American government, or
      2  was it something extraordinary, the degree of —-
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I made point in the book I wrote on the Party Chancellery
      4  that I think this exceeded the normal of in-fighting you
      5  find in all governments. It is a special case here.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. When you worked in the Institute of History, who was
      7  the director at that time? Was it still Martin Broszat?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: At this time it was Martin Broszat until his death in
      9  1989.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: He had a very great reputation, did he not, and he is
    11  still greatly admired by German historians?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think so.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Were you familiar with all the collections of documents in
    14  the Institute files? Did you work in the archives at all?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Not all the files. I mean, the Institute has an enormous
    16  collection of files, but I know some of them.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Was Dr Hoff still there, Anton Hoff, the archivist?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I think he died in 1883.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: 1983?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: 1983, sorry.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just before you came?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is a very friendly atmosphere there at the archives, at
    24  the institute?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think they were friendly to me. I do not know —-
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: They are very co-operative, are they not? They do not
    .           P-11

      1  hold things back very much apart from own private
      2  collections?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot make such a general statement.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: In fact, you probably had quite a lowly position there,
      5  did you not? You were a newcomer and you were working in
      6  the Institute?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have no difficulties in actually getting access to the
      8  collection but I cannot make a general statement on that.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did you ever take the opportunity to look at what is now
    10  ED 100, the collection of my documents which is in the
    11  Institute?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I have seen some of the ED 100 files, but I cannot
    13  say that I have a complete overview.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have seen some of them yes, but at the moment I cannot
    16  recall every document I have seen in the Institute.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am just going to give you a list of names of collections
    18  of diaries. I am sorry, you have a copy of this already.
    19  I ought to give a copy to his Lordship, perhaps. (Same
    20  handed) just on the back of that there is a blue column
    21  called Hitler’s People. Do you have that if you turn it
    22  over? There is a list of names of diaries that I used
    23  when I wrote my book Hitler’s War, which are now in the
    24  archives. I have added to those since then but I just
    25  pick out a few names. Canaris: Would that be a valuable
    26  source?
    .           P-12

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: At the moment I cannot recall the Canaris diaries. I am
      2  not able to comment on every item, but I think some of
      3  them are of course important.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Some are more important and some are less important?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, I am not trying to trick you. I am just at
      7  this stage trying establish — I will give a little
      8  warning if I am going to try and trick you.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, do I get anything more from than
    10  that — is this the new edition that is coming out
    11  shortly.
    12  MR IRVING:  No, this is the second edition, my Lord, but I just
    13  wanted to comment on the fact I wondered whether he had
    14  taken the trouble to look at these very important
    15  collections of diaries that are in my collection, either
    16  for his own work or in the expert report.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can you put it as a single question rather
    18  than the whole lot?
    19  MR IRVING:  Yes. Did you use the diary of Walter Havel?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I looked at the transcripts. I think it is in England, is
    21  it not, the original? I looked at the transcripts at one
    22  stage but not for the Party Chancellery. I think I looked
    23  at the Bormann, it is more a calendar.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: The calendar?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which I have now provided to the Defendants. The Walter
    .           P-13

      1  Havel diary does contain one of these episodes July 1941,
      2  does it not, where Hitler describes the Jews as a
      3  bacillus?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot recall this particular passage, I am afraid.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: When you drew up this glossary of meanings of words,
      6  which, I must say, I find very useful indeed, and this
      7  goes purely to the conduct of the case, when did you start
      8  writing that approximately?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it was in December last year.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: In December last year?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I tried to use the Christmas holiday to do it.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: When did you complete it?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it was actually in January think.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: You completed it in January?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, January I think.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. When were you asked to do it by the instructing
    17  solicitors in this case?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think they wrote me an e-mail. I think it was in
    19  November, but I could not start immediately to work on it
    20  because I had other obligations. So I am sure I started
    21  to work on it at the end of the Christmas holidays.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: You got a letter of instruction?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think, as far as I recall this, I got an e-mail.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. So you got an e-mail sometime in November, you began
    25  writing in December and you completed it in January?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, that is right.
    .           P-14

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: Any idea when in January you completed it?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it was more through the end of January, probably
      3  on the first days of February, I cannot recall.
      4&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I can help, I think, because now it comes out of
      5  Dr Longerich’s hands, as it were. It came in its first
      6  version in German, which, since I was the person who
      7  requested it, I think in November is right, maybe even
      8  October, and was useless to me. So it had to be
      9  translated. It came back and the translation was, to say
    10  the least, unsatisfactory. Then it had it go back again,
    11  and what we now have emerged in the course of the last few
    12  days.
    13  MR IRVING:  Yes.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving I am not unsympathetic to the fact
    15  that you are having to deal with this at pretty short
    16  notice because it came to you very, very late in the day.
    17  MR IRVING:  Of course I accept Mr Rampton’s explanation but it
    18  was delivered to me on Friday evening and, if it turns out
    19  he completed it in January, I would have wanted to know
    20  what the reason for the delay was.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  If you want to say you want Dr Longerich to
    22  come back at some later stage because you want to ask some
    23  further questions, you would be pushing at an open door.
    24  MR IRVING:  I fully accept Mr Rampton’s explanation about
    25  translation difficulties.
    26  During your professional career, Dr Longerich,
    .           P-15

      1  as you say in your curriculum vitae on page 3 of your
      2  report, you have received research grants from the German
      3  Historical Institute in London, and from the Deutsche
      4  Forschungsgemeinschaft and also from Yad Vashem?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, that is true.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Are you still in debt to Yad Vashem in any way?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I started to work on the project. The project has not yet
      8  been completed. The relationship, there is no contract
      9  between us and in this sense, it is not a book contract or
    10  something like that, but I still have to complete this
    11  project we started a couple of years ago.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: I do not want to know any figures or quantum. Does this
    13  mean to say they paid you in advance for something and you
    14  are still working on it?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. They paid me for ten months actually. It enabled me
    16  to live in Israel for ten months.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: As you say in this —-
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  What will you be doing for them? What will
    19  you be researching?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We started to work on a project, a documentation about the
    21  deportation of the Jews from Germany to Minsk and Riga and
    22  I had a partner there. We started to collect the
    23  documents, but unfortunately the work has not been
    24  completed yet. It is actually a major project and has not
    25  been completed yet.
    26  MR IRVING:  The Eastern European archives have turned out to be
    .           P-16

      1  particularly fruitful, is that right?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Absolutely, yes.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it to be regarded as a great tragedy they have only
      4  recently in the last ten or 15 years become available to
      5  historians? Is that right?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot comment whether it is a tragedy. It is a fact
      7  that it has become available in the last years.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: They were not available at the time I wrote my first
      9  edition of the Hitler biography in the 1960s?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: With some exceptions. It was always possible to get some
    11  of the documents out of the archives. For instance, there
    12  is a large collection of documents in the German Central
    13  Agency for the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes. They actually
    14  managed to get a large collection from this material in
    15  the 1960s. There is also a large collection in the
    16  Bundesarchives archive and individual researchers had the
    17  chance to see not the whole archives but some of the
    18  documents.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: If I can just dwell briefly on the files in the
    20  Zentralestelle, which is presumably the ZST source?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Absolutely, yes.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: You did not identify that in your report, did you?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think there is a list of abbreviations and it should be
    24  there.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: The documents provided by the Eastern European archives to
    26  the German Zentralestelle, which is a prosecuting archive
    .           P-17

      1  — could I put it like that?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is the house archive of this agency. They have their
      3  own library and their own archival collection.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: At Ludwigsburg?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it specifically collected for the purpose of carrying
      7  out prosecutions of German and other citizens for war
      8  crimes?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is the main purpose of the whole institution and of
    10  course mainly some historical background.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: They have very valuable collections of documents there, do
    12  they not?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: They have a very good collection, yes.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is where Dr Goldhart worked, for example?
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, do you think we should move on
    16  from the archives?
    17  MR IRVING:  I just want to ask one question which makes the
    18  point clear, my Lord. Is it apparent to you that, if an
    19  archive has been collected for the purposes of
    20  prosecution, it is less likely to include defence
    21  material, if I can put it like that?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, you can use this material in different ways. I do
    23  not say that they had a complete set of documents from the
    24  Russian archives. It is certainly a selection. I did not
    25  select it. I do not know who selected it and who made the
    26  decision about this, so I should be very careful to make a
    .           P-18

      1  comment on that.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: You would always bear in mind using such archives that you
      3  are only seeing one side of the picture and not
      4  necessarily the other side?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it is difficult to say because they were
      6  interested. They did a lot of work in this Zentralestelle
      7  during the 1950s and 60s, and they actually had historical
      8  expertise there because they actually worked on the
      9  historical background. I would not say that they were
    10  only interested in this aspect of prosecution. I think
    11  they had to collect the historical expertise which was not
    12  available at this time and could not be provided by
    13  historians. So I would be cautious to make such a
    14  statement about this collection.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: I see on page 5 of your report that you are an expert, or
    16  you have written about the Wannsee conference?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I gave the annual lecture in 1998 at the Haus of the
    18  Wannsee conference and this published as a booklet.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: I do not want a lengthy answer at this time. I just want
    20  a brief overview. Is it right that opinions differ as to
    21  the importance of the Wannsee conference in the history of
    22  the Final Solution?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not think, generally speaking, the short answer,
    24  I would not say that there is so much difference about the
    25  significance of the Wannsee conference. It was basically
    26  a conference on the implementation of what is called the
    .           P-19

      1  Final Solution. I think a statement like this could be
      2  accepted by most of the historians. Of course, if you go
      3  into the interpretation of the text, you will find
      4  differences.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Opinions differ?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Opinions differ among historians.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yehuda Bauer has said one thing, Eberhard Jaeckel has said
      8  another, and so on?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would be very careful to make a general comment. One
    10  could look at the writings of Yehuda Bauer and Eberhard
    11  Jaeckel and then I am prepared to comment on it.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: My Lord, the next question is purely pre-emptive in case
    13  another matter comes up. This is still on that page,
    14  three paragraphs from the bottom. You edited something
    15  called “Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland”, a book on German
    16  unity?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. That is a collection of documents. Actually
    18  I issued this in 1990 when this was actually called, as
    19  you see here, documents about the question of German unity
    20  so that, when the book came out, the question was solved.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would you tell the court please, during the 1960s, 1970s,
    22  and 1980s, or certainly during the 1960s and 1970s, what
    23  was the official designation in west German circles of the
    24  Soviet zone or the German Democratic Republic?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The official name?
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: The official name, Sprachledlung.
    .           P-20

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not think there was a Sprachledlung but I think in
      2  the 1950s the generally preferred term was Soviet zone of
      3  Occupation. This changed, then in the 1960s, at the end
      4  of the 1960s, when it became more common to speak of the
      5  German Democratic Republic, but I am certainly not an
      6  expert on, you know, on this issue —-
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Have you ever heard of the word Middle Deutschland.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, of course.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was that also an official designation?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This was also common, yes.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: No kind of revanches sentiment was attached to that word?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would be very careful to make such a general statement.
    13  It is a complex issue.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Professor Longerich, I think I can say quite evidently
    15  that you harbour no personal dislike or animosity towards
    16  me at this stage?
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, I am sure not. Mr Irving, shall we move
    18  towards one of the substantive questions that you are
    19  going to have to ask about? Let us move on, in other
    20  words.
    21  MR IRVING:  On page 8, three paragraphs from the bottom, you
    22  lecture the German Historical Institute —-
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: — on the policy of destruction, vernichtung?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, that is the title you prefer. I cannot recall the
    26  exact English title of this lecture.
    .           P-21

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: Politik der Vernichtung. Was I present in the audience on
      2  that occasion?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I remember you, yes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did you invite questions at the end of that function?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Director of the Institute invited question, yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did I ask a question?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you asked a question.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: What did the Director of the Institute say?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Director said, “Dr Longerich does not want to answer
    10  your question”.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: He said, “Dr Longerich has informed me in advance he will
    12  not answer any questions from Mr David Irving”?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is correct, yes.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Thank you very much. Was there any specific reason for
    15  your refusal?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think there was a discussion in the Institute whether
    17  you should be actually asked to leave the building, and,
    18  well, at this stage I actually know, I actually knew that
    19  I would be called into the witness stand here, and
    20  I thought it was better not to answer this question, not
    21  to have a kind rehearsal of this.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Sorry, you did or you did not know you were
    23  going to be a witness?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I was quite aware, I think, that I would be.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Oh, you were, even back in 1988?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    .           P-22

      1  MR IRVING:  Did you state that at the time?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Pardon?
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did you state that to the Chairman at the time as the
      4  reason why?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. I did not give a reason.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: What was the question I asked? Do you remember? What
      7  document was I asking about?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think you were asking about the Schlegelberger, what you
      9  called the Schlegelberger document.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: I read out the Schlegelberger document and invited you to
    11  reconcile it with what you had said in your lecture?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this was the moment when you called me a
    13  “coward”? Isn’t this this incident?
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is right, yes.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I can recall this, yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just a brief answer this time, do you consider the
    17  Schlegelberger document to be a key document in the
    18  history of the Final Solution?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, absolutely not.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: Totally unimportant?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is unimportant, yes.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Have you mentioned it in any of your books?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not think so.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: A book, in other words, a document which says the Fuhrer
    25  has asked repeatedly for the solution of the Jewish
    26  problem postponed until the war is over, in your view, was
    .           P-23

      1  unimportant?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, that is your interpretation of the document.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am saying what it says.
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, it is third-hand evidence. It is an undated
      5  document. We do not know who actually wrote the
      6  document. It is third-hand evidence. It is about Lammers
      7  who said that somewhere in the past Hitler had said
      8  something to him about the solution, not the Final
      9  Solution, of the Jewish question. I think we will come to
    10  the document later in more detail, but I think I could not
    11  see this and I cannot see this as a major document, let us
    12  say, for the interpretation of the Holocaust.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: What would have prevented you saying this to what was
    14  obviously a friendly audience at the German Institute
    15  on —-
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  He has given his answer. You may not accept
    17  it, but he felt inhibited by the fact he had been asked to
    18  give expert evidence.
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I should mention that I do not want to find myself on
    20  Mr Irving’s website with my answer. I felt myself ten
    21  with the full comment, you know, of my behaviour and
    22  I know that Mr Irving was doing these things, and I do not
    23  want to get engaged in this kind of argument or debate, so
    24  I prefer to be silent.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: You prefer there not to be a debate, is that right?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Pardon?
    .           P-24

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: You prefer there not to be any debate on things like this?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not prefer to be involved in this kind of debate
      3  that you, you know, should be more specific, not to be
      4  with my comment. I do not want to find me on your web
      5  page which is what I said during this discussion or during
      6  this lecture. This was the second reason.

    Section 25.7 to 41.5

      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: We are now going to go to the meaning of words, Professor
      8  Longerich. Again this is perfectly straightforward
      9  questioning and answering. There are no concealed tricks
    10  involved here. Would you agree that a lot of the words
    11  that you have put in your list quite clearly show an
    12  intention, a homicidal intent, if I can put it like that?
    13  A lot of the euphemisms used by the Nazis?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think that is true.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: A lot of them are ambiguous?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: They are in the way they were used they are. They are
    17  sometimes ambiguous, yes.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is really a bit of a minefield, is it not?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think, I cannot speak about minefields. I think
    20  what an historian has to do, he has to look at each
    21  document and has to look at the context and then try to
    22  reconstruct from the context what actually the meaning of
    23  this, of this passage might be.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: But is not the danger there that you then come back using
    25  our pre-Ori methods, that you extrapolate backwards from
    26  your knowledge and assign a meaning to the word rather
    .           P-25

      1  than using the word to help you itself?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is the problem with all interpretations. You have to
      3  come back. Of course, you cannot analyse the word
      4  completely, you know, outside. You have to look at the
      5  meaning of the word, but always in a historical context.
      6  I am not a linguist, so I prefer to actually, as I said,
      7  to look at the context and to —-
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: You speak English very well, Dr Longerich, if I may say
      9  so, and I think we are all very impressed by that and I am
    10  certainly impressed by the arguments you have put forward
    11  in your glossary. Would you agree also that the same word
    12  can have different meanings when uttered by different
    13  people?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. That is exactly why I think it is important always
    15  to look at the context because, as you rightly said, the
    16  same word could have different meanings in different
    17  contexts.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: The same word can also have a different meaning depending
    19  on when it is uttered?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Exactly.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Even by the same person?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Exactly.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Or in what circumstances it is uttered?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is what I call the context.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: The only two words I am really concerned with (but we will
    26  certainly look at the other words in your glossary) are
    .           P-26

      1  the words “vernichtung” which is destruction or
      2  annihilation?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I said, I translate it as, I could accept this
      4  translation, but I also think in our context, I said
      5  probably the translation “extermination” is the better one
      6  or the more appropriate one.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, well, “extermination” is a possible one, but you will
      8  appreciate it is not always proper to go for the third or
      9  fourth meaning of a word?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know what you mean by “the third or fourth
    11  meaning”. If you mean the use of dictionaries, I think
    12  that is a rather mechanical way, you know, at looking at
    13  dictionaries. Of course, a dictionary offers various
    14  meanings and you have to probably go to the third or
    15  fourth meaning if the context suggested that, the context
    16  in which the document stands. So I do not think a
    17  translator or an historian would always in a mechanical
    18  way take the first meaning in the dictionary.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Here is a 1935 dictionary that says — I will just check
    20  it — “vernichtung” has only two meanings and that is
    21  “annihilate; destroy”?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This looks rather small, your dictionary, if I may say so,
    23  and you find other dictionaries — actually, I do not
    24  think that.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: I have any number of other dictionaries going back over
    26  the years.
    .           P-27

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We can go, if you want, to the dictionaries.
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think what the witness is saying is you can
      3  swap dictionary definitions until the cows come home and
      4  no-one is at the end of it any the wiser.
      5  MR IRVING:  The other word I want to look at is “ausrotten” and
      6  I am going to ask you very quickly, Dr Longerich, to take
      7  this little bundle of documents which is on the left-hand
      8  side there which I just gave you.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I just see this for the first time, I have to say.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is that the little bundle there?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. I have given it to you for the first time because
    13  perhaps I can ask an interim question. When you compiled
    14  your glossary, Dr Longerich, did you have before you a
    15  number of documents from a dossier on the word “ausrotten”
    16  that had been provided by the Defence solicitors?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry, a glossary of terms of what the word —-
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: When you wrote your glossary —-
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: — did you before you a number of documents provided to
    21  you by the Defence solicitors?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I cannot actually — I cannot recall this. I wrote
    23  this in Munich but, of course, it was holidays and when
    24  I did this, I did not have anything in front of me.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Very well. The first page, page 1 — I am looking at the
    26  big numbers at the bottom — the ausrottung des Prostesten
    .           P-28

      1  tismus?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Your bundle, yes.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is my little bundle, yes. This is 1900 —-
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: — published by some church body, and it is about the
      6  ausrotten des Prostesten tismus in Salzburg?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Obviously, they are not talking about liquidating all the
      9  Protestants, are they?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know, I mean, you know, in Germany in the 17th
    11  century, for instance, they had what they called religious
    12  wars and many people were actually ausgerot for religious
    13  reasons. So if you give me a chance to find out whether
    14  this is about the 30 year war.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It appears to be dated 1900. I do not know
    16  whether the Gothic script means it is older than that.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is written 1900, but is it not historical subject?
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, if I may say so, I do not think we
    19  will get very much help out of that.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I see. It is about the church history of the 18th
    21  century.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am looking just at the use of the word, my Lord, and
    23  suggesting strongly that at this time they were not — it
    24  is in close parallel to the phrase the ausrotten des
    25  Judentums?
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. I follow the point you are making, but
    .           P-29

      1  can one not put it this way? Do you accept or not, I do
      2  not know, Dr Longerich, that you can use “ausrotten” to
      3  mean “rooting out”. It depends on the context?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am not sure about “rooting out”. I think the meaning
      5  here of “ausrotten” is to wipe out, to get completely rid
      6  of.
      7  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: All right, wipe out?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This applies not to — I do not know, I mean, I am not
      9  familiar with the — I mean, if you give me the time
    10  I will try to do my best to get familiar with the history
    11  of the churches, of a church in Salzburg in the 19th
    12  century, I am not sure whether they kill anybody or so.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us forget about —-
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think the term “ausrotten” applies to an organization
    15  which probably Protestentismus is here. It does not
    16  necessarily mean that everybody who belongs to this
    17  organization is going to be killed. You can also speak,
    18  I mean, today about “ausrotten” of criminality, for
    19  instance, if you mean, you know, that you get rid of this
    20  problem. But I think what is more important is that, you
    21  know, it is more tricky when it comes actually to the
    22  ausrotten of human beings, then I think the meaning is
    23  quite clear, as far I see it.
    24  MR IRVING:  Can we now go to page 2 which is a 1935 Nazi
    25  reference to it, one which you have not adduced in your
    26  glossary. This is a speech by Rudolf Hess on May 14th. My
    .           P-30

      1  Lord, the translation is the final paragraph on that page.
      2  “National socialist legislation”, the actual phrase which
      3  I am going to look at is “National Sozialische Deutschland
      4  des Judentums etwa richtiglos ausgerottet wurde”.
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Where is that?
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: So there is a specific reference here to —-
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Fourth line?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  MR IRVING:  — the fourth line of the German. Here you
    10  have: “National Socialist legislation has now introduced
    11  corrective measures against this overalienisation. I say
    12  ‘corrective’ because the proof that the Jews are not
    13  being ruthlessly ausgerottet”, which I say is rooted out,
    14  “in National Socialist Germany, is that in Prussian alone
    15  33,500 Jews were working in the manufacturing industry,
    16  89,800 are engaged…”, and so on. So he is talking
    17  clearly there about rooting out, is he not, not about
    18  liquidating because this is 1935, no one is killing Jews
    19  at that time, are they?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I take your word that this is the authentical texts.
    21  I have not seen this document myself. I do not know the
    22  context. He is saying that the Judentum, which is
    23  probably the Jewry in this context, is not ausgerottet in
    24  1935, which is perfectly true, I think. It is a
    25  preHolocaust document, I cannot see —-
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is a Nuremberg document, is it not, if you look —-
    .           P-31

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  But the point that is being put,
      2  Dr Longerich, is that “ausrotten” is being used there in a
      3  context which has nothing to do with extermination. That
      4  is the only point that is being put.
      5  MR IRVING:  By a Nazi, in connection with the Jews?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, so it is not the Jews, it is the Judentum, the term
      7  “Judentum” means here, let us say —-
      8  MR IRVING:  The Jewish community?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — the Jewish community, the alleged social position of
    10  the Jews in Germany, their property, their wealth and so
    11  on. So I think that, and so far the term means not only
    12  human beings, a collective, but it also means more than
    13  that, and in this sense the Judentum was not ausgerottet,
    14  so that is….
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: The next page, Dr Longerich, on page 3 is the English
    16  translation, but you can look at the German, if you wish,
    17  which is on page 5. This is on item that you yourself
    18  have adduced. This is Adolf Hitler’s use of the word
    19  “ausrottung” in 1936. He is not talking about Jews, but
    20  it is the same word. He is talking about the need for an
    21  economic four-year plan. On page 3 he puts in this
    22  sentence: “A victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not
    23  lead to a Versaille Treaty, but to a final destruction,
    24  indeed the ausrottung of the German nation”, “volk”. Is
    25  Hitler saying that if the Bolsheviks succeed in war
    26  against Germany, they are going to exterminate the German
    .           P-32

      1  nation?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am sorry. Normally, I have more time to interpret
      3  documents than this one or two minutes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: This is one referred that you yourself have referred to
      5  though, is it not, in your glossary?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So I just have to look at it because I quoted it myself in
      7  my own document, he goes then on and says after you stop
      8  here, “And if the ausrottung”, he tries to explain what
      9  “ausrotten” means. In English, it says here that:
    10  “After a Bolshevik victory, the European states,
    11  including Germany, would experience the most terrible
    12  catastrophe for its people since humanity was affected by
    13  the extinguishing of the states of classical antiquity”.
    14  So I think if you say, “Well, this will be worse than the
    15  end of the Roman Empire”, this statement involves clearly
    16  that this will be done in a very, that this ausrottung
    17  will be done in very cruel manner, it will cost a lot of
    18  lives. I think this is implicit here in Hitler’s words.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: But “ausrottung” here cannot be equated to the word
    20  “extermination”, can it? He is not saying, “If the
    21  Bolsheviks win in a future war, it will lead to the
    22  extermination of the German people”, he is saying, “It
    23  will lead to the emasculation of the German people or the
    24  end of them as an important power in Europe”?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would not agree because when he makes this reference,
    26  “It is more terrible than the end of the Roman Empire,
    .           P-33

      1  the states”, he says.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Then it is quite something. I mean, this is not just, you
      4  the Versaille Treaty, as he said. It is not just the
      5  collapse of the German Empire; it is much, much more.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Hunger, starvation and pestilence.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In a way, I am trying not to speculate what Hitler thought
      8  in 1936 what is actually more terrible than the end of the
      9  Roman Empire. I think it is quite reasonable to assume
    10  that this kind of “ausrottung” would, as the end of the
    11  Roman Empire did, involve the killing of many, many
    12  people.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can you just for my benefit translate
    14  quickly, if you would not mind, the immediately following
    15  words, where he talks about what a catastrophe that would
    16  be?
    17  MR IRVING:  “The extent of such a catastrophe cannot be really
    18  imagined”.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Next sentence?
    20  MR IRVING:  “How the densely populated west of Europe,
    21  including German, would survive after a Bolshevik
    22  collapse, it would experience probably the most awful
    23  national catastrophe since the extinction of the antique
    24  states — since the” — it is a complicated sentence.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is a complicated sentence, but,
    26  Dr Longerich, it is all pretty apocalyptic stuff, is it
    .           P-34

      1  not, that he is —-
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Exactly, and I think I translate it a little bit
      3  more, I said, “The most terrible catastrophe”,
      4  “grauenhaft”, I think is the word “terror” in it, and so
      5  it is —-
      6  MR IRVING:  “Awesome”?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it is more than that.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can I just ask you briefly about this document. This is,
      9  of course, a document dictated by Adolf Hitler to his
    10  private secretary, is it not? It is not a speech. He is
    11  choosing his words carefully.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I do not know whether he dictated this to his
    13  private secretary. It is a document he provided for
    14  Goring. It is an instruction for Goring to carry on
    15  with —-
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Well, I know because Christa Schroeder told me he dictated
    17  it to her.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am trying to explain this to the court. It is the
    19  document which actually says that Germany should be able
    20  within four years to fight the next war. So it is an
    21  instruction for Goring. But I think if we go — no,
    22  I cannot read more than that in this document.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We have your answer about that document
    24  anyway.
    25  MR IRVING:  Yes. Page 6, again we are still in 1936, but
    26  collection of documents published obviously by anti-Nazis
    .           P-35

      1  now about the expropriation, the humiliation and the
      2  vernichtung of the Jews in Germany —-
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: — since the government of Adolf Hitler. This time it is
      5  the word “vernichtung”.
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: 1936, of course, the Jews as such had not been vernichtet,
      8  had they, and yet this is a history of the destruction of
      9  the Jews?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have to make here a general observation. I just have to
    11  trust that this is all, you know, this is original.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: I have the original documents here.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: And I always prefer to look at documents in the
    14  appropriate context, but, of course, it is possible that
    15  somebody in ’36, and I think these are the Jews who
    16  emigrated from Germany, would use the term “vernichtung”
    17  in a sense that, you know, “vernichtung” there, you would
    18  use it in the sense that he would not refer to the actual
    19  killing of the Jews because the actual killing, as we
    20  know, did happen later on. So I do not think how this
    21  document can help us to interpret or to put the Nazi
    22  terminology into the historical context.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, I agree. It is a low grade document. It is outside
    24  Germany but there is the phrase “vernichtung der Juden” in
    25  1936.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, and who actually published it, do you know that?
    .           P-36

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us move on. It is a low grade document.
      2  MR IRVING:  The next one is high grade. It is page 7, Walter
      3  Hewel?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Walter Hewel was a diplomat on Hitler’s staff. He was the
      6  liaison officer, von Ribbentrop, was he not?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: H-E-W-E-L?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: And he wrote a memorandum on the conference between Hitler
    11  and this Czech State president Hacha — H-A-C-H-A — on
    12  March 15th 1939, which is in the official published
    13  volumes, is it not, ADAP?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, again I cannot recall the document. I just trust
    15  that this is correct what you are saying. I do not have
    16  the ADAP with me and I do not have —-
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Well, if this is a fig quotation, no doubt, I will be shot
    18  down in due course by the Defence. The phrase in German
    19  is [German – document not provided] which I will translate
    20  as “If in the a autumn of the last year, 1938,
    21  Czechoslovakia had not given in, then the Czech volk would
    22  have been ausgerottet?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: What is Hitler saying there?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well…
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it important, do you think, this use of the word here?
    .           P-37

      1&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Do let him answer. One question at a time.
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know about Hitler’s plan, you know, it is a
      3  hypothetical question. It is assuming that the Munich
      4  agreement would not have happened, and so I do not know
      5  what was going on in Hitler’s mind about the future of the
      6  Czechoslovak people, you know, in the case that would have
      7  been in 1938. So I cannot answer this question outside
      8  this.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is Hitler telling the Czech State President, “Good thing
    10  you signed on the dotted line at midnight or 2 a.m.
    11  otherwise I would have liquidated your entire people”, is
    12  that what he was saying?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Forgive me, I do not know to which text you are referring
    14  now.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is the context there. If the word “ausgerottet” used
    16  in Hitler’s mouth talking about —-
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, we have another document from the conversation
    18  between Hacha and Hitler where actually Hacha himself
    19  says, “Well, actually our people felt that — our people
    20  are quite relieved because they feel now because they were
    21  on the assumption that they were going to be vernichtet in
    22  the case that, you know, the Munich agreement would not
    23  have kept —-
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: How many Czechs were there? About 10, 15, 20 million?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Are we talking about the Czech Republic?
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    .           P-38

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think 7, 8 million or something like that, yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: So Hitler is at this time, is this what you are saying,
      3  “I would have exterminated 7 million Czechs if you had
      4  not signed”?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: First of all, I do not know whether actually, but this is
      6  verbatim document, whether it implies some kind comment on
      7  Hitler, and then I am not sure — it is a hypothetical
      8  question because what happened is that Czechoslovakia and
      9  the Western powers gave in and the Czechoslovak people
    10  were actually saved from a major catastrophe, may I say it
    11  like this, and I do not know what was going on in Hitler’s
    12  mind in ’38 about the future of the Czech people in case
    13  that, you know, he had not signed the Munich agreement.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, but —-
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: But —-
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: — you do get the drift of my question, that here is that
    17  word “ausgerottet” in connection with a volk and Hitler
    18  saying, “I would have done it to them if you had not
    19  signed”?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: You know, it is a hypothetical. It is also, you know,
    21  Hitler sometimes uses, you know, he made threats and he
    22  threatened people and he made completely, you know,
    23  remarks which shows that he was out of control. So, you
    24  know, I do not know the context whether this is a kind of
    25  emotional reaction or anything like this.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  What you are saying, it all depends on the
    .           P-39

      1  context?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is absolutely true.
      3  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: And is it also right that sometimes politicians, or Hitler
      4  anyway, would use a term like “ausrottung” meaning “wipe
      5  out”?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      7  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Which is not to be taken literally?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, that is what I would say.
      9  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: That is why I am not really —-
    10  MR IRVING:  That is precisely the point I was going to ask.
    11  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is all context, Mr Irving, is it not,
    12  really?
    13  MR IRVING:  The final question on that quotation, therefore,
    14  is, is it not likely that Adolf Hitler was just saying,
    15  “If you had not signed, I would have ended Czechoslovakia
    16  as a power”?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think that is much, much stronger than that,
    18  “ausrottung”, and again from the conversation with Hacha
    19  I know that Hacha was under the impression that the
    20  Czechoslovakian people would be vernichtet.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: What did he mean by “vernichtet”? I know you used this in
    22  your glossary.
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think that people had —-
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Gas chambers for the entire Czechs?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, but I think that people had felt, that people in
    26  Czechoslovakia in ’38, felt that probably their existence,
    .           P-40

      1  probably their life was under danger. I think that is
      2  quite fair to say.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: The entire Czech nation or just a few left wingers
      4  and —-
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That people felt that their life was in danger.

    Section 41.6 to 57.5

      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Move on to the next passage, please? This is one you have
      7  quoted, is it not? This we do not have to argue whether
      8  he has been correctly reported or not because this is from
      9  a transcript of a speech that Hitler made to the Nazi
    10  editors on November 10th 1938.
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. This is actually the day, the day after
    12  Kristallnacht, so the day, during the night approximately
    13  I think 90 or more people were killed, so this gives you a
    14  kind of background. Now, the term here Hitler is
    15  hesitating in this speech. He says, “Well” — may be
    16  I should go, I have to go to my —-
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is quite a complicated sentence. Can you
    18  translate it?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry, I have to go to my own text and I have to compare
    20  the two text. I am sorry about this.
    21  MR IRVING:  While you are doing that, can I set it in context?
    22  Is Hitler saying —-
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am sorry, I cannot do this and listening to you. I have
    24  to find my —-
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Just pause a moment, Mr Irving.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have to find my own text. I know that it is somewhere.
    .           P-41

      1&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  On page 21, in paragraph 6.12.
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, thank you very much, Mr Rampton.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Yes, and then the sentence — you did not give the,
      4  you stop in the middle of the sentence and you did not
      5  include the last five words, and the last five words in
      6  German are “aber man brauch Sie leider”, “but we need
      7  them, unfortunately”. So the context is that he is going
      8  to say, “Well, actually, you know, I could when I look at
      9  the intellectual classes in Germany, you know, one could,
    10  I could come to the conclusion”, and then he is hesitating
    11  and saying “ausrottung”, and then he goes on and says,
    12  “Well, unfortunately, we need them”. So he is saying
    13  this idea to ausrottung, to kill the intellectual classes
    14  is completely illusionary, and so he has to come back and
    15  says, “I cannot do it”.
    16  You see, I have difficulties with this kind of,
    17  you know —-
    18  MR IRVING:  My Lord, can I just translate the sentence for you?
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, do not interrupt.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — I have difficulties actually to with these kind of
    21  documents which come in the last minute and leave out an
    22  important passage of the sentence, of the German
    23  sentence. Please give me sometime always to find the
    24  original if I have not got it in my report, I actually
    25  would like to insist that the original is here because
    26  I think this is not the way one can do it.
    .           P-42

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Dr Longerich, I have some sympathy with that,
      2  particularly as you have pointed out that there is quite
      3  an important bit of that same sentence omitted in
      4  Mr Irving’s piece of paper.
      5  MR IRVING:  Can I just read out the translation of that
      6  sentence to you, my Lord?
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, because it has just been read out.
      8  MR IRVING:  I do not think he has actually read out the
      9  translation.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Well, I have read it; I thought he did.
    11  THE WITNESS: [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I can do it if you want to.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Do if you want to, but include the last words
    13  because they make quite a big difference, it seems to me.
    14  MR IRVING:  Not in my submission, but there we are. “I look at
    15  the intellectual classes amongst us, then, unfortunately,
    16  well, you need them, otherwise, I do not know, you could
    17  ausrotten them or something like that, but unfortunately
    18  you need them”. I do not understand why you say I left
    19  out the words “man brauch Sie an”?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Because you stop the sentence here with the colon and, in
    21  fact, the sentence is not stopping. You give as reference
    22  [German – document not provided] and this is not a
    23  complete, a complete sentence. You stopped in the middle
    24  of the sentence and left out the last five words. You
    25  should have used — I mean —-
    26  MR IRVING:  Which are the words that I left out?
    .           P-43

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If your interpretation differs, you should have used, you
      2  know, the normal, you know, these little dots one uses if
      3  one does not insert the complete sentence.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, which are the words you say that I left out?
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  He has said many times, “aber man brauch Sie
      6  leider”?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: “So you cannot kill them because we need them”.
      8  MR IRVING:  Are those words not on the fourth line of my
      9  quotation on page 7? “Man brauch Sie”?
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, they are, but they come in twice
    11  and don’t let us spend too long on this.
    12  MR IRVING:  Precisely, my Lord, but the whole point I am
    13  looking at there is this is Adolf Hitler in 1938 when
    14  nobody is liquidating anybody —-
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Except the 90 people who just died the night before, and
    16  this is the little exception one has. I mean, you have to
    17  realize the context is that this is the most brutal
    18  killing which happened in Germany since, I think, the
    19  Middle Ages. There are more than 90 people, I would say
    20  several hundred people possibly were killed the last
    21  night, and in this atmosphere Hitler is giving a press
    22  conference and speaks about the ausrottung of
    23  intellectuals. I think one cannot, you know, one has to
    24  look again at the historical context because this is, you
    25  know, an atmosphere which is dominated by brutality and a
    26  kind of absence of public order and law. I think, you
    .           P-44

      1  know, this has to be included here.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Your answer invites two questions, unfortunately. The
      3  first question is was Adolf Hitler, to your knowledge, at
      4  the time you made this speech on the afternoon of November
      5  10th aware that 90 people had been killed during the
      6  night?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know. I do not know that.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: The second question is, are you, therefore, suggesting
      9  that the verb “ausrotten” is not a mass extermination but
    10  a midget extermination, if I can put it like that, of just
    11  90 people? Is that the scale you put “ausrotten”?
    12  I thought that “ausrotten” meant extermination on a huge
    13  scale.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I am just saying that when he made this, he made the
    15  statement and the statement says, “I can’t kill them, I
    16  would like to but I can’t kill them”, but one has to look
    17  at the atmosphere of this very day.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It always comes back to context?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is what I am trying to say.
    20  MR IRVING:  Precisely, but a perfectly reasonable
    21  interpretation of the word “ausrotten” there would be get
    22  rid of them, abolish the intellectual classes, abolish
    23  the —-
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The translation here —-
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: — upper classes?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry. I think the translation, the proper translation,
    .           P-45

      1  is to kill them all, but, unfortunately, I cannot do it.
      2  I have said this now three times and I think it is– I do
      3  not want to —-
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Adolf Hitler was telling the editors of the leading
      5  newspapers in Germany, “I just wish I could kill all the
      6  intellectuals” in 1938?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, “But I cannot do it, unfortunately”. That is what it
      8  says in the text here.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. This is the image you now have of that kind of thing
    10  55 years later, but how would the editors have picked up
    11  at the time if that was the meaning of the word
    12  “ausrotten” in 1938? You appreciate that the meaning of
    13  words change over the years and when Adolf Hitler uses the
    14  word in 1938, the editors sit there thinking, “Yes, he
    15  wants to abolish them, he wants to get rid of the upper
    16  classes”, just the same as Tony Blair gets rid of the
    17  House of Lords?
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, not the upper classes. I do not think
    19  that is right.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The intellectual classes — well, then he could have said,
    21  “Well, actually I want” — I said this here in my report,
    22  I said if he were just referring to a kind of, you know,
    23  social, you know, reform or reform of the educational
    24  system or some leveling of class, something like that, he
    25  could have said so. He could have said, “Actually I want,
    26  you know, to be more, Hitler jungen in the universities.
    .           P-46

      1  I do not want to get — I would like to get rid of the
      2  sons of academics, well-established people”, but he says
      3  he used the term “ausrotten”. I cannot help this– it is
      4  here and —-
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just one more question on that. Would it not be a
      6  parallel if Tony Blair said he wanted to rid of the House
      7  of Lords, wipe out the House of Lords, would he not say
      8  “ausrotten” there and would that mean that he wanted to
      9  stand them against a wall?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is a hypothetical question. How can I answer this
    11  question?
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: But it is that kind of word and that kind of situation, is
    13  it not? “This is a body which is bothering me. I wish
    14  I could, “Out, out, damn spot”?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If you ask me as an historian, I should make a historical
    16  comparison, then you have to include in this picture that
    17  Tony Blair just killed 91 Conservative Member of
    18  Parliament. So this would give you a kind of — and then
    19  if he would use at the same time, at the next day the term
    20  “ausrotten”, I would look at it and say, “Well, a
    21  dangerous man”.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, let us move on because really this
    23  is not, I think, a very helpful exercise.
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is difficult for me to make such comparisons.
    25  MR IRVING:  I did not drag in the 90 deaths and I am going to
    26  have to ask a question. Did Hitler order the Jews killed
    .           P-47

      1  that night?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Did Hitler?
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Or did Hitler order the Jews killed in
      4  Reichskristallnacht?
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I do not think that bears on the issue we are
      6  considering at the moment.
      7  MR IRVING:  It bears on the questions of intent behind the word
      8  “ausrottung”?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think that Hitler played a centre role in the
    10  launching of the Kristallnacht.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: We know your views on that.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Pardon?
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can you now go to document No. 8, please?
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You did ask the question, Mr Irving.
    15  MR IRVING:  He then answered a totally different question
    16  whether Hitler played a central role or not.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us move on if we have to do this
    18  exercise, let us do it quite quickly.
    19  MR IRVING:  Page 8.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I could not complete my answer, sorry.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: This is a 1941 document, a book again in German [German –
    22  document not provided]
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was Hungary exterminating the ethnic minorities?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, you see, give me the chance, you know, to read the
    26  book. Maybe the book, it might be a pamphlet from
    .           P-48

      1  somebody who said, well, actually the Hungarians are
      2  killing, literally killing, the minorities. I do not know
      3  the order. I do not know whether Paclisanu is a reliable
      4  author. I have not seen the book and I do not know
      5  whether the book says — I do not know whether you have
      6  read the book — if the book says that the Hungarians are
      7  killing the minorities. There might be somebody —-
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think that is a fair answer. Without that
      9  further information, I do not think that particular cover
    10  page really helps.
    11  MR IRVING:  Well, if this expert witness can answer the
    12  question whether Hungary was killing ethnic minorities,
    13  that would clarify what the title meant.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not — that is in 41. I am a bit hesitating here
    15  because, well, they actually were quite rude with
    16  the minorities after that, but I cannot comment on that
    17  without actually looking at the content of the book.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, at this stage in our discussion, therefore,
    19  we can agree that the word “ausrotten” can mean just about
    20  whatever you want it to mean?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, clearly not. You have to look at the context and the
    22  context will help you to establish a meaning of the word,
    23  I think.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: If you turn the page now to page 9, this is my summary of
    25  a telegram which I found in the Roosevelt library.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I would suggest that I should comment not on your
    .           P-49

      1  summary but on the original, given the experience we have
      2  before.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is one way out of answering the question, is it not?
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, Mr Irving, that is not fair. Do you
      5  refer to this yourself, Dr Longerich?
      6  MR IRVING:  No, he does not.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. Sorry for interrupting you.
      8  MR IRVING:  Are you suggesting, therefore, that I have
      9  deliberately copied faked quotations from a telegram from
    10  my own files?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, but I have the experience and that quite upset me that
    12  you left out here half a sentence of a sentence without
    13  actually —-
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which repeated the precisely the same four words that were
    15  earlier in the sentence, right?
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We have left that document. Let us look at
    17  this one.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am just saying, I am not just — I am not happy, you
    19  know, just to comment on your summary of a report I have
    20  not seen in the original. I think it would be
    21  inappropriate for me, as an historian, to comment on
    22  that. I should see the original and I should not draw
    23  conclusions from your summary.
    24  MR IRVING:  Shall we try, unless his Lordship says that
    25  I should not ask the question about this?
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  This appears to be — is it Swiss?
    .           P-50

      1  MR IRVING:  It is an American diplomatic despatch in the
      2  Roosevelt Library.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Commenting on whether a word in a report
      4  which we do not have has been correctly translated.
      5  MR IRVING:  It appears that this report may be based on
      6  mistranslation of the words ausrottung and entjudung. Is
      7  it possible therefore to mistranslate the words ausrottung
      8  and entjudung?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have to fully digest, just one second.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is a bit of problem if you always have to produce the
    11  whole document or the original report, you do appreciate
    12  that.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So your question is what, sorry?
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: The question, if you are prepared to answer a question on
    15  this summary, or extracts from an American diplomatic
    16  despatch, is it possible to mistranslate the word
    17  ausrottung and entjudung in a way which might go one way
    18  or might go the other. Even in 1944, in other words,
    19  there is no firm and fixed definition or translation?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, somebody speculates about the issue whether the
    21  words ausrottung and entjudung were mistranslated.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: And how shall I comment on that?
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I find this frankly an absurd document
    25  because the report appears to refer to the extermination
    26  of European Jews at camps in Silesia?
    .           P-51

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: It refers to a cyanide process and to German executions
      3  and then Mr Harrison, whoever he may be, thinks that
      4  ausrottung has been mistranslated. It is an absolute
      5  nonsense.
      6  MR IRVING:  I am only relying on the mistranslation, the fact
      7  that it is possible to mistranslate the word ausrottung.
      8  That is all I can do with that particular document.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If you want me to comment on it, I should be able to know
    10  more about the facts than Mr Harrison did, shall I put it
    11  this way? At the moment I do not know what I should do
    12  with this document.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: The final sentence, of course, “I spoke yesterday with one
    14  of the men who planted the report with the newspaper
    15  agencies”. Did this kind of thing go on during the war
    16  years, that documents were planted with newspaper
    17  agencies?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: During the war documents were planted with newspaper
    19  agencies, yes. That happened.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: You always want to see original documents. If you turn
    21  the page to the next one which is unnumbered, is this the
    22  kind of document you are familiar with from Himmler’s
    23  files? You may actually know it, in fact, because it is
    24  addressed to your subject Martin Bormann, is it not?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I became quite familiar with him, that is true.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is dated 21st February or thereabouts, 1944?
    .           P-52

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. It says that the misstande, what is misstande in
      2  English?
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Bad conditions?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes something like that.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Naff, as they say in America.
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Can I ask the interpreter something?
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, of course.
      8  THE INTERPRETER:  Things which are not right, things which need
      9  putting right.
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So he is not referring to people. He is referring to
    11  things which are not going right. He is saying that these
    12  misstande, these things which are not right, will be
    13  ausgerotet, so of course the term ausgerotet, you could
    14  give me thousands of documents which would show me that
    15  misstande ausgerotet were meant, ausgerotet, everything,
    16  every possible context.
    17  MR IRVING:  It has been dictated by Himmler, has it not?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Himmler’s use of the word ausrottung in a non homicidal
    20  sense, that is all I am relying on this document for.
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: You can prove from this document so far that Himmler used
    22  the term ausrottung once, not referring to human beings
    23  but to misstande in a non-homicidal sense, yes, that is
    24  true.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, all I am trying to establish here in the
    26  beginning of the 21st century is that back in the 1940s
    .           P-53

      1  the word ausrottung did not have necessarily the meaning
      2  that we now give it, with our knowledge of all the
      3  atrocities that happened. Do you accept that?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I myself in my report made a little reservation here and
      5  I said, well, not every time the word ausrotten means
      6  killing, but if it refers to people, or to a group of
      7  people, in the historical context of the Nazi period,
      8  I did not find a single document in which one would not
      9  translate the word ausrotten to kill in large numbers or
    10  to kill all as far as possible. This is my provisional
    11  conclusion.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Wipe out?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think wipe out is a possible translation. Exterminate
    14  is another one. Kill off, or extirpate, which is the one
    15  I preferred. But I think for the German living at this
    16  time the term from a leading Nazi or national socialist,
    17  the term ausrotten applying to people means quite clearly,
    18  I mean for the average German at this time means quite
    19  clearly to kill in large numbers. It is a very cruel
    20  expression and of course there is a lot of violence in
    21  this word.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Can you not put yourself back in the mind set of the
    23  1940 when the word possibly had a different meaning?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think particularly at this time, because at this time
    25  people lived in the time when people were killed on a
    26  massive basis, they were quite aware that the use of this
    .           P-54

      1  vocabulary by leading Nazis referred to mass killing. Why
      2  should I speculate in a general way? One could look at
      3  the individual documents and establish the meaning. It
      4  does not help us, I think, to look at documents which are
      5  outside the context.
      6  MR IRVING:  You have to have some kind of guiding star to look
      7  at, do we not?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is fine.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Go to the next page, page 11, which is a 1944 military
    10  dictionary. We are getting pretty close to the actual
    11  meaning of 1944 if we accept that the dictionary was
    12  probably printed a year or two earlier. No, it was
    13  actually printed in 1944. That is what page 10 shows us.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Military dictionary?
    15  MR IRVING:  Military dictionary, yes.
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which is a dictionary produced just for the use of the
    18  armies. It contains all sorts of things, too. There you
    19  have the meaning of the word ausrotten given in the
    20  following sequence: Wipe out, crush, annihilate. Wipe
    21  out is probably right.
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I again am not a linguist but, if I look at the other
    23  terms on this page, it is obviously that this is a
    24  dictionary for military terminology, so it refers I think
    25  particularly to the military sphere. But again I am quite
    26  convinced that you can present more dictionaries which
    .           P-55

      1  actually do not have the meaning of extermination.
      2  I could probably show you dictionaries which have the
      3  meaning of —-
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am really finding this all pretty
      5  unilluminating really, because in the end we have to look
      6  at the documents which actually do relate allegedly to
      7  extermination, and decide whether ausrotten in that
      8  context means extirpate.
      9  MR IRVING:  My Lord, it is an uphill task because we are
    10  looking backwards, down through the telescope so to speak,
    11  to the events of the 1940s and trying to work out what a
    12  word meant when in common usage at the time, when we find
    13  the common meaning of the word was quite different from
    14  the way every German, and every Englishman, now
    15  understands what you mean by it, because we know of the
    16  atrocities that happened.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  One has to make allowance for that fact, I
    18  accept.
    19  MR IRVING:  The reason I am going through this, if I can put it
    20  like this, is that, if we are looking at what Adolf Hitler
    21  means when he says certain things or issued certain
    22  orders, we really need to know what the word meant in
    23  common usage at that time, and not what it now means at
    24  the beginning of the 21st century.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We really have spent a very long time on
    26  ausrotten and I think we have the full rage of
    .           P-56

      1  possibilities in mind.
      2  MR IRVING:  That is the bad news. The good news is frankly
      3  that I am going to accept without demur that most of the
      4  meanings he applies to the other words, like Umsiedlung
      5  and the rest.

    Section 57.6 to 69.17

      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I have to say here that I last night found three
      7  mistakes in the translation. I think I should correct
      8  them.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think you probably should.
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I know that I am responsible in the end — I am not
    11  blaming the translator, I am responsible and for the
    12  text. It is in point 5.9 and it is on page 14. I think
    13  the term Juda must die should be translated not with
    14  Judaism must die, but simply with Juda must die, because
    15  it refers I think basically to the tribe of Juda and
    16  I think one cannot and should not translate the tribe of
    17  Juda with Judaism which has another meaning. The same
    18  would apply to 6.14. There is the same mistranslation.
    19  I apologise for that. In 6.7 actually the word nicht is
    20  not translated, so in 6.7 it says in the indented
    21  paragraph in the second sentence what does die and it
    22  should say what does not die. So this is unfortunately a
    23  mistake. I am sorry about that.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Do not worry, that is fine. Shall we move
    25  elsewhere?
    26  MR IRVING:  We are now dealing with your glossary. I must say
    .           P-57

      1  I take exception to the title of your glossary because
      2  this assumes a priori that there was such a programme to
      3  exterminate or murder. Really what we are looking at is a
      4  glossary of terms used by the Nazis in their programme of
      5  persecution of the Jews, is it not? It includes murder in
      6  some cases but it is all sorts of other things, is it not?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In connection with a murder.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. You say in your paragraph 1.1 of your introduction,
      9  that the Nazi regime avoided speaking of the murder of
    10  European Jews by name, in other words they did not like
    11  saying it.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Do you not yourself say in your report, I think it is
    14  round about paragraph 4.3.1 that the Einsatzgruppen
    15  reported quite frequently in most glowing terms of the
    16  killings they were carrying out and they made no bones
    17  about what they were doing?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I said here generally, so the Einsatzgruppen, of course
    19  there are exceptions and the most known exceptions are the
    20  Einsatzgruppen reports. If you look into the history of
    21  the Holocaust, this is rather a rare example, I think.
    22  Historians of the events in Russia are quite happy to have
    23  this, if I may use this term here, this source, but
    24  generally you are looking at the whole system. They were
    25  quite reluctant to use openly this expression.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
    .           P-58

      1  MR IRVING:  Except that it is rather odd that you should argue
      2  on the one hand there is this colossal use of euphemisms
      3  everywhere, but on the other hand everyone is talking
      4  about killing.
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, not everybody is talking about killing. I made it
      6  quite specific. We have some exceptions and the
      7  Einsatzgruppen reports are the best example for that. Of
      8  course there are more exceptions, but generally, and this
      9  explains why we do not have more documents, we should
    10  imagine that an operation like this, the killing of about
    11  6 million people, in the 20th century we should have more
    12  documents on that, because it was an operation on an
    13  unprecedented scale. But to explain that actually the
    14  number of documents is in a way limited, I am saying here
    15  generally they prefer not to speak about the killing.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So in newspapers, for instance, and things like that they
    18  did not announce on the first page that we are killing the
    19  Jews today, 5,000 people got killed in Auschwitz. They
    20  tried to keep it as a state secret. Even in the
    21  bureaucracy you find the kind of hesitation. It was
    22  actually forbidden to use this terminology within the
    23  bureaucracy. Of course there were exceptions.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: You refer to the speech by Heinrich Himmler at Posnan on
    25  October 4th 1943 in your paragraph 1.2.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  43 or 44?
    .           P-59

      1  MR IRVING:  It was actually 1943. I think that is mistake in
      2  the report, my Lord.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: 1943, yes. That is a mistake.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is quite an ordinary speech, is it not?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Why is it extraordinary in the context of what we are
      7  talking about this morning?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, he is saying: I also want to talk to you quite
      9  frankly about a very grave matter, we can talk about it
    10  quite openly among ourselves, but nevertheless we can
    11  never speak of it publicly, just to underline my point,
    12  just as we did not hesitate on 13th June 1934 to do our
    13  duty as we were bidden and to stand comrades who had
    14  lapsed up against the wall and shoot them, so we have
    15  never spoken about it and will never speak of it. It was
    16  a natural assumption, an assumption which, thank God, is
    17  inherent in us, that we never discussed it among ourselves
    18  and never spoke of it. That is I think a remarkable
    19  passage. Then he is going on: “Most of you will know what
    20  it means to have 500 of a thousand corpses lying together
    21  before you. We have been through this and, disregarding
    22  exceptional cases of human weakness, to have remained
    23  decent. That is what has made has made us tough. This is
    24  a glorious page in our history, once that has never been
    25  written and can never be written”. Of course, the last
    26  sentence is a kind of challenge for historians, I think.
    .           P-60

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: He is talking about the shootings on the Eastern Front, is
      2  he not? He is not talking about the western European
      3  Jews. He is talking about here about the killings, the
      4  machine gunnings into pits and so on?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am always quite cautious. He is talking about the
      6  killing of hundreds of people. I cannot see whether he
      7  refers to shootings, or whether he refers to extermination
      8  camps, or to labour camps, I have no idea.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: As you say yourself, he says, “most of you will know what
    10  it means to have 500 or a thousand corpses lying together
    11  before you”. He is referring to the shootings on the
    12  Eastern Front is he not?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Not necessarily. He could also refer to extermination
    14  camps.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  This is a speech to SS officers, is it not,
    16  not to the generals or anything of that kind?
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: To the SS Gruppenfuhrer.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: To the SS GruppenFuhrer, that is true.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: He had this speech recorded on disk, did he not?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is true.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did that indicate that he was particularly concerned about
    22  secrecy?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think the procedure was, it was not uncommon that he had
    24  his speeches on disk. He would give the disks to his
    25  personal adjutant and Brandt, and Brandt would then write
    26  a good manuscript, what actually improved the wording and
    .           P-61

      1  so on. So I think the disk was primarily meant to be used
      2  for internal purposes, just to record exactly the words of
      3  the speech and to take it as a basis for an extended and
      4  improved minute. I think it was not intended to broadcast
      5  the speech or something like that, definitely not.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: We had a discussion here about the script of that speech,
      7  the transcript that was made.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Are you aware that he required those who had not read it,
    10  or had not attended it rather, to sign a list saying that
    11  they had in the meantime read the speech?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It may be right. I cannot recall this, but I think you
    13  are right.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. It is in my discovery. It is a two or three page
    15  list of the names of all the SS Gruppenfuhrer and they had
    16  been required to confirm either that they have heard this
    17  speech or that they have since read it?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would you like to speculate from your knowledge as an
    20  expert on this why Himmler would have wanted to make sure
    21  that they had all heard the politics of the Third Reich?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: One should not speculate, but it is a very long speech.
    23  I think it is probably more than 50 pages or something
    24  like that.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: He refers to the killing of the Jews. It might be that he
    .           P-62

      1  wants them to share this secret with him, but it could
      2  also mean that he just thought it was an important speech
      3  and they should listen to him, and they should be aware,
      4  because he is speaking about the conduct of war and all
      5  other important issues. So I am not absolutely sure that
      6  this is particularly this issue, why he is doing that.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Let me put it like this. Are you aware of any other
      8  Himmler speeches where he required those who had not
      9  attended to read it like school children afterwards?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am not sure, I cannot say anything to that.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can you take it from me that I have never seen any other
    12  such list from any other Himmler speech?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. I am afraid I have to say it might be, but I cannot
    14  recall that.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Are you prepared to suggest that there is a link between
    16  the fact that he made this extraordinary expose in this
    17  speech with the fact that he required all the SS generals
    18  to sign that they had now taken cognisance of it?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If I should speculate on it in this sense, yes, it is
    20  possible.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Probably a link?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am not quite sure, Mr Irving, what the
    24  suggestion you are making is. What are you saying that
    25  the reason was?
    26  MR IRVING:  I was just about to try and elicit this. I think
    .           P-63

      1  undoubtedly that Dr Longerich is an expert on these
      2  matters and I would be interested to hear his views.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. You are perfectly entitled to ask, but
      4  I was not quite sure what the suggestion was.
      5  MR IRVING:  Is there some suggestion that Himmler is making
      6  them all into accomplices after the fact?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is a possible interpretation.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Of something that he has done. Is he trying to spread the
      9  guilt, do you think?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is a possible interpretation, yes.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: Am I right, if I can ask a general question here, in
    12  saying that we are very much in the dark when we get up to
    13  this rarified level of Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Hitler, we
    14  do not really know what happened between them? We are
    15  forced to speculate, depending on our own personal
    16  positions.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, to speculate. We are in a way informed speculators
    18  so I think we have some sources and we should always take
    19  those sources as a basis for our speculation. And of
    20  course it is the nature of the system, the genre of
    21  decision making. We know there is a record of the
    22  relationship between Himmler and Hitler before this time,
    23  so we are also allowed, I think, to draw a conclusion from
    24  this wider context.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You have not told me what your conclusion is?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: My conclusion?
    .           P-64

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: The question really was, we do not know much about the
      2  relationship between Himmler and Hitler.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We know something about the relationship between Himmler
      4  and Hitler.
      5  MR IRVING:  Specifically in this connection, am I right, my
      6  Lord?
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It was your question I was paraphrasing.
      8  MR IRVING:  I am sure it would interest your Lordship too to
      9  know, from your own personal knowledge as an expert
    10  particularly on the Party Chancellery files, for example,
    11  is there any hint in all that huge body of, as you say,
    12  50,000 documents which suggests that there were intimate
    13  discussions between Himmler and Hitler on the Final
    14  Solution with a homicidal intent, if I can put it like
    15  that?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Not necessarily in the files of the Party Chancellery but,
    17  if I can expand on that, the sources we have relating to
    18  Hitler and Himmler, I would say, the most important
    19  document we have, is the entry in the Dienskalendar, the
    20  18th December 1941. This is of course an important
    21  document. We have the speeches, not only this speech, but
    22  also a couple of other speeches, a couple of speeches
    23  Hitler made to this issue. We have a number of other
    24  documents which I refer to in my report number 1.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: We will come to them.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So we have documents from 42, where Himmler said, “the
    .           P-65

      1  occupied Eastern territories have to be made free of Jews,
      2  this is a burden on my shoulders, it was laid as a burden
      3  on my shoulders”. We have more documents like this, which
      4  gave us a kind of insight into the relationship. They
      5  actually were discussing the issue of the Holocaust among
      6  them.
      7  MR IRVING:  Is it not a danger you refer to the December 18th
      8  1941 document. That of course only turned up two years
      9  ago. Does that mean to say that for 53 years people were
    10  really reaching these conclusion without such a document,
    11  finally like a drowning man they found a straw?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. The other documents are not known, and it added to
    13  our picture. As you suggested yourself, it is luck that
    14  we actually opened, that we have access now to Eastern
    15  European archives, but they were not in the dark before
    16  that. It adds to our knowledge.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Just so I am clear, you say that the informed
    18  speculator would draw the conclusion that Hitler and
    19  Himmler were discussing the Holocaust. By the Holocaust
    20  in that connection you do not just mean the shootings by
    21  the Einsatzgruppen?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I mean the systematic killing of European Jews.
    23  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: By whatever means?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: By whatever means, yes.
    25  MR IRVING:  What would you say to the historian who says that
    26  such speculation is without foundation if one looks at it
    .           P-66

      1  objectively?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would reject this view.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Would you say that one’s personal political
      4  viewpoint come into it, that the extreme right-winger
      5  would adopt one view and the cautious German historian,
      6  aware of the laws in Germany, would adopt a different
      7  view?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know to which laws are you referring. I publish
      9  all my books in Germany. I never felt any restrictions on
    10  publishing books.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am sure.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: As far as the own political viewpoint is concerned, the
    13  ideology, I think we have to rely on our professional
    14  work. So we have to just try to exclude this fact as far
    15  as it is possible. We have some rules how to interpret
    16  sources, how to deal with material, and I think what we do
    17  is, generally speaking, reliable. You can rely on that.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would you classify the great body of German historians as
    19  being diligent and applying themselves to the task?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Why did they wait for 25 years before looking at Heinrich
    22  Himmler’s handwritten notes of his telephone conversations
    23  with Hitler?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Which ones are you referring to?
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: The notes in Himmler’s handwriting which were in the
    26  National Archives in America and available on microfilm
    .           P-67

      1  since the 1950s and I was first person to use?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If you give me a specific reference to one quote, and you
      3  can go through the works of my colleagues and find out
      4  whether they left something out, I think that — well,
      5  stop here.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Let me put the question this way round. I do not
      7  want to go too far down this avenue, but are you aware of
      8  any other German historian who, before 1975, made any use
      9  of Heinrich Himmler’s handwritten notes on his telephone
    10  conversations or meetings with Hitler?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Before 1975?
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Approximately, when my book Hitler’s War was published.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Actually, I cannot recall that.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot actually answer this question because I cannot
    16  recall every word which was published before 1975. But,
    17  if you are making the point that you were one of the
    18  first, or probably the first, who was using the documents,
    19  I agree.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is not the point I am trying to make. I am
    21  suggesting that, if an historian has not shown proper
    22  diligence in turning up and using the sources, then how he
    23  cares to speculate is not worth the paper he writes his
    24  speculations on.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am reluctant to make a general statement about the
    26  historians. If you talk about a certain person, a certain
    .           P-68

      1  author, you can discuss his books, whether the sources are
      2  available or not, but I am really hesitant to make a
      3  general sweeping statement about all my colleagues in
      4  Germany.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The answer you gave me just now about what
      6  the informed speculator would infer was based on all the
      7  now available evidence including the Himmler diaries?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: One would try to include these documents into one’s own
      9  interpretation, yes.
    10  MR IRVING:  It is right that we are learning the whole time,
    11  are we not, that more and more documents become available,
    12  particularly from the Moscow archives and from your own
    13  work, for example, on the Martin Bormann papers? We are
    14  constantly adding to our information, so we are correcting
    15  misinterpretations, we are correcting even mistranslations
    16  sometimes, or misreadings?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. It is a research process, that is true.

    Section 69.18 to 81.14

    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: You rightly point out the fact that Muller in January 1942
    19  said the word liquidierung was not to be used?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which is understandable. If you are familiar with my
    22  Goebbels biography, do you know that it was Dr Goebbels
    23  who first issued that order?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Sometime in November or December 1941, Goebbels issued a
    26  propaganda directive that the word liquidate is only going
    .           P-69

      1  to be used in connection with the Soviet killings?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Interesting. I am not aware of that, no.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: But liquidierung is quite plain. We do not have to argue
      4  about the meaning of that word of course.
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, definitely not.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: But on paragraph 2 we now come to Umsiedlung and the
      7  various other words with this settlement route.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is correct to say that these words are used in both
    10  homicidal and non-homicidal senses throughout the
    11  documentation. Sometimes Umgesiedlung means they are
    12  going to be literally, as we saw in one document, in the
    13  same paragraph concerning Brestitovsk Jews in October
    14  1942, we saw one document where at the beginning of the
    15  paragraph it referred to, I think, 15,000 Brestitovsk Jews
    16  had been Umgesiedelt, which is shot, and then at the end
    17  of the same paragraph it said, “The village of A, half the
    18  Jews had been shot and the rest had been Umgesiedelt to a
    19  neighbouring village”, and that is a typical case of the
    20  problem facing us, is it not, with this particular word?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not have this document in front of me but in general
    22  I could agree.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Assume it is true because we have been
    24  through it more than once.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That makes it so important to look at the context.
    26  MR IRVING:  Sometimes we just do not have the context to judge,
    .           P-70

      1  is that right?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We try our best to establish the context.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Sometimes when the Jews were sent just to ghettoes, that
      4  is where the word “umgesiedelt” is used, is it not?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Give me please some kind of reference and I will comment
      6  on it, because it is a very difficult subject because the
      7  meaning, as you rightly said, changes and can change in
      8  the same document. So I should refer, I should in my
      9  answer refer to single documents.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, in paragraph 2.2, you refer to a Wehrmacht report.
    11  It is not even an SS report, is it?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: So the German Army was also involved in the camouflage.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: They replaced the word “shooting” with the handwritten
    16  word “resettlement”?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which is a rather pointless kind of change if it is
    19  possible for us years later to see both words written
    20  down?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Obviously, this man was not very intelligent who did
    22  this.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: In paragraph 2.4 you quite clearly give an example here
    24  where “Umsiedlung” is unambiguously used in its homicidal
    25  sense: “There are two pits there and groups of 10 leaders
    26  and men working at each pit relieving each other every two
    .           P-71

      1  hours”.
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, and —-
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: So that is what you are talking about when you are talking
      4  about the context, in context like that there is
      5  undoubtedly no question?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, exactly.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: The clarity is beyond dispute, and it would take a lunatic
      8  to say or to continue to argue that the word “Umsiedlung”
      9  there does not mean that, it does not mean killing?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I agree.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: But in the case of the key documents that we are looking
    12  at with Adolf Hitler, which is all that interests me
    13  really, we do not have that degree of clarity, do we?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I would like to suggest we should look at the
    15  documents and then we could —- I think I should not make
    16  these general statements, I think I should always refer to
    17  —-
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think particularly in the light of that
    19  question, if there is a document, and I do not have one in
    20  mind, where Hitler uses the word “umsiedeln” —-
    21  MR IRVING:  With that degree of clarity.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  — Then it would be helpful to put it to the
    23  witness. I do not recollect if there is one or there is
    24  not.
    25  MR IRVING:  What I am suggesting is that there is no such
    26  document with that degree of clarity.
    .           P-72

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Is there a Hitler document using the word
      2  “umsiedeln”?
      3  MR IRVING:  I do not believe there is, my Lord, in which case
      4  —-
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Then the point is academic.
      6  MR IRVING:  Your Lordship will know that I do not attach much
      7  important for my purposes. I attach more importance to
      8  the words “Vernichtung” and “Ausrottung”.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us move on to Vernichtung; we have done
    10  Aurottung.
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: My list is not complete; it is just what I found.
    12  MR IRVING:  In paragraph 3, page 3, we are dealing with section
    13  3 now, Evakuieren.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: You do incidentally accept that the word “Umsiedlung”
    16  referred equally sometimes to the westward movement of
    17  ethnic Germans?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: And similarly “Besiedlung” can be the resettlement, for
    20  example, we have a September 1942 document where Lublin is
    21  being besiedelt with Volksdeutschen?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I will always say that I would like to prefer to see the
    23  document and not to speculate about this, but you may be
    24  right.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: “Evakuierung” does not always mean the killing, does it?
    26  It does not always have homicidal context either, does it?
    .           P-73

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It always depends on the context.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. It usually means deportation under rough conditions
      3  or sometimes?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sometimes, yes, it also, you know, there was a scheme for,
      5  what is the expression, Luftkriegsevakuierung —-
      6  THE INTERPRETER:  The evacuation from air raids.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In the context of air war, this was also the official
      8  term. So it could be used in a different context.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think you are really agreed about
    10  Evakuierung, that —-
    11  MR IRVING:  On paragraph 3.2, we come to the 6th March 1942
    12  meeting where Eichmann is talking about the evacuation of
    13  the Jews to the East.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: The second and third line it says: “Further evacuation of
    16  55,000 Jews”, and you conclude that they are being sent to
    17  Auschwitz, and they should, you quote a document there,
    18  the Reich’s security.
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not conclude that these Jews on 26th were sent to
    20  Auschwitz. One should, to make it clear, it would have
    21  been better to start on 20th with a new paragraph. This
    22  is a completely different issue.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: On 20th February, the Reich’s Security Head Office issued
    24  guidelines on implementation of the evacuation of Jews to
    25  the East, Auschwitz Concentration Camp.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    .           P-74

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: And from that, you conclude that the evacuation of the
      2  Jews to Auschwitz is a homicidal meaning, is it?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this is quite clear from the document that the
      4  people were sent to Auschwitz and ordered to kill them
      5  there. So the term evacuation then, particularly
      6  after 1941, could just mean the deportation to a point but
      7  it also could mean the deportation to this point plus the
      8  killings of the people there. So, I think these two
      9  interpretations are possible after 1941.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. I will come to this later on, either today or
    11  tomorrow, are you familiar with the Ahnert document, the
    12  deportation from France?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: We will come to that when the time comes.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: But you are not saying that all the people deported to
    17  Auschwitz were killed. You accept that some were used for
    18  slave labour?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think we went through the history of the Auschwitz. It
    20  was a combination of a slave labour camp and extermination
    21  camp.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  But I do not think, Mr Irving, that you are
    23  suggesting that, when guidelines are issued on the
    24  evacuation of Jews to the East (Auschwitz concentration
    25  camp), you are not suggesting, are you, that evacuation
    26  has a wholly non-homicidal connotation there?
    .           P-75

      1  MR IRVING:  It can be either, my Lord. Here is one typical
      2  example where the context does not really help us. I am
      3  trying to establish that, from what we know, we do not
      4  know whether they were killed on arrival or whether they
      5  were put to work as slave labour as very large numbers or
      6  what. So that document does not really help us.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: May I comment on that.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, of course.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think that we know, not from the document, but, of
    10  course, we have enough information about Auschwitz to
    11  establish that, because these are guidelines; the general
    12  picture of what happens to Jews who were deported to
    13  Auschwitz after February 1943. So I think we could
    14  establish the context if we want to do so, but the
    15  selections and about sending people to gas chambers
    16  I think we have this information, and from this, I would
    17  then take this information and say that actually this
    18  makes it, I think, almost clear that the term evacuation
    19  here could include the killing of the people.
    20  MR IRVING:  In fact, it means exactly what it says that has
    21  been evacuated to Auschwitz.
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think we could, in a way, extend our knowledge and go
    23  into this day of Auschwitz, and it is not that this is a
    24  dark area —-
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: This is not the time or place for that.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: So, we could do research and I think that, in the end, we
    .           P-76

      1  could come to the conclusion that this, in general, meant
      2  the extermination of the people in the camp at Auschwitz.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: If I refer to the previous sentence beginning: “A report
      4  of 26th December”, in which the head of the police force
      5  Saliter reported in detail about his experiences
      6  accompanying and supervising the transport of 1,007 Jews
      7  from the Rheinland to Latvia, is an entire report on the
      8  of evacuation of Jews to Riga, is that right?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: In December 1941, what happened to these Jews who were
    11  deported to the Riga at that time?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: At this time, the Jews were actually sent to ghettoes or
    13  to camps.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: To the Jungfernhof camp?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: To the Jungfernhof camp or to the —-
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: So they were not massacred on arrival, then?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Most of them were not massacred on arrival.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: What conclusion do you draw from the use of the word
    19  evacuation there, then?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Here, it says that the Jews — I am trying to be cautious
    21  — it says here that the Jews are going to be deported to
    22  Riga, and the document does not say that the Jews are
    23  exterminated on the spot. There is actually one reference
    24  in the Saliter report, where Saliter says that the
    25  collaborators, if I may call them so, in Latvia were quite
    26  astonished to see the Jews here because they said that you
    .           P-77

      1  can Ausrotten them yourself in Germany. But I think they
      2  were probably a little bit ahead at this time and in this
      3  context, I could not say that the word evacuation would
      4  necessarily include the killing of the people who were
      5  sent to this place.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, we have actually seen a number of documents
      7  over the last weeks from this December 1941 period,
      8  indicating that these trainloads from the Reich to Germany
      9  carried provisions and equipment for their first weeks in
    10  there camp on arrival there. So the evacuation here,
    11  would you accept, does actually mean evacuation then and
    12  not necessarily anything more sinister?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This is what we call the second wave of deportations.
    14  This was about 21 trains to Riga and about, I think, seven
    15  or eight trains to Minsk which happened between November
    16  1941 and February 1942, except the six trains where the
    17  people were shot on the spot in Kovno and in Riga, except
    18  these six trains where the majority of these people
    19  actually were not shot on the spot but they survived a
    20  couple of months, most of them, and they were provided
    21  with all kinds of things, with tools and so on, from the
    22  Jewish communities because they, some of them, maybe even
    23  the majority, I do not know, some of them may actually
    24  have thought that they were some sort of pioneers who were
    25  sent to the East. So I think this idea to provide them
    26  with tools and so on also includes a moment of an element
    .           P-78

      1  of deception, giving them the idea that they actually can
      2  start a new life somewhere in the East.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Do you have any proof for that. This is an important
      4  point, I think. Do you have any proof that this was an
      5  element of deception in inviting them it take
      6  their appliances with them?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think that the fact that 6,000 people were shot on the
      8  spot gives you an idea there was a kind of, you know, a
      9  kind of juxtaposition between the provision of these
    10  trains and actually what happened to those people. If
    11  I can explain this.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: I do not want really get into the police decodes business
    13  here, my Lord, because I think we will stick to the
    14  meaning of the words.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The cross-examination is notionally to do
    16  with the translation of words.
    17  MR IRVING:  It is, entirely.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The trouble is you are chasing some of the
    19  uses. I understand why, Mr Irving; it is not a criticism
    20  of you, but the result is that it is a little bit
    21  scattered this cross-examination, and it is not a
    22  criticism.
    23  MR IRVING:  I have two ways of doing it. Either I can follow
    24  my own plan or I can follow his own very useful glossary
    25  which he has provided for us, and as we all have the
    26  glossary, I think it is more useful if I follow his
    .           P-79

      1  paragraphing rather than introduce yet further confusion.
      2  But I am taking large leaps and bounds through it.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. You have been confronted with the
      4  glossary and I suppose you have to really to deal with it.
      5  MR IRVING:  Well I hope that is not implied criticism of my
      6  dealing with it.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is not a criticism at all of you, Mr
      8  Irving, no.
      9  MR IRVING:  But if the Defence does seek to rely on these
    10  meaning of these words, then I have to try to shoot them
    11  down.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, I know. Well, take your own course.
    13  MR IRVING:  Paragraph 3.3, the evacuation to the Lodz ghetto
    14  —-
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which was referred to in the Gestapo report of June 9th.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: In fact, the stages of the evacuation make it quite plain
    19  that were not actually being evacuated to their death, so
    20  they were initially evacuated somewhere else.
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but it is —-
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: They were transported to the special command.
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but it is clear from, if you look at the following
    24  document, it is clear that they were deported to the
    25  extermination camp Chelmno. The Sonderkommando is the
    26  Sonderkammandolange which actually was responsible for the
    .           P-80

      1  Chelmno extermination camp and the gas used there.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Abschieben, which is No. 4, carries only the meaning of
      3  deport really, does it not, or does it —-?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This is the original meaning, I think.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Goebbels, for example, in his 27th March 1942 entry,
      6  talks about the Abgeschobene Juden, of whom 60 per cent
      7  would probably be liquidated.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which implies that the Abschiebung, the deportation, was
    10  not the killing, that was just what they used what came
    11  first.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: You might be right in this case, but it is clearly said in
    13  his document what happened, so I think one of the key
    14  documents as far as Holocaust is concerned.

    Section 81.15 to 97.17

    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: We are now on No. 5, which is Vernichtung.
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: In other words, abschieben is not a very important word in
    18  this particular argument, would you agree?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think that, in a kind of hierarchy, I would not put it
    20  on the top.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Vernichtung is, however, quite important, is it
    22  not?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: You have quoted in 5.1, the Langenscheidt version of the
    25  word, as destroy, annihilate or exterminate, presumably in
    26  that order.
    .           P-81

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is really destroying a thing, is it not, or if you can
      3  regard a group of people as a thing, then it is destroying
      4  a group of people?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If you look at the group of people as a thing then, if you
      6  make this —-
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: For example, Judentum is a body of Jews, a community of
      8  Jews, is it not?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Again, I think that we have enough examples to discuss it
    10  with reference to a document. We do not have to speculate
    11  about the possible ways the terminology was used.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I quite agree.
    13  MR IRVING:  You refer to Klausewitz?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: As defeating the enemy, you destroy the enemy?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. He is referring to, I think, an enemy army. So he
    17  is not referring just to people; he is referring, well, to
    18  an organization, and he is making it quite clear that the
    19  term “vernichtung” could mean, well, it could mean, as he
    20  said, annihilation of the enemy forces either by death or
    21  by injury or any other ways, either completely or merely
    22  to such an extent that the enemy no longer has the will to
    23  continue the fight. So I am trying to illustrate here
    24  that if the term “vernichtung” refers to an organization,
    25  it can have the meaning, you know, following Klausewitz,
    26  to kill all of them, to kill part of them, but basically
    .           P-82

      1  to make sure that the organization, as such, is not able
      2  to exist any more as an organization.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: You could bankrupt somebody and he would be destroyed,
      4  could you not?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you can make all other kinds of connotations.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Take the army prisoner —-
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It all depends on the context.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you can make all kinds of combinations, but I think
      9  the most interesting, I mean if I may suggest that the
    10  most interesting case is of course when it refers to the
    11  vernichtung of people, not of an organization, of Judentum
    12  but of Jews, then I think it becomes clear what the term
    13  actually meant.
    14  MR IRVING:  You have referred to Adolf Hitler’s speech of
    15  January 30th 1939 —-
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: — in this context where he uses the word “vernichtung”?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, 5.6, footnote.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: We do not have the exact quotation.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Unfortunately not.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: But the sense is, he said: If international finance Jewry
    22  once more succeeds in launching a new world war, then it
    23  will end not with the destruction of the European people,
    24  but with the destruction of, is it Judentum?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I have the quote in the first report.
    26  MS ROGERS::  38.
    .           P-83

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: 38. Shall I read this again?
      2  MR IRVING:  I think it is an important passage.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, perhaps you should in that case.
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I will only read the second — well, I should read the
      5  whole passage: “In my life I have often been a prophet and
      6  was generally laughed at. During my struggle for power it
      7  was mostly the Jewish people who laughed at my prophecies
      8  that I would some day assume the leadership of the state
      9  and thereby of the entire folk, and then among many other
    10  things achieve a solution of the Jewish problem.
    11  I believe that in the meantime the then resounding
    12  laughter of Jewry in Germany is now choking in their
    13  throats. Today I will be a prophet again. If
    14  international Jewry within Europe and abroad should
    15  succeed once more in plunging the people’s into a world
    16  war, then the consequence will be not the Bolshevization
    17  of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the
    18  contrary the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.”
    19  So “Jewry” is here in the German original
    20  Judentum, and the annihilation is the vernichtung,
    21  annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.
    22  MR IRVING:  Yes. The words “on the contrary” you just
    23  interpolated that. They are not in the original, are
    24  they.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  “Sondern”.
    26  MR IRVING:  Sondern, it just means “but”?
    .           P-84

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: But, yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is the word “but” that comes in after a negative, is it
      3  not, as in French? I am going to draw your attention to
      4  the fact that this speech is on January 30th 1939?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Had not a few days earlier Adolf Hitler through Hermann
      7  Goring as head of the four-year plan, appointed Reinhardt
      8  Heydrich to set up an agency to speed the emigration of
      9  the Jews from Germany?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. That is true, yes.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. That was just four our five days previously, was it
    12  not, or about two weeks previously, something like that?
    13  It was one of the consequences of the Kristallnacht?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Shall I explain the context?
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was that genuine or was that camouflage?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry?
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was the setting up of the Heydrich agency genuine or
    18  camouflage?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this was at this stage genuine, but I think I have
    20  to explain the background, if you do not mind.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: You know there were international negotiations going at
    23  this time between the so-called international government
    24  for refugees and the German Government represented by
    25  Hischaft. So the idea was that actually one could, you
    26  know, force world Jewry, as the Nazis perceived it, to pay
    .           P-85

      1  for the emigration of the Jews from Germany. In my
      2  interpretation I think they really thought this was a
      3  serious idea, a serious plan, that one could actually let
      4  them pay for the emigration of 400,000 Jews from Germany.
      5  So I think we have to look at Kristallnacht in this
      6  context, because I think the policy of the Nazis was to
      7  start a policy of terror against the Jews, to terrify them
      8  to leave the country, but also to force the Western powers
      9  actually to give in and to support this emigration
    10  programme. I think the speech has to be seen in this
    11  context. It is a threat, it a very violent threat: Look,
    12  if you don’t agree and if we are getting in a kind of
    13  dispute again and if this dispute again will lead to
    14  another world war, then of course the life of the Jews in
    15  Europe is threatened, we are threatening the life of
    16  them. So if you look at the context they were, on the one
    17  hand, planning and preparing a programme for emigration,
    18  but on the other hand they were looking at the
    19  consequences if this programme would fail and if they
    20  would be involved in a military conflict with the Western
    21  powers again.
    22  So if you threaten somebody, you know, it is a
    23  possibility. The whole idea I think of, well, threatening
    24  people is that you, in a way, leave a kind of uncertainty
    25  what you actually will do with the people you are
    26  threatening.
    .           P-86

      1  MR IRVING:  I am sorry, did you want to say anything else?
      2  No. Would you regard this speech by Adolf Hitler as being
      3  a further twist to the Jewish arm, saying: “Get out while
      4  you can”?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think the motive behind the speech, there are various
      6  motives behind the speech, and one motive is clearly to
      7  threaten German Jews to leave the country as soon as
      8  possible. This is one of the motives behind the speech.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  On what matters, which is what “vernichtung”
    10  means in that context —-
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    12  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: You say it does mean extermination or extirpation?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I actually said here in the text “annihilation”. You
    14  know, historians are debating this question. Some of my
    15  colleagues would say this is clear, Hitler actually at
    16  this stage had a clear programme to kill European Jews.
    17  I am not sure. I think the motives behind the speech are,
    18  there were different motives between the speech. It is a
    19  violent threat. It includes the possibility to kill the
    20  Jews in Europe, but I am not sure whether, you know,
    21  actually one can interpret this as a kind of programme
    22  which was already there.
    23  MR IRVING:  What possible proof is there for the fact that
    24  Adolf Hitler had at this time, at the beginning of 1939, a
    25  programme or a plan or intent to liquidate the Jews of
    26  Europe or anywhere else?
    .           P-87

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The historians who would take this line would argue the
      2  events which followed to actually give us a kind of clue
      3  that Hitler probably had this plan at a very early stage.
      4  I do not agree with this view. I think he still, you
      5  know, was not sure whether he preferred emigration or
      6  whether he was going to the next step and actually
      7  envisaging, was actually trying to envisage what would
      8  happen in a case of a war. So I think it is a kind of a
      9  watershed here.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is he effectively saying: “We will hold the Jews
    11  hostage”?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this is the message. There are various motives
    13  behind the speech. The fact that he is referring here to
    14  a world war, not simply to a war, a war against Poland,
    15  let us say, but a world war, which implies the involvement
    16  of the Western powers. I think this is a threat against,
    17  the Western powers against Great Britain, in particular
    18  against the United States. But this speech is really open
    19  for interpretation. I cannot prove at this stage that
    20  Hitler had a programme, a blueprint to kill European Jews
    21  during the next years. I think it would go too far to
    22  draw this conclusion from this speech. It is definitely a
    23  very violent threat. It is three months after
    24  Kristallnacht, and actually I think one has to bear this
    25  in mind that, you know, it is saying we could actually
    26  repeat Kristallnacht on a much, much wider scale. I think
    .           P-88

      1  something like is implied here.
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, I am conscious that time is
      3  passing and we are spending huge amounts of time on the
      4  meaning of these various words. In a way you have been
      5  rather pushed into doing it because of the form of the
      6  glossary, but it does not seem to me terribly helpful all
      7  this, because it all depends, and Dr Longerich’s last
      8  answer reveals, that exploring what the context of a
      9  document is can be quite a complicated exercise.
    10  MR IRVING:  I agree, my Lord, but I hope I am gradually
    11  bringing it home to your Lordship that when Adolf Hitler
    12  is concerned, which is the person I am largely concerned
    13  with, we are all at sea and anyone can draw whatever
    14  conclusion they want.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We are at sea in 1939. I am not so sure
    16  about 1941 and 1942.
    17  MR IRVING:  Which I hope we will reach in the course —-
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Well, let us move on.
    19  MR IRVING:  In that case I will not draw attention to what he
    20  said two days previously.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, I think 41 and 42 is the time, when the
    22  shooting started on the Eastern Front, paragraph 5.7
    23  maybe.
    24  MR IRVING:  I was up to 5.8 already.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Good.
    26  MR IRVING:  At 5.8 you refer to the Goebbels diary entry, Adolf
    .           P-89

      1  Hitler speech?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: To the Gauleiters on December 12th 1941?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Here the reference is, well, actually the reference is
      6  not, the “vernichtung” does not come in a speech; it comes
      7  in the second part, in the Hans Frank diary four days
      8  later.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: According to the Goebbels diary he says “vernichtung” in
    10  this speech, and again the full reference is in, the
    11  translation is in the other report, in the first report
    12  which is in chronological order so we should find it.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  61?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. There is footnote 156, so if we look at the German
    15  text in the first report, page 61, then we have the
    16  translation I think in both.
    17  MR IRVING:  That is in fact harking back to precisely that
    18  speech, is it not.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is completely circular.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  MR IRVING:  It is exactly the same.
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, he did this a lot of times. He always came back to
    23  this speech. I think he have five or six or more examples
    24  where Hitler is actually referring to this prophecy,
    25  particularly at this time. It is not only on 12th
    26  December; it is also on 1st January, 30th January and 24th
    .           P-90

      1  February. He is always giving the same text. On 21st
      2  February he is actually replacing the word “vernichtung”
      3  by “ausrotten”. So he is actually saying, he is
      4  indicating that things become actually more violent and
      5  more threatening.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: You then look at what Hans Frank said on December 16th?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. So we are back in the glossary?
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, back in the glossary, paragraph 5.8.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it plain that the word “vernichtung” as used by Hans
    11  Frank is unambiguously referring to liquidation there?
    12  Immediately before the passage you quote, has not Frank
    13  told subordinates that a great Jewish emigration is about
    14  to begin, meaning the Jews of the German government are
    15  going to be deported and adopted by the Soviet Union?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, again I would prefer to see the text here. I do not
    17  know who has the full.
    18&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I think we probably need the new file. That is
    19  much the best way of doing it.
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am just wondering where we get with this.
    21  This is Frank putting a gloss on Hitler had said in 1939.
    22  We have looked at what Hitler said in 1939.
    23&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, my Lord, I think the case is Frank is putting
    24  a gloss, if that be the right word, on what Hitler said on
    25  12th December 1941.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Do we need to trouble with what Frank says?
    .           P-91

      1&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  The witness makes the point, and indeed Mr Irving
      2  accepts, that the understanding which Frank had of what he
      3  had been told by Hitler in Berlin was quite unequivocal.
      4  It was about physical liquidation.
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. He came back from Berlin — it is four days after
      6  Hitler’s speech — saying he had discussions in Berlin
      7  and he is referring to this discussion. I think it is
      8  fair to assume, because Frank was as Reichsleiter present
      9  at the Reichs and Gauleiter meeting, so it is fair to
    10  assume that he is referring to this speech and may be
    11  other discussions they had.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I thought he was referring back to 1939.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but if you look at the —-
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I think, my Lord, it would honestly be helpful
    15  because what we have done in this file is to put in fact a
    16  long translation provided by Professor Browning against
    17  the German text. Would you turn to 172, first of all?
    18  That is the English of Professor Browning. .
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Where will I find that?
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is called N1. It is also in another file
    21  but this is probably the best place.
    22&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Do not worry about the other file. N1 is the one
    23  you need. I hope this should be a long paragraph in
    24  English indented. My Lord, may I ask the witness whether
    25  that is what he has?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I have got that.
    .           P-92

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  If one turns to page 6 in a bold crayon, 178, one
      3  finds a third of the way down the page the words “mit den
      4  Juden”.
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  That I think is the passage we are looking for.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      8&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I will leave it there.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Thank you very much, Mr Rampton.
    10&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I should add that it goes over the page to the end
    11  of a paragraph, the next paragraph beginning “Die
    12  ucheiner”.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. Mr Irving, have you got N1? Were you
    15  able to follow all that?
    16  MR IRVING:  I am going with your Lordship’s view that what Hans
    17  Frank’s use of the word means is really not of much
    18  relevance, having gone to all that trouble.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The way it is put is, and just decide whether
    20  you want to ask a question, is that Frank had just come
    21  back from Berlin where he had heard Hitler speaking, so he
    22  is not harking back in all of what he says to 1939 but to
    23  four days before.
    24  MR IRVING:  Yes.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think the way it is put is that vernichtung
    26  is used fairly unambiguously in Frank’s speech as a record
    .           P-93

      1  of what he had been told in Berlin. It is really that one
      2  phrase, is it not, Dr Longerich? “In Berlin we were told
      3  why all this trouble, we cannot use them in the Ostland or
      4  the Reichskommissariat either, liquidate them yourselves”?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. That is I think the main paragraph, the main
      6  sentence.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: It may be that you do not want to cross-examine about
      8  that, Mr Irving?
      9  MR IRVING:  Not really, because it is not the word vernichtung
    10  unfortunately.
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is the words Juden vernichtung. That is in there, in
    12  the German text. (German spoken). The term vernichtung
    13  the term vernichtung is clearly in here. When he is not
    14  sure about the means how to vernichtung the people, he is
    15  saying we cannot liquidate, we cannot execute them, we
    16  cannot poison them, so what shall we do?
    17  MR IRVING:  That is the problem we have with that particular
    18  passage, of course, my Lord, is it not Frank says earlier,
    19  we cannot poison them, we cannot shoot them.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. We are looking — this is on page bold 7, second
    21  paragraph. So they are looking for a kind of solution,
    22  how to vernichtung the people.
    23  MR IRVING:  Without shooting or poisoning them?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Poisoning could be a possible method. They are
    25  looking for a kind of solution to this problem and then it
    26  is explained here that we will have a meeting in Berlin,
    .           P-94

      1  and this is obviously the Wannsee conference. Then it
      2  becomes clearer what would happen in the
      3  Generalgouvernement.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: If you went back to the Klauserwitz example and somebody
      5  said to a German general, we have Eisenhower’s armies in
      6  front of us, we cannot shoot them, we cannot poison them,
      7  how are we going to destroy them? The answer is, cut off
      8  their water supply, cut off the power, deprive them of the
      9  shipping lines, the oil. There are all sorts of ways of
    10  destroying an enemy.
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is why I am trying to explain how difficult it is to
    12  make comparisons because clearly von Klauserwitz is
    13  referring to an army, and in your example you refer to an
    14  army, but here it is about the Jews.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: An enemy?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: An enemy, but the Jews are the Jews. This is the people,
    17  the human beings, and if I destroy, vernichtung, human
    18  beings, and I discuss then the methods, whether I should
    19  liquidate them, execute them or whether I should poison
    20  them, I think then the context is pretty clear. There is
    21  not much room for interpretation, I think.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, it is even clearer than that because he
    23  says, we cannot shoot them and we cannot poison them.
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, because they have not been told from Berlin what
    25  method they should use. Then, if you into the Wannsee
    26  protocol, actually the suggestion comes from von Below,
    .           P-95

      1  they had the Secretary of State, “We could like to deal
      2  with the Jews on the spot, we do not want to send them to
      3  the East, we would like to do it here”. Then it goes on
      4  in the Wannsee protocol. The various methods were
      5  discussed how to solve the problem. Then they were
      6  discussing what to do, poisoning, gassing, probably
      7  executions. This is preWannsee. He was sure that they
      8  were going to vernichtung the Juden, because it came back
      9  from Berlin and heard the speech, but the method was
    10  unclear.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: You are not suggesting, although I am sure you quite
    12  accidentally gave the opposite impression, that in the
    13  Wannsee protocol there is any reference to killing at all,
    14  is there?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know whether we will go to the Wannsee conference
    16  in more detail.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The problem with all of this is that it is
    18  not Mr Irving’s fault at all, because he has been
    19  confronted with this glossary and I can understand why he
    20  is going through it, but to me it is unhelpful, this whole
    21  exercise. We are coming across odd documents from 39 or
    22  35 or 43.
    23  MR IRVING:  Rather the same thing happened with the previous
    24  witness, my Lord. We came across topics that the witness
    25  urgently wanted to talk about and which no doubt will get
    26  raised later on.
    .           P-96

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think it is better to look at these words
      2  when we come across them in the context of examining the
      3  substantive issues rather than having a kind of linquistic
      4  sequence of questions.
      5  MR IRVING:  That would be the other way of slicing the same
      6  cake.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I know it would. I say again — it is not
      8  intended critically of you at all — that darting from
      9  one document to another is not I think particularly
    10  helpful.
    11  MR IRVING:  I am very rapidly going through the remaining part
    12  of the glossary to see if there are any important points
    13  to take. The fact that Robert Lie used a word a certain
    14  way does not mean to say necessarily that that was the
    15  standard meaning of the word?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am only referring to Lie. He was one of the top Nazis
    17  and he used the term in a quite open way. I find our
    18  discussion quite interesting but —-

    Section 97.19 to 114.17

    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Very well. In that case that finishes the with the
    20  glossary I think. I may wish to come back to it. Dealing
    21  now with your first report, Dr Longerich, page 10, you say
    22  there in your opening sentence that there can be no doubt
    23  that Hitler’s behaviour during his entire political career
    24  was characterised radical anti-Semitism.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was he always an anti-Semite, in your view, or did it come
    .           P-97

      1  upon him in his youth?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this way of radical anti-Semitism, which means
      3  that he wants to basically remove the Jews from, let us
      4  say, German soil, I think this is a product of the First
      5  World War and appeared immediately after the First World
      6  War. Other historians would argue that actually he learnt
      7  this in Vienna, but I think one has more to emphasise.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: There have been all sorts of weird theories, have there
      9  not, about where it came from?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, there are all kinds of theories. I think we are on
    11  safer ground if we look at the period after the First
    12  World War.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Were all the top Nazi leadership equal in their
    14  anti-Semitism, or were some more anti-Semitic than
    15  others? Were some more motivated than others?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Quite clearly some more anti-Semitic than others.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Some were more homicidally anti-Semitic than others?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Obviously you have worked for 20 years now in the records
    20  so you must have gained some impression that you can tell
    21  us about, the kind of league table of anti-Semitism.
    22  Would Martin Bormann be high up the list of anti-Semitism
    23  as an active anti-Semite?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Absolutely, yes. Definitely.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Josef Goebbels, would he be more or less anti-Semitic
    26  than Bormann?
    .           P-98

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have never thought about a kind of hierarchy, but
      2  I think, if you look at the top Nazis, I think you can
      3  fairly say that radical anti-Semites, people who wanted to
      4  remove by any means the Jews from Germany, I think you
      5  would count among them Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann,
      6  I think, and some others.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Hermann Goring, for example, was always getting in trouble
      8  because he had Jewish friends, did he not?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but the fact that one has Jewish friends does not
    10  necessarily exclude that one can be an anti-Semite or even
    11  a radical anti-Semite. I think probably Goring looked at
    12  this more from a kind of political or tactical point of
    13  view. I am not sure. I think the anti-Semitism of Goring
    14  and his role in the Final Solution has not been fully
    15  researched. That is all I can say to that.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Goebbels was the real mover and shaker, was he not? He
    17  was the propagandist, he was the little poison dwarf, the
    18  evil genius?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: He was definitely a radical anti-Semite, and he was trying
    20  to push forward anti-Semitic policy, this is right, but
    21  I would not make a kind of hierarchy where I would place
    22  Goebbels at the top.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: The reason why I am asking this is this. Goebbels, for
    24  example, would never have dreamed of employing a Jew on
    25  his staff or a half Jew on his staff, would he? I do not
    26  think he did.
    .           P-99

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot say anything about his dreams, but I think he did
      2  not, as far as I know.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is an English expression. Adolf Hitler of course did
      4  have some half Jews on his staff, did he not?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know. I cannot recall any names. Hitler?
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. His private chauffeur, Emile Morris. When it turned
      7  out that Emile Morris was Jewish, did not Hitler protect
      8  him and keep him on to the end?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot recall this.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Do you know Peter Hofmann, Professor Peter Hofmann?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: He is a well-known Canadian German historian, is he not?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Have you read his book, Hitler’s Personal Security?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I know the book but I cannot recall this detail. I simply
    16  do not know.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Does it not strike you as odd that an anti-Semite like
    18  Hitler would not mind having a Jewish chauffeur, Emile
    19  Morris?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I cannot comment on this story. I do not know whether it
    21  was an established fact that Morris was a Jew. I cannot
    22  comment on that. Again I would say, if you look into the
    23  history of anti-Semitism, the greatest anti-Semites had
    24  sometimes Jewish friends. They would say, well, this is
    25  my friend, he is an exception, he is not like others.
    26  This is a typical stereotype.
    .           P-100

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: You are damned if you do and damned if you do not,
      2  effectively?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is a typical stereotype. I do not think one can draw
      4  major conclusions from the fact that somebody protected a
      5  Jew or had Jewish friends.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Just pause a moment, Dr Longerich.
      7&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Can I say something? I am not criticising
      8  Mr Irving in the very least for having gone through that
      9  glossary, and he did it really rather quickly, but I am a
    10  bit concerned now because Mr Irving conceded one question
    11  and answer to the effect, I think, that Hitler was from
    12  1919 onwards a profound anti-Semite and that anti-Semitism
    13  was one of the important planks of Nazi ideology.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So, in the early years you say that this is
    15  really not an issue?
    16&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I have made it specific. From 1919 onwards and
    17  that anti-Semitism became an important plank of Nazi
    18  ideology or policy call it what you like.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Adding the rider that, as far as Hitler
    20  personally was concerned, he had other things on his mind
    21  from about the invasion of Russia.
    22&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  He may have had other things on his mind. Being
    23  an anti-Semite is not exclusive of other things.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, but I think Mr Irving’s case, and he will
    25  correct me if I am wrong, is that anti-Semitism was not
    26  really something that was concerning Hitler from — am
    .           P-101

      1  I right about this — about 1941 onwards, because he was
      2  fairly preoccupied.
      3&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No. He said from the time he came to power. From
      4  1933.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You tell me, Mr Irving. Have I misunderstood
      6  your case?
      7&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I have misunderstood Mr Irving’s concession, if
      8  that be right.
      9  MR IRVING:  My Lord, my general impression is that Adolf Hitler
    10  abandoned that particular plank once he came to power. It
    11  had been very useful for getting him into power but, once
    12  he was an absolute dictator, he did not need it any more
    13  and it bulked less large.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The point Mr Rampton makes is do we need to
    15  spend very long exploring anti-Semitism in the 30s, given
    16  that you accept that he was a radical anti-Semite over the
    17  entirety of that period?
    18  MR IRVING:  The question is whether he was a cynical
    19  anti-Semite and used it in the same way that an Enoch
    20  Powell might use immigration as a means of establishing a
    21  political position, or whether he was profoundly
    22  viscerally anti-Semitic.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Which option are you going for?
    24  MR IRVING:  I am going for the cynical version, my Lord.
    25  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So he was not really an anti-Semite, it was
    26  just a political gambit?
    .           P-102

      1  MR IRVING:  He was when it served his purpose. He was a beer
      2  table anti-Semite. He used it to whip up support, but in
      3  private, and this is what counts, his state of mind was
      4  slightly different, which is what I was trying to elicit
      5  from just one or two episodes of his own—-
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I find that slightly difficult difficult to
      7  reconcile with your acceptance earlier on in this trial
      8  that he was without qualification a rabid anti-Semite, at
      9  any rate in the 30s.
    10  MR IRVING:  I would then say it is perfectly possible for him
    11  to have been like that originally and then drifted out
    12  when he no longer needed it, just as with Goebbels it was
    13  the other way round. Goebbels was originally viciously
    14  anti-anti-Semitic and wrote his letter to his girl
    15  friend—-
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Do not let us worry about Goebbels. Can you
    17  put this point that you are now making in a general way to
    18  Dr Longerich?
    19  MR IRVING:  Two more questions and then we will have it, I
    20  think. Adolf Hitler’s dietary cook was also Jewish,
    21  Marlene Exener.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is not putting it in a general way.
    23  MR IRVING:  I was going to say — well, is the answer do you
    24  know that or not?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: If somebody maintained people like that on his private
    .           P-103

      1  staff, is it an indication that personally he had no
      2  real — what is the word I am looking for — distaste
      3  for Jews as individuals?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I made my point. I think, if you look into the
      5  history of anti-Semitism, you cannot draw conclusions from
      6  these personal relationships, because the anti-Semite
      7  would always argue, well, this is an exception, this is
      8  not a typical Jew, this person is different. I remember
      9  vaguely these rumours that one or the other person was
    10  Jewish, or what they called half Jewish, but I do not
    11  think one can actually write a kind of history of Hitler’s
    12  anti-Jewish policy on this basis. This might be the case,
    13  but it does not — it is a well-known stereotype in the
    14  history of anti-Semitism, as I said.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I interrupt you rudely and just ask you
    16  the question which was the one I had in mind? Do you
    17  accept what Mr Irving is contending, that Hitler’s
    18  anti-Semitism in the 1930s was not an expression of a
    19  genuine anti-Jewish feeling, but was simply a political
    20  gambit to enable him to achieve power?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not think so. I do not agree.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Pursue it, if you want to, Mr Irving, but that was the
    23  general question I had in mind.
    24  MR IRVING:  I would ask again the general question. If he was
    25  viscerally anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic, would he have
    26  tolerated Jewish members of his personal staff? Would he
    .           P-104

      1  have tolerated Field Marshal Milsch, who was a well-known
      2  half Jew?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I made my point clear. As far as I see
      4  anti-Semitism — my English runs out a little bit —
      5  there is no contrast, no juxtaposition. I think this does
      6  not actually disturb my view. It does not surprise me.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: OK. Just one final question to round off this context.
      8  In that little league table I was beginning to draw up of
      9  Himmler, Goebbels, Goring, Bormann, Lammers, Hitler, where
    10  would Hitler come on the anti-Semitism scale? Would he be
    11  above or below Dr Goebbels? Would he be more or less
    12  anti-Semitic?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would just say that Hitler was a radical anti-Semite
    14  like Goebbels. The degree of percentage, I cannot make a
    15  judgment about that. I do not know how one measures
    16  radical anti-Semitism.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Which way did the anti-Semitic current flow? From
    18  Goebbels to Hitler, or Goebbels to Hitler?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: If you look at this group of people, I think I would
    20  describe it as a consensus. It was a general radical
    21  anti-Semitic consensus among them and it is impossible to
    22  say.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think we understand the difficulty you are
    24  in and I think, Mr Irving, you must move on.
    25  MR IRVING:  If you had read the Goebbels diaries right through,
    26  would you be able to form an impression on who was making
    .           P-105

      1  the suggestions to whom, or who was just listening?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Again, I would prefer to look then at certain
      3  passages. As a general view I think my interpretation is
      4  that there was a high degree of anti-Semitic consensus
      5  between Hitler and Goebbels, and of course Goebbels in his
      6  diaries, one of the motivations, motives, why Goebbels
      7  wrote the diaries is that he wanted to show, the diaries
      8  should present him as a very active energetic person. So
      9  of course, he is in a way the actor, and others actually
    10  are reacting to him. My general impression is that there
    11  was an anti-Semitic consensus among them.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
    13  MR IRVING:  Can we now go to page 12 of your report, paragraph
    14  1.4?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: In general terms you are saying that, between the outbreak
    17  of war in summer 1939 and the middle of 1941, the Nazis
    18  were look for a territorial solution to the Jewish
    19  problem.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is this commonly accepted or do most historians now accept
    22  that there was no homicidal plan?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This is accepted, but I made a little comment there at the
    24  end, and I said, well, actually, if you look at the
    25  so-called territorial solution, one should actually say,
    26  and this is my argument, that this increasingly offers a
    .           P-106

      1  perspective of the physical end of the Jews in Europe. So
      2  I think the territorial solution, it was not meant that
      3  the Jews should actually come back from this reservation
      4  or whatever they planned, and they should stay there for
      5  300 years. I think, if you look seriously at this
      6  territorial solution, these plans had clearly a genocidal
      7  implication, but they were still plans. They were not
      8  carried out.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: So that, although they were talking in terms of geography
    10  and moving them out beyond the pale, even then you suspect
    11  that they would really like to kill them? They were
    12  thinking in terms of killing? You want to have it both
    13  ways, really?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would come back to this phrase there is obviously a
    15  strong genocidal element in those plans, so they were
    16  considering among themselves the question how and whether
    17  the Jews would survive or they would not survive.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Are you talking about the European Jews here or the
    19  Russian Jews?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am talking about the European Jews.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: But there is no actual document which indicates a
    22  homicidal intent. It is just that your feeling is they
    23  were talking geography but thinking in terms of bullets?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I could expand on that. There are two arguments. First
    25  of all, if you look at the plans themselves, at the
    26  comments they made on the plans, I think you can come to
    .           P-107

      1  the conclusion that these so-called reservations would not
      2  offer sufficient means for existence to the Jews. On the
      3  other hand, I collected quite a number of comments from
      4  top Nazis, which actually made quite clear from the
      5  context that what they envisaged was that the Jews, the
      6  Jewry, Judentung, the Jews would actually not survive in
      7  the end this deportation to reservations.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: They hoped they would perish in the process?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: They would perish and put to death by a combination of
    10  diseases, epidemics, simply insufficient means for
    11  survival, hard labour and things like that.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, you appreciate there is a difference in
    13  intent there, just saying, “I want them to get out and who
    14  cares what happens to them when they are out”?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is one thing, but that is not quite the same as
    17  saying a homicidal intent?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I think that is to say very short, that is the
    19  difference between the idea to let them perish out there
    20  and to immediately kill them by executions or gas and so
    21  on. That is the difference.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: I do not want to go right back to the 1920s, but you do
    23  rely in part on Mein Kampf, do you not?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, of course.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: I have a copy of Mein Kampf here, one of these little
    26  things you collect over the years, given to me. I hasten
    .           P-108

      1  to add I have never read it. Am I right in saying that
      2  Adolf Hitler was not the only person whose hand is to be
      3  seen in Mein Kampf? In fact a number of other people
      4  wrote it with him, Rudolf Hess and others?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I should say I read the book. I think it is a very
      6  interesting book. One should read it. Hitler dictated it
      7  to Hess. It is unclear. Some historians would argue that
      8  actually he helped to improve in a way the text, but
      9  I think the fact that Hitler’s name is on the book
    10  indicates that he is responsible for every word in the
    11  book. I think also one recognizes of course his thoughts
    12  in the text.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Do you see a direct line then between what Adolf Hitler
    14  put his name to in Mein Kampf in 1923 or 1924 and what
    15  subsequently happened 20 years later?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. I think the policy developed gradually, but we have
    17  to take the fact into account that Hitler made very
    18  radical anti-Semitic statements as soon as the mid 20s.
    19  We cannot overlook this fact.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: He made anti-Semitic statements in it?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, Mein Kampf. He spoke about putting 12 to 15,000 of
    22  these people to gas and so on.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: They could be held under gas?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. He did not say that he was intending to kill
    25  European Jews, but he made some very, very interesting
    26  statements concerning the fate of the Jews.
    .           P-109

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, this is only a suggestion. It
      2  seems me that the key phase really is when talk moved, as
      3  Dr Longerich says it did, from deportation to Madagascar
      4  or wherever else —-
      5  MR IRVING:  1941 is the key year.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, exactly. Do you think that is where
      7  your quarrel with Dr Longerich really starts, is it not?
      8  MR IRVING:  This is absolutely true and that is why your
      9  Lordship will see that I am rapidly leafing through the
    10  pages which are heavily annotated by me, the
    11  Reichskristallnacht and so on.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I know it is a temptation, but if you can
    13  resist the temptation.
    14  MR IRVING:  In the meantime we have dealt with the
    15  Reichskristallnacht.
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think you have.
    17  MR IRVING:  I do not know what the law is here. If I do not
    18  traverse these matters here in court —-
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I have said this already. I think in the
    20  context of this case, if you have already cross-examined
    21  another expert on a particular topic, and you have
    22  certainly cross-examined Professor Evans on Kristallnacht,
    23  that is quite sufficient, unless Mr Rampton wants to
    24  persuade me otherwise, by way of putting your case, and
    25  you certainly do not need top traverse the same ground
    26  again with Dr Longerich. Mr Rampton, you do not disagree
    .           P-110

      1  with that?
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, I do not. Reichskristallnacht is mentioned in
      3  passing only in the first part of Dr Longerich’s report.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think the same applies really to the
      5  shooting by the Einsatzgruppen.
      6  MR IRVING:  To much else, which is not a matter of great
      7  contention between us.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is true.
      9&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I think it has gone really as an issue.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So really I think we are looking towards the
    11  40s in terms of pagination.
    12  MR IRVING:  We are making rapid progress. For the remaining
    13  three minutes I will just have a quick look at page, 45
    14  please. On May 25th 1940 Himmler did put this document to
    15  Hitler on the plans for the East?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was this again Plan Ost or was that another document?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This was the future of the Frentfurgischer, as it was
    19  called in the text, the alien people.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: Does not Himmler in this document say words to the effect
    21  that we cannot do what the Russians do, we cannot just
    22  liquidate them?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, the quote here is: “The Bolshevist methods of
    24  physically extirpation (Ausrottung) of a people because of
    25  inner conviction, as un-German and impossible”. So he is
    26  distancing himself from ausrottung. In the same text he
    .           P-111

      1  says: “I hope to see that by means of the possibility of a
      2  large emigration of all Jews to Africa or to some other
      3  colony – that the concept of Jew will be fully
      4  extinguished”. So I think we have take these
      5  two sentences into account. Distinguished but not
      6  ausrottung.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: I just wanted to look at the fact that the word ausrottung
      8  in that document does not by itself mean killing, because
      9  Himmler had to add the word “physical” in font of it, did
    10  he not, so going to physically ausrottung them?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Of course that is a possible interpretation, but sometimes
    12  in a document you make your position very clear by
    13  actually repeating the same meaning and adjective.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is added emphasis, is it?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you have to have a subject but you also add an
    16  adjective.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: To make it unmistakable?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, exactly.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Because otherwise it could be mistook.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, and also probably you want to strengthen your point.
    21  People tend to repeat themselves. That is quite a common
    22  experience. If in the same document you make the same
    23  point twice or three times, it does not always, I think
    24  one cannot — well, I stop here. Sorry.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just like Adolf Hitler in that November 10th 1938 speech
    26  using the phrase “we do not need them”? He says it twice
    .           P-112

      1  in one sentence.
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: It does not add anything really?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, for example.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: I see a smile from his Lordship. That was not the point
      6  I was hoping to make there. I would hate to go down just
      7  on that one sentence. That is the reason. Page 46 just
      8  for one minute. The Madagascar plan was quite feasible,
      9  was it not?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In which sense feasible?
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: It could have housed them. The island is big enough.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The relevant question is they thought it was
    13  feasible? Whether they were right or not may not be here
    14  or there.
    15  MR IRVING:  I was going to ask the witness. He is rather
    16  dismissive of the plan.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In which sense feasible? You mean to provide a place
    18  where 4 million Jews could have a happy life? In this
    19  sense feasible?
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: Happier life.
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Or feasible in the sense of an SS police state, so to say
    22  a big prison, with a high death rate? In this sense
    23  I would say, yes, it was feasible. We have contemporary
    24  examinations about this problem. For instance, the Polish
    25  Jewish Commission which was sent to Madagascar in 37, they
    26  came back with a recommendation that, as one member put
    .           P-113

      1  it, Madagascar would offer a place for about 50 to 75,000
      2  people. The Jewish members of this Commission did not
      3  agree. They said 2,000 probably. So this is contemporary
      4  evidence we have. I would say clearly that I doubt that 4
      5  million Jews would have the chance to survive this, if
      6  I may say, excursion to Madagascar in 1940.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, one final question before the adjournment.
      8  Are you aware that the population in Madagascar has
      9  increased from about 2 million to 13 million over the
    10  period?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I looked it up because this was always said. 4 million in
    12  30s to 30 million indeed in the 1990s, yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: So that kind of population could have been absorbed?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, within 50 years, with an infrastructure and so on, of
    15  course. Experience shows that.
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Two o’clock.
    17  (Luncheon Adjournment)

    Part III: David Irving’s Cross-Examination of Dr. Heinz Peter Longerich, continued, Afternoon Session (114.18 to 192.24)

    Section 114.18 to 132.14

    18  (2.00 p.m.)
    19&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  My Lord, can I hand in my little note on the
    20  inadmissibility of expert witness statements?
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Thank you very much — yes, please.
    22&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I say no more about it. Yes.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, Mr Irving?
    24  MR IRVING:  Thank you. (To the witness): Dr Longerich, we had
    25  reached the middle of 1941 roughly and I think I am right
    26  in summarizing that there is no evidence up to 1941, the
    .           P-114

      1  middle of 1941, of any directives by Hitler to exterminate
      2  Jews, no order for a systematic extermination of the Jews
      3  that you are aware of by the middle of 1941?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, if it comes to the preparation of Barbarossa,
      5  I would not agree. Before that — at the moment I cannot
      6  — probably you are right, I cannot recall something like
      7  that.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, shall we have a look at the directives issued in May
      9  1941 now?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Well, by the way, no, I have to correct myself,
    11  there is no — we do not have a written, a written
    12  statement by Hitler signed by Hitler, you know, that the
    13  Jews have to be killed. This is something we do not have.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: On page 55 of your report, 15.1, you begin by saying: “In
    15  the course of the preparations for the racist war of
    16  extermination against the Soviet Union”, that is rather
    17  colourful language, is it not?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, this is actually a language which is commonly used
    19  by historians to describe the specific nature of this war.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. It is not really material here except that it goes
    21  to your state of mind, I suppose, but are you not aware
    22  that there is a body of historical opinion on the other
    23  side now which says that to a certain extent,
    24  notwithstanding that Hitler had always wanted to fight the
    25  Soviet Union, by June 1941 it also had a preventive
    26  character?
    .           P-115

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not accept this thesis. I think it does not
      2  convince me at all. These historians have not produced,
      3  in my opinion, enough evidence to prove that Hitler was
      4  just, well, fighting a preventive war.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Preventive war?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: I did not say he was just fighting a preventive war
      8  because I said that there was certainly evidence that he
      9  had always wanted to fight the Soviet Union. I chapter 14
    10  of Mein Kampf goes that way, does it not? But Stalin’s
    11  biographer, General Volkagonov, has presented documents
    12  from Stalin’s own private archives indicating that the
    13  Russians were planning to attack Germany?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not think there is enough evidence now. I mean,
    15  I know that research is going on, and one actually can
    16  find more material in Soviet archives, but at the moment
    17  I do not think that the case is made that Hitler was just
    18  fighting a preventive war against the Soviet Union and
    19  that Stalin had decided to attack Hitler somewhere in the
    20  summer 1941.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Once again, I did not say he was just fighting a
    22  preventive war, but it had a preventive element?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not accept this. I think, from the German side, if
    24  you follow the preparations, I mean, I am, of course, more
    25  an expert — expert on the Germans, not on the Soviets.
    26  I am just following the discussion, but on the German
    .           P-116

      1  side, it is quite clear in the preparations, from my point
      2  of view, that Hitler actually is planning this war since
      3  the summer of 1940, and in the documentation that there is
      4  actually, as far as I am aware, almost no reference to the
      5  policy of behaviour of the other side. So I think it is
      6  the main reason for this was really, on the one hand, the
      7  ideological belief of Hitler that he has to destroy this
      8  so-called Bolshevik Empire and, on the other hand, he is
      9  trying to find a way out of the general, the war situation
    10  he found himself in in the summer of 1940 when Britain was
    11  not prepared to surrender. So I do not share this view,
    12  that it was to some extent a preventive war.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Or to any extent at all a preventive war?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, I do not share this view.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: I do not want to labour the point, but I am just drawing
    16  attention to the fact that in that first line you do
    17  appear to throw around words like “extermination” rather
    18  loosely.
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not think I throw around; I just say that, in my
    20  opinion, if you follow this documentation, I think it is
    21  fair to say that this was a racist war of extermination
    22  from, you know, as both, if you look at the preparation
    23  and planning and, on the other hand, if you then look at
    24  what happened after the 22nd June 1941.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: We are looking now at Hitler’s instructions to the High
    26  Command Operations staff, March 3rd 1941. These are the
    .           P-117

      1  guidelines which I believe I gave your Lordship in
      2  complete translation a few days ago, the English
      3  translation of the document.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, I think you did.
      5  MR IRVING:  Is there any indication in that document, apart
      6  from that quoted paragraph, that there is an intention
      7  when the Russian campaign begins to liquidate the Jews as
      8  such rather than just the leadership?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not have the full document in front of me, so
    10  I cannot answer this, but you could probably help me.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: But you would have quoted it if it was in the document?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I looked through the document and if I did make a
    13  mistake, it is nothing, there is not such a phrase in
    14  document.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: I think we can take it that Hitler himself is the author
    16  of this document, can we?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: When Hitler refers to the Jewish Bolshevik intelligentsia,
    19  der Judisch Bolschewikisch intelligentsia, he is referring
    20  to the people around Stalin and the leadership of the NKBD
    21  and the Commissarts, that kind of people?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think the top leadership but also the Party
    23  functioners, I think.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Whether they were Jewish or not, he just put them all into
    25  one package?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Jewish Bolshevik intelligence, yes, Jews and non-Jews
    .           P-118

      1  probably.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: This was part of the Nazi party jargon, was it not? It
      3  was part and parcel — it was a word they liked using a
      4  lot?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but it refers to the fact that they were convinced
      6  that Bolshevism or Marxism is a kind of sinister, you
      7  know, tool of the Jews, you know, in order to destroy the
      8  Aryan people. This is, I think, the background. It is
      9  just not, it is just not kind of jargon. It has a thing,
    10  it has a background.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: The further quotations that you put on that page from the
    12  papers of General Thomas —-
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: — who I incidentally learned was the father-in-law of my
    15  private secretary after 20 years she worked for me, oddly
    16  enough. It is a small world. These are just references
    17  to destroying the Soviet leadership?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Or murdering them or killing them?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would that be a legitimate military aim to discuss with
    22  the German High Command?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, it gives you a kind of insight about the nature of
    24  this war because they are not planning only to annihilate
    25  or exterminate the Russian Army, but also they are trying
    26  to crush the whole system, including killing, obviously,
    .           P-119

      1  the leadership. So it is far more than a normal war when
      2  two armies fight against each other, and, yes, and —-
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: So it is just one step up the ladder, shall we say, of
      4  extermination?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: So it is not the whole way, but it is an interesting rung
      7  in the ladder?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: If we can put it like that? Turning to page 56, please,
    10  paragraph 15.4, you refer to Hitler’s guidelines of 3rd
    11  October?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. It is a mistake. 3rd March. Sorry about that.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: 3rd March.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: 15.4, first line, should have “March” instead of
    15  “October”.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: In this directive it says, this is the directive of March
    17  13th issued by General Alfred Jodl: “In the operation
    18  area of the Arm, Himmler is granted special
    19  responsibilities by order of Hitler for the preparation of
    20  the political administration.”
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but it is also — yes, sorry.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: It looks pretty sinister and it probably is pretty
    23  sinister, but is this not within the guidelines of
    24  military operations, securing the rear areas?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but it says if you take the full, if you look at the
    26  German terminology, “die sich aus dem endgultig
    .           P-120

      1  auszutragenden Kampf zweier entgegengesetzter politischer
      2  Systeme ergeben”, this is in English “These special
      3  responsibilities arise from the ultimate decisive struggle
      4  between two opposing political systems”. So it is not
      5  about just two armies fighting against each other. It is
      6  actually two political systems and the idea here is to
      7  completely, well —-
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: National socialism, on the one hand, and Bolshevism on the
      9  other?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: I think somebody once said the child with most -isms is
    12  the -ists. So they are dealing here with the Bolsheviks
    13  or the Bolshevists and the National Socialists rather than
    14  the Jews as such?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, but from the context it becomes quite clear that in
    16  the views of the National Socialist, you cannot separate
    17  Bolshevism from Jewry, so it is a kind of, it is quite
    18  clear it is one of the main elements of the National
    19  Socialist ideology that Bolshevism is in a way a kind of
    20  invention of the Jews, of all Jewry, in order to conquer
    21  world dominion, I think. This is something that you
    22  cannot separate here from this.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Sure enough in the next paragraph it spells out what the
    24  special responsibilities are. They are going to be
    25  bumping of all the Bolshevik Chieftains and Commissarts?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    .           P-121

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: I agree with that. That is quite obviously contained in
      2  the documents. We now go on the following page to page 57
      3  to the massacres executed by the four Einsatzgruppen?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  But can I just be clear about that? Forgive
      6  me. The documents we have just been looking at, four of
      7  them, 3rd March onwards?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Do you regard those as being preliminary to the setting up
    10  of the Einsatzgruppen?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think one has to bear in mind that this is, you
    12  know, this is preparation of a racist war of
    13  extermination. So the result of the speeches and of these
    14  instructions are certain guidelines which are given to the
    15  troops. This is the Commissart order, the order to kill
    16  all Communist Commissarts, and this is what was called
    17  here the guidelines for special areas. And then there is
    18  the jurisdiction decree which says, basically, that every
    19  German officer is entitled to take retaliation measures on
    20  the spot, and they are the guidelines for the conduct of
    21  the troops in Russia.
    22  So the whole of it has to be seen as a whole set
    23  of regulations and guidelines, which I think can be
    24  described as a kind of package for the racist war of
    25  extermination and Hitler is intimately involved in the
    26  preparation of this.
    .           P-122

      1  MR IRVING:  As a what for the racist war?
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  “Package”.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: A kind of package of set of documents which actually —-
      4  MR IRVING:  You describe them as the prerequisites —-
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, exactly.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: — which does not necessarily mean that the one flowed
      7  from the other. The racist war of extermination would not
      8  have been possible without these prerequisites, but that
      9  does not necessarily mean that this was anticipated or
    10  planned?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think it is quite clear from the documents that
    12  this war, you know, this racist war, is planned from at
    13  least March 1941 onwards and Hitler is playing an active
    14  role in the preparations of those guidelines.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, if you are going to put it like that, I
    16  think you ought to point us to the passage of the March
    17  documents on which you are relying.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Am I right, my Lord, that he should —-
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, you are, but I do not want to assume too
    21  much, but 3rd March refers to the establishment of
    22  guidelines?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, it is an instruction from Hitler to Jodl to actually
    24  rephrase the guidelines, to be more radical in those
    25  guidelines. So it gives him a kind of idea of what he
    26  wants, and he says, this is the key sentence, “The Jewish
    .           P-123

      1  Bolshevik intelligentsia must be eliminated”. Then they
      2  are going on and revising these guidelines, and in end it
      3  says in here that there is in the operational area of the
      4  Army, the Reichsfuhrer SS special duties, he has to carry
      5  out and these duties relates to the fight between
      6  Bolshevism and National socialism.
      7  So there is a specific political racist, I would
      8  say, element in here. It is not just a preparation of,
      9  let us say, a normal war between nations or armies.
    10  MR IRVING:  Racist or ideological?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Both. You cannot separate that. You cannot separate
    12  anti-Semitism from the anti-Communism. This is one thing.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: But if I narrow it down, these actual documents before us
    14  refer only to the leadership, the intelligentsia.
    15  Everything beyond that is extrapolation by yourself, is it
    16  not?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know what the “Sonderaufgaben im Auftrage des
    18  Fuhrers” are. There is no — the document does not give
    19  us any explanation for that. It is not — the documents
    20  refer to leaders and to special tasks “im Auftrage des
    21  Fuhrers”, “on behalf of the Fuhrer”, so I do not know what
    22  this actually, I mean, because I was not there and we do
    23  not have a document about this, I do not know what this
    24  means.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: This is the document of March 13th on page 56, is that
    26  right?
    .           P-124

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. “Sonderaufgaben”, special tasks on behalf of the, by
      2  order of the Fuhrer for the preparation, and so on, and so
      3  I do not know what this really, how far —-
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it likely that Himmler went to see Hitler a bit jealous
      5  because the Army and the Air Force and the Navy had been
      6  given all these great tasks for this great ideological
      7  campaign in the East and Himmler has been to see Hitler
      8  and said, “Mein Fuhrer, I want jobs too. What are you
      9  going to give me?” and Hitler says to him, “Well, you are
    10  going to do this and you are going to do that. Your job
    11  is in the rear area, mopping up the partisans, holding
    12  down the population, securing the transport routes”?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. What happens is that I think the initiative came from
    14  Hitler because he is the one who is revising, first of
    15  all, the instruction, the guidelines by giving Jodl this
    16  instruction. So he is the one who thinks that the Army is
    17  not radical enough about, the Army has not completely
    18  understood the task ahead of them.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: The ideological nature?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The ideological was, so he is giving this instruction.
    21  Then in the end it is ended in these guidelines where
    22  these special tasks are mentioned.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, you are interested in the special tasks, are
    24  you not? We do not know what they are, but can I remind
    25  you of the meeting after Barbarossa began on July 16th
    26  1941 where Himmler is given special tasks, is he not?
    .           P-125

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, he is then — what he gets then is special tasks.
      2  He gets —-
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Pacifying the rear areas?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, he wanted more. He wanted the overall political —
      5  he wanted a political — he wanted the responsibility, the
      6  political responsibility, in a way to reorder the whole
      7  area. What he got there on 16th is the competence for the
      8  political — for the security — for securing.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Securing the rear area?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Securing the rear area. So it is the word “police” is the
    11  crucial word in this.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: “Police”?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: “Police”.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: So did Hitler on that 16th July 1941 meeting effectively
    15  give Himmler carte blanche? I am anxious not to lead you
    16  in any way on this. If you disagree, then please say so.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think the meeting is decisive and we can see after
    18  the meeting that actually Himmler sent more men to the
    19  East and the killings were radicalized and, you know, and
    20  the whole process escalated.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: And is it possible (and I put this as a hypothesis to you
    22  and it may militate against me or for me, I do not know)
    23  that Hitler may have said to Himmler, “Herr Reichsfuhrer,
    24  do what you see best, do whatever you think is right, but
    25  do not tell me what you are doing”? Would that be
    26  possible? “Just keep me out of it”?
    .           P-126

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is difficult for me to speculate about this.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: On the basis of their relationship, as we know?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It is really difficult for me to speculate about this
      4  question, what he actually said, because I do not have
      5  minutes or anything about that. I find it difficult
      6  to answer this question.
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: But later on we do find in 1942 the documents where
      8  Himmler says: “The Fuhrer has ordered the Eastern
      9  territories to be rid of the Jews. He has placed this
    10  burden on my shoulders. Nobody can take it off me”?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: And that rather fits in with that kind of hypothesis?
    13  I only want to put it you if you think you are comfortable
    14  with it.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I find this difficult to answer. You can, of course,
    16  argue that, in general, how this system, the political
    17  system, worked, the decision-making worked, that Hitler
    18  would make a general statement, gave general guidelines,
    19  and then leave it to other people responsible for this
    20  area actually to fill this out, you know, with their own
    21  energy and their own ideas, but really I do not know about
    22  the exact content of this guidelines.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: If it repeatedly happened that somebody like Hans Lammers
    24  went to see Hitler to protest about this or that, and
    25  Hitler would answer, or Ribbentrop would go to Hitler, and
    26  Hitler would answer, “Keep me out of this. Take it up
    .           P-127

      1  with Himmler. It is his pigeon, it is his business”?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think, if we want to, if we want to discuss it,
      3  I think we have to discuss these individual letters or
      4  pieces of documents.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is just a general impression I was asking you about
      6  from your knowledge of the papers. So what we differ on,
      7  Dr Longerich, is this, am I right in saying this, that the
      8  March 1941 documents, you think it was an ideological
      9  preparation for the ideological war in the East, that
    10  Himmler was being given orders for, and I say it was a
    11  typically military securing the rear areas kind of job he
    12  was being given?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, you cannot separate the Nazi ideas of warfare in the
    14  East from their ideological goals. I mean, for them it
    15  was not contradiction to speak about securing of areas and
    16  to speak of ideological goals. I do not think one can
    17  separate these two issues.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I just ask you this, Dr Longerich. Do
    19  you regard it as legitimate in deciding what the objective
    20  was to look and see what actually happened?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, of course.
    22  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Because we know pretty precisely what happened?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, of course.
    24  MR IRVING:  I will come to that question as question B, but,
    25  first of all, I will ask question A, if I may, my Lord?
    26  Would you agree that the documents before us fit entirely
    .           P-128

      1  with the notion of military securing of rear areas?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, because it says, if you just look at the documents and
      3  leave out what happened after that, it says here:
      4  “Special responsibilities by order of the Fuhrer for the
      5  preparation of the political administration. These
      6  special responsibilities arise from the ultimate decisive
      7  struggle between two opposing political systems”. So it
      8  is not just about policing and security.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would that include the murder and extermination of the
    10  political and military leaders on the other side, the
    11  intelligentsia?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think so.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Now, if we turn the page and now we come to the four
    14  Einsatzgruppen, page 57?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am only going to ask you one question about this because
    17  I think we accept what happened there, that killings
    18  began, but this is going to be now questions B to start
    19  with, the fact that the killings began, is there any
    20  indication that they began as a direct result of these
    21  orders and guidelines or did they just begin of their own
    22  accord like a spontaneous combustion?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. We have, I think, quite good documentation because we
    24  have Heydrich’s order of 29th and Heydrich’s letter to the
    25  highest SS police leader of —-
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: I think the 2nd July.
    .           P-129

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — 2nd July which actually gives you a very clear idea
      2  what the task of the Einsatzgruppen was.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: The 2nd July one which, my Lord, I am afraid I still have
      4  not translated for your Lordship — we are working on it
      5  — this is 2nd July 1941 where Heydrich, am I correct,
      6  says to the people in the Baltic states: “If pogrom
      7  start, you are not to stop them and, in fact, you are to
      8  help them along”?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I —-
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: “But don’t let it be seen”?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I translated this in the second part of my
    12  report. This is at page 6, and if you look at the English
    13  translation, I have to say here that I have,
    14  unfortunately, made a mistake here which I have to correct
    15  because if you read this indented paragraph “To be
    16  executed are”, you have to add the word “or” to the first
    17  line, “To be executed are all” and then it goes on
    18  “functionaries of the Comintern”, and so on, so that the
    19  word “all” —-
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So all of the lot of them?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: “All” also relates to the last line, “All Jews in Party
    22  and State functions”, so this is the way the original
    23  German document is arranged. So we know from this
    24  document that Heydrich ordered the Einsatzgruppen to
    25  execute all Jews and part — all Jews in Party and State
    26  functions and the more, I think most interesting word in
    .           P-130

      1  this “all” is the next line which you find on page 7 and
      2  “other, and all other radical elements including”, the
      3  most important word is I think the “etc.” in the end,
      4  which says, “Well, this is not a definite list of the
      5  people we are going to kill”. You know, you actually, you
      6  know, can add to the list. You can add saboteurs,
      7  propagandists, snipers, assassins and agitators, others
      8  who fall into this category.
      9  MR IRVING:  But am I right in saying —-
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: My interpretation of this order is that this is a kind of
    11  open, very general order which appeals to the initiative
    12  of the men in the field. They can actually go and extend
    13  the killings if they find it appropriate, if it is
    14  feasible.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: An umbrella order?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry?
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is a kind of umbrella order?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Also, there is no indication in this order who
    19  actually is to be spared. It does not say, for instance,
    20  it is not allowed to shoot women.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Why should it not be allowed to shoot women?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, it is not said in this order here.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: If there is a woman kommissar she was going to be spared,
    24  or a woman sniper?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Then would assume that this is a Jew in party or state
    26  function, or it is one of the propagandists, saboteurs
    .           P-131

      1  snipers, and so on. So I think this is not —-
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, I really want to come to this July 2nd
      3  document tomorrow when we deal with your second report,
      4  but I do draw attention to your footnote there, the second
      5  line from the bottom, the only Jews who are actually
      6  included in that are the Jews in party and state positions
      7  who are on the shooting list.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, and the word “etc.” in the end, I think in my
      9  interpretation —-
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: That could mean anything. It could mean the milkmen and
    11  everybody else, could it not?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, everybody else, everybody Jew or non-Jew who was
    13  suspicious from the point of view of the Nazis, the
    14  invaders.

    Section 132.15 to 147.4

    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can I now take you back to page 57, where we are looking
    16  at the Einsatzgruppen?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: I take it from your footnote that you have not made any
    19  use of the police decodes that are in the Public Record
    20  Office?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have looked at the police decodes, both in the
    22  collection here and also at the collection in Washington.
    23  I have seen several hundred of them, not more.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Since you wrote this report or before that?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I saw the Washington decodes about two years ago and the
    26  ones here after I finished the report, I think.
    .           P-132

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: Just a subsidiary question: How would you rate the
      2  decodes as a source? Are they really pure gold, untouched
      3  and unimpeachable integrity as a source?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In the sense that they are authentic?
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Authentic and likely to contain something approximating to
      6  the truth?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We have actually the chance in some cases to complete the
      8  deciphers with the German originals in this case.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Compare them?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Sorry, compare them, and in this case it is clear that
    11  they are authentic. The problem with the deciphers is
    12  that they are relating to the order police, which is one
    13  branch of the German police. A second problem is that the
    14  German would use, as far as I am aware, a different code
    15  for the highest class of classified documents. They would
    16  not use this code. The Einsatzgruppen would not send
    17  their messages through the order police system. It is
    18  clear from one of the deciphers from September that the
    19  Germans were aware of the danger that the codes could be
    20  broken and the Deluger sent an order to say what actually
    21  —-
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Keep the figures up or something?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Be quite cautious here what you are sending. Also, we do
    24  not know how comprehensive actually the work of the
    25  deciphers were. Is this everything they got? Is this the
    26  whole communication of the German police? So I think we
    .           P-133

      1  will spend, as historians always spend, a lot of time
      2  actually to assessing this document and to find out to
      3  which extent it will help us to understand the killings
      4  better than we did before.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: I have to take up two points. First of all, you say that
      6  because it is the Ordnungs Polizei, the order police, it
      7  does not contain a high level of material, but we have
      8  seen in this courtroom messages from Himmler to Jeckeln,
      9  and that is of course at the very highest level, is it
    10  not?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The high SS police leader would use the communication
    12  system of the order police. That is possible, yes.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would you accept, having spent some time looking at these
    14  decodes, that they are a pretty random selection, that
    15  they are not methodologically skewed in any way? Although
    16  it is not 100 per cent, the volume of documents that has
    17  been left for us to look at is a random collection of many
    18  hundreds of thousands of items?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am not sure what the numbers — what I am trying to say
    20  is, if you look at the deciphers, you cannot be sure that
    21  the deciphers contain the whole radio communication
    22  between, let us say, Himmler and Jeckeln, for instance.
    23  I have no way to find out how comprehensive and how
    24  representative this collection is. But of course it adds
    25  to our knowledge.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. You did not have those, just to make this quite
    .           P-134

      1  plain, at your disposal when you wrote this report?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I looked into some of the Washington files.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: The Washington files are not as complete as the British
      4  files?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, exactly.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I had the Washington files in front of me when I wrote the
      8  report, and I did not include them here because what I
      9  have seen in Washington for me — for instance, I did not
    10  find in Washington the Himmler Jeckeln correspondence and
    11  I did not spend enough time probably on it, but there is
    12  nothing in it which actually I thought was valuable enough
    13  to include it into the report.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, could you put, really for my
    15  benefit as much as anybody else’s, to Dr Longerich what it
    16  is you say about the decodes that is significant.
    17  MR IRVING:  I am just about to come to that very point, my
    18  Lord.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Good.
    20  MR IRVING:  You say you were not at that time familiar with the
    21  Himmler and Jeckeln decodes?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Have you in the meantime had a chance to look at them?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am referring here to the decodes of November 30th, the
    26  telephone call from Himmler to Heydrich on November 30th,
    .           P-135

      1  and principally I am going to ask you now about the deeds
      2  codes of December 1st 1941.
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: There are three?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: The first one is a message from Jeckeln to Himmler on the
      7  morning. My Lord, do you want to have the items in front
      8  of you?
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am trying to follow but the documents are
    10  now even more scattered about.
    11&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, they are not.
    12  MR IRVING:  They should now be —-
    13&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  They are now collected in here.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I know, but I had marked the previous
    15  versions of them, that is the problem, and these are all
    16  in German.
    17&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, they are not.
    18  MR IRVING:  I have translated them.
    19&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Wherever possible the English has been put
    20  opposite the German.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  31st December?
    22  MR IRVING:  1st December, my Lord.
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Page 142, if I am right on this, in this blue bundle.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Thank you very much.
    25  MR IRVING:  There should be three altogether. The first one is
    26  page 141. This is 9.15 in the morning. This is from the
    .           P-136

      1  senior SS police commander, north Russia, to Berlin,
      2  saying: “I need by next available air courier 10 Finnish
      3  military pistols with two drum magazines, each execution
      4  of Sonderaktionen”. He requests a radio telegram reply.
      5  What inference do you draw from that?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know whether the term Sonderaktionen refers here
      7  to shootings, and I do not know whether these Finnish
      8  pistols were used.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is it a reasonable inference if I say that this is
    10  probably a reference to the machine gunning of Jews into
    11  pits?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know. It says militairpistol. This is not a
    13  machine gun or short machine gun.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Execution of Sonderaktionen?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am not sure. I think it is reasonable to argue this
    16  line, but I do not know whether ever Finnish military
    17  pistols were used. They had their own weapons. I do not
    18  see a reason why they urgently needed for these executions
    19  Finnish weapons. It does not make sense for me. It might
    20  be right, but I do not know the background.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Might not there be reasons of camouflage? They wanted, if
    22  bodies were dug out, to have Finnish bullets found in the
    23  bodies rather than German bullets? This kind of thing
    24  might have been in it.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We have enough expertise information that they use
    26  normally the standard Army pistol.
    .           P-137

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: Tommy gun?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The 9 millimetre pistol for these operations. Actually
      3  I have not found something like that.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Dr Longerich, the ones I really rely on are page 143, two
      5  messages that afternoon, or evening rather, 7.30 p.m.,
      6  both at the same time. One from Himmler’s adjutant,
      7  Grotmann, and one from Himmler himself, to Jeckeln.
      8  Jeckeln was the chief villain, was he not? He was one of
      9  the biggest murderers in Riga.
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes he was the highest SS police leader.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: The chief SS police leader. The first one summons him to
    12  a conference with Himmler on 4th December?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: The second one, even more peremptorily, from Himmler
    15  himself says to him, “The Jews being outplaced to the
    16  Ostland are to be dealt with only in accordance with the
    17  guidelines laid down by myself and/or by the
    18  Reichssicherheitshauptamt on my orders. I would punish
    19  arbitrary and disobedient acts”.
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: That looks like quite an important telegram or message?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think you will relate this to the telephone call of 13th
    23  November, and I think you are right to do so.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am anxious to hear your opinion about it because it
    25  appears to be significant.
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I think these are two significant and important
    .           P-138

      1  entries.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. Let me float a hypothesis past you, Dr Longerich.
      3  Does this indicate to you that Jeckeln has acted outside
      4  the authority that he believed he had to kill Jews?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think this is a fair assumption. I think this is
      6  absolutely possible. Also, I find it quite striking, if
      7  this is right, if Jeckeln is actually responsible for the
      8  murder of 6,000 people, what is the consequence of that?
      9  Is he then court martialled? Or he is thrown out of the
    10  SS? No. He got a nasty letter.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: A rap across the knuckles?
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. That is all he got. Then he had dinner with Himmler
    13  on the 4th and that is it, obviously. It was probably a
    14  violation of the guidelines but it was not seen as a kind
    15  of severe disobedience, a lapse or something like that.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: These were just Jews, were they not? They were German
    17  Jews but just Jews?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is probably true, yes. That is definitely true.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: I think no one disputes the fact that this is a gangster
    20  state and these are gangsters amongst themselves are they
    21  not?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did the killings then stop for a while as far as German
    24  Jews were concerned?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: As far as we know, the killing on a large scale, mass
    26  executions, stopped in Riga until a couple of months,
    .           P-139

      1  until they used gas vans at the beginning of 1942.
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Just in Riga or elsewhere as well?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, to make this quite clear, there were two waves of
      4  deportation, the first one to Lodz of 20,000 Jews in
      5  October, and the second one, they planned to deport 50,000
      6  people, 25,000 each to Riga and to Minsk. They managed to
      7  deport about 21,000 to Riga or 24,000, and 8,000 to
      8  Minsk. The general observation is that it was obviously,
      9  as far as I see it, not the policy to kill them all
    10  because we do not have mass executions at this time in
    11  Lodz concerning German Jews and in Riga concerning German
    12  Jews. We only have these six trains in Kovno and Riga,
    13  and this was stopped. It was obviously, as is said here,
    14  not in accordance with the guidelines given by the
    15  Reichssichherheitshauptamt .
    16  MR IRVING:  It is a strange little glimpse of history which you
    17  have come across now at the end of the 20th century, 55
    18  years or more after the events. Is this an indication to
    19  you of how history is constantly in flux?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. These two messages confirm what we actually knew
    21  before. Obviously these killings in Riga were obviously
    22  not in accordance with the guidelines of the
    23  Reichssicherheitshauptamt and now we have another
    24  confirmation by these two telegrams.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: Has it been very widely noised around among German
    26  historians that the orders came down from on high that
    .           P-140

      1  these killings had to stop? I have never heard it
      2  before.
      3&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  That is a slightly tricky way of putting that
      4  question. What does Mr Irving mean by on high?
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think that is right. The problem is —
      6  I think this is what Mr Rampton is really saying — that
      7  there are guidelines. We do not know quite what the
      8  guidelines say. That is the difficulty. We cannot assume
      9  that the guidelines say no killing, full stop.
    10  MR IRVING:  I was tempted to say from the Fuhrer’s
    11  headquarters, but then Mr Rampton would certainly have
    12  objected.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is a separate point.
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No. Himmler was probably somewhere in that
    15  complex at the Wolfsschanze when the telephone call of
    16  30th November was made. That is as far as one can push at
    17  what one might call wishful thinking.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I just ask the question? There obviously
    19  were guidelines knocking around somewhere?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    21  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Do you take the view that the guidelines said no Jews,
    22  German Jews or any other Jews, to be killed ever?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No.
    24  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Or what?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have not seen these guidelines.
    26  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: No. Nobody has.
    .           P-141

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think I should not speculate on the guidelines. As far
      2  as I see this, the Holocaust emerged in different phases.
      3  We have the Soviet Jews who were killed during the summer
      4  first, and then the killing was extended in the autumn of
      5  41 to parts of Poland and to Serbia, then in the spring
      6  and summer of 42 to other areas. So the German Jews at
      7  this stage were deported into these ghettoes, and the
      8  majority of them survived until the spring of 1941. So it
      9  was not policy at this moment, I think, as far as I know,
    10  as far as I am able to reconstruct this, to kill
    11  systematically German Jews on arrival in the ghettoes in
    12  Minsk, Riga and Lodz. Here obviously Jeckeln, let me put
    13  it this way, made a mistake, which is quite difficult to
    14  say because it involved the death of 6,000 people. But it
    15  was obviously not the policy of the
    16  Reichssicherheitshauptamt to kill every German Jew who was
    17  deported in the East at this stage.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Was it the policy to kill some of them in so
    19  far as you can speculate?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: When this happened, as I said, there was no severe
    21  punishment for that. It was not seen as a major
    22  violation. It was seen as a minor incident.
    23  MR IRVING:  That is a different matter, whether it was
    24  punishable or not. Can I ask you to look back at page 122
    25  of that bundle of German documents, the same one? It is
    26  another decode.
    .           P-142

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Now this one you may also have seen in view of the fact
      3  that I found it in the PRO and brought it to the attention
      4  of the court. It concerns the shipment of train loads of
      5  Jews.
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Where are we?
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Page 122 of the bundle of documents. It concerns whether
      8  there was a homicidal intention already in store for the
      9  train loads of Jews being sent out of Germany. This is a
    10  train load of Jews. It is a telegram. I will ask you
    11  just to read it first and then I will ask you some
    12  questions.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This is the first train to Kovno. The people were all
    14  killed in Kovno.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Thank you for telling us. That is very interesting to
    16  know that. This is the train load on November 17th 1941,
    17  6.25 p.m., the transport train number DO, presumably that
    18  is Deutschland Ost, 26th, has left Berlin for Kovno with
    19  944 Jews on board, details of what the transport escort
    20  is. Then it says the transport has been provided with
    21  3,000 kilograms of bread, 27 hundred kilograms of flour,
    22  and various other things, which indicates that they were
    23  going to have enough food for the journey and some.
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: There is another telegram, I am not sure if it is in this
    26  bundle or not, Miss Rogers will know, which actually says
    .           P-143

      1  they are going to be taking their Gerat with them.
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Tools.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Their tools or appliances?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Does that imply they anticipated the people sending them,
      6  anticipated they were going to be going to a new life, if
      7  I can put it that way?
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  We had this this morning, you got the answer
      9  you wanted. They were lured into thinking that they were
    10  going to a new life in the East.
    11  MR IRVING:  Very well, but am I right now, Dr Longerich, you
    12  said that this particular train load, which was referred
    13  to here, which I did not know, I have to confess, ended up
    14  being murdered?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The first five trains to Riga were diverted to Kovno and
    16  these are the trains where the people were killed, and the
    17  first train to Riga as well. If I am not completely
    18  mistaken, I am pretty sure the people on this train were
    19  killed.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: So would this indicate a totally chaotic situation? The
    21  people in Germany who were sending them out, assume they
    22  are going to need tools and bread for a new life, whereas
    23  the people who received them, bumped them off as they
    24  arrived?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Again, the tools and the food was provided by the Jewish
    26  community.
    .           P-144

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is neither here nor there, is it, really?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It was provided by the Jewish communities, so the Jewish
      3  communities were assuming that, as a kind of solidarity
      4  with the people who were deported, they had to provide
      5  them with enough food and tools to survive the first days
      6  and maybe to build up new homes. I cannot draw from the
      7  fact that these trains were provided with food and tools,
      8  I am not able to draw any conclusions as far as the
      9  motives and aims of the Gestapo was concerned. It refers
    10  to the Jewish communities in Germany, what they thought it
    11  was appropriate to do.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, but —-
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The SS or the police did not provide the trains with food
    14  from their own stocks.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. I now take you to page 124. That is the other
    16  message I was referring to, where they are being sent with
    17  the food and the money and the appliances.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: This is a message from the SS, is it not, in Bremen to the
    20  commander of the police in Riga, saying, we are sending
    21  all these people with this food and with these appliances?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Is a reasonable inference, reading that, that the people
    24  in Bremen assumed that they were not just carrying all
    25  this stuff as camouflage, because they were going to be
    26  bumped off when they got there? The people in Bremen had
    .           P-145

      1  no idea they were going to their deaths?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Gestapo, you mean?
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: The people who sent this message.
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know. I am really cautious to draw this
      5  conclusion from this document. They are just saying the
      6  Jews are coming and they are bringing money and tools and
      7  food with them. I have to see if it survives the internal
      8  correspondence of the Gestapo in Bremen. I would not
      9  simply agree.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would not the least perverse interpretation to be put on
    11  this message be that it is an innocent message from the
    12  people in Bremen, saying we are sending a train load of a
    13  thousand people who are members of the chosen race, with
    14  all their food and appliances, and they are arriving at
    15  such and such a time, and so on? Any other interpretation
    16  is pure speculation.
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Every interpretation here is I think speculation. The
    18  money, for instance: Do you think this is money from the
    19  Gestapo in Bremen to buy food for the Jews in Riga?
    20  I would think the money is taken from the Jewish community
    21  and it goes into the pockets of the Gestapo. I see this
    22  document here and I cannot follow your line of
    23  interpretation.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am not interpreting it. I am just reading what it says.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. So it says that this train was sent to Riga and did
    26  they have money and food and tools on the trains? That is
    .           P-146

      1  what I can read from the document.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. I think, unless your Lordship has another question
      3  to ask about these decodes, we can move on.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Not for me.

    Section 147.5 to 166.15

      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: We now move either onwards or backwards, whichever way you
      6  look at it, to the 16th July 1941 conference between
      7  Hitler and Rosenberg on the policing of the Eastern
      8  territories. Did you use the diary of Otto Brottigan?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I used part of it which is printed in a German edition.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Did you not look at my original diary which is in the
    11  Institute of History? I donated the entire diary to the
    12  Institute of History.
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I used the one which is printed and commented.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: I am not sure how much of it is printed but the
    15  handwritten diary describes the atmosphere of rivalry
    16  between Rosenberg and Hitler, and Rosenberg coming out
    17  full of glee because he had got all that he wanted.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: There is this typical jealous going on at the top level
    20  inside the hierarchy of Third Reich.
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: You agree that in that entire meeting of 16th July 1941
    23  the word “Jew” was not even mentioned? So it is not very
    24  important from our point of view, except for establishing
    25  the hierarchy in occupied Eastern Russia?
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Where is this in the report, or is it not?
    .           P-147

      1  MR IRVING:  Page 57, paragraph 15.7.
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I am not sure at the moment whether in the entire text the
      3  name Jew is not mentioned, but I think for me the central
      4  passage here is this expression of Hitler.
      5  MR IRVING:  Anybody who looks askance?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: How would you translate it?
      7  Q. [Mr Irving]: Anybody who looks askance can be shot.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. I think this is a category which also would include
      9  Jews, without particularly referring to them.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. You do agree that “der nur schief schaut” does not
    11  actually refer to somebody looking odd? It is actually
    12  somebody who is looking out of the corner of his eyes at
    13  you, or something like that? Anybody suspect?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Anybody suspect, yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: You summarize in paragraph 15.8, rather dangerously and
    16  adventurously in my view: “With the beginning of the
    17  massive murder of the Soviet civilian population in the
    18  summer of 1941, a stage was reached in which these
    19  statements and similar ones by Hitler could no longer be
    20  understood as general threats of violence”?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: So we are looking really between the lines, are we there?
    23  Again, we have nothing specific to point to.
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think, if you look back and look at Hitler’s orders and
    25  his speeches in March 1941, and the fact that he demanded
    26  the annihilation or the extermination of the Jewish
    .           P-148

      1  Bolshevik complex, if you look at the intelligentsia — of
      2  course this involved the killing of at least 10,000,
      3  probably 100,000, people. Then I think one has to take
      4  this into account if one looks at the way Hitler actually
      5  used this terminology after these events. I do not know
      6  whether we have actually reached here the stage where
      7  I refer to the Einsatzgruppen and their reports back, and
      8  the fact that these reports were widely circulated, we
      9  have evidence that Hitler actually has seen them —-.
    10  Q. [Mr Irving]: I would be interested. Do you know off the top of your
    11  head or from your memory what is the evidence that Hitler
    12  actually read the Einsatzgruppen reports?
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us find it in the report.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I should be cautious here. We have this document from the
    15  1st August 1941.
    16  MR IRVING:  Muller document?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Muller document, which I erroneously dated 2nd August,
    18  41, in this report. I cannot find it for the moment.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: That document does not show he was shown any?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No, you are right.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Take this a little bit more slowly. Lets
    22  find your reference to the Muller document. Is that in
    23  your second report?
    24&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes.
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    26  MS ROGERS::  Page 26 of 2.
    .           P-149

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: You are right, one should be cautious. Is it 26?
      2  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Are you sure it is page 26.
      3  MR IRVING:  It is in the bundle of documents.
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have it in the report 1, page 57, in the middle of 15.6.
      5  MR IRVING:  Page 50 of the bundle.
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I use the wrong date. It is definitely the 1st August.
      7  It says here: “Dem Fuhrer soll von hier aus lfd Berichte
      8  unber die Arbeit der Einsatzgruppen im Osten vorgelegt
      9  weren”. In English, the Fuhrer should be presented with
    10  continuous reports on the work of the Einsatzgruppen in
    11  the East from here. So it is an intention, yes. But we
    12  have also other evidence that were not only the
    13  Eichnesmeldung, which were done on a daily basis, but
    14  there were also monthly and bimonthly reports about the
    15  activities of the Einsatzgruppen. We know that these
    16  reports were widely circulated. They had a distribution
    17  list with more than a hundred names or institutions on
    18  it. These monthly reports were widely circulated among
    19  the different ministries. For example, in the Foreign
    20  Ministry one of the monthly reports was shown to 22
    21  people. It is difficult, I think impossible, to argue
    22  that the result of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen
    23  could be hidden before anybody, because it was literally,
    24  I think hundreds of people actually in the official
    25  capacity have seen these reports. So I think that this is
    26  enough evidence to say that the intention that Hitler
    .           P-150

      1  should see this, that this actually was carried out,
      2  because it could not be, it was impossible to hide it
      3  before. On the contrary, it is exactly what he himself
      4  demanded in these orders. It is about the destruction of
      5  the Bolshevik Judao empire. That is what he wanted to
      6  hear and that is why they presented him I think with these
      7  reports.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You say he ordered it and it happened?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    10  MR IRVING:  Now I have to ask supplementary questions on that
    11  of course. You say that these Einsatzgruppen reports had
    12  lengthy distribution lists. You mentioned 22 names on
    13  one.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Was the adjutants officer, the Fuhrer, one of them?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I did not say that 22, the Einsatzgruppen reports, we do
    17  not have complete distribution lists for every report and
    18  they vary from report to report. So I do not know.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Well let me ask in general terms. On any of the
    20  distribution lists was there any of Adolf Hitler’s
    21  officers?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We do not have a complete set of distribution lists.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. On even one report then?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have to look to the reports. I cannot say this.
    25  I found in report No. 128 the Party Chancellery, for
    26  instance, involved. If you want to argue that these
    .           P-151

      1  operations of the Einsatzgruppen were hidden before Hitler
      2  —-
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Hidden from?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: From Hitler, sorry, then you must argue that Bormann was
      5  part of this conspiracy because he received a copy, and he
      6  would not be alarmed and go to Hitler.
      7&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am sorry. I do not interrupt in the middle of
      8  an answer — at least I try not to. Again, I am a bit
      9  troubled by all of this. I had the transcript reference
    10  some days ago, weeks ago, I have not got it at the
    11  moment. My recollection is that Mr Irving accepted in
    12  cross-examination, first that there was systematic mass
    13  shootings in the East by the Einsatzgruppen and, secondly,
    14  that they were approved by Hitler. So where are we going
    15  I ask myself?
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I just check that because that thought
    17  had gone through my mind? I was hesitant about it.
    18&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It was early on in the case, almost probably the
    19  first week.
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think I will be able to tell you.
    21  MR IRVING:  I think the answer to that is that there are
    22  killings and there are killings.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am not sure that is the way it has been
    24  put.
    25&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am not going to swear to it, but I think my
    26  recollection is more or less right.
    .           P-152

      1  MR IRVING:  I am going to come back to this question.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am trying to prevent Mr Irving coming back to
      3  these questions, because I think it is a waste of the
      4  court’s time and my client’s money, and this witness’s
      5  time too.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am not sure, doing the best I can from my
      7  own notes, that the latter part of what you have just said
      8  is right. But, if anybody can check on the transcript, it
      9  is quite an important point. I do not think if I may
    10  respectfully say, so on your say so I can stop this line
    11  of cross-examination. If you can pick up a reference?
    12&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, of course not.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Your position now, Mr Irving, and I do not
    14  suggest it was different before, is that, yes, there were
    15  these mass shootings going on and there were documents
    16  floating around reporting them, but you do not accept that
    17  the reports ever got back to Hitler?
    18&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  What I am quite certain about, my Lord —-
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I have an answer first? Is that right?
    20  MR IRVING:  That is correct, my Lord. That is the position.
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Although the one we do have for December 42
    22  says “vorgelegt”, you still do not accept that Hitler saw
    23  it? That is what jogs my memory that I do not think it
    24  has ever been—-
    25  MR IRVING:  December 29th, 1942 yes, but that is something
    26  different which we will come to in due course.
    .           P-153

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is the same thing. It is a report of
      2  shootings by the Einsatzgruppen.
      3  MR IRVING:  My Lord, if you feel I am wasting this witness’s
      4  time, I do hope that your Lordship will tell me.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  What Mr Rampton is anxious about is that you
      6  should not waste time by cross-examining on a point which
      7  you have already conceded.
      8  MR IRVING:  I am very unlikely to do that, my Lord. It is my
      9  time also.
    10&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I do not agree with that. Certainly it was
    11  conceded that report No. 51 of 29th December was probably
    12  seen by Hitler. That is out of the way. That has gone.
    13  That is 363,000 plus Jewish deaths by shooting.
    14  MR IRVING:  I beg your pardon? That was conceded?
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I do not think that was conceded. We must
    16  get the references.
    17&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It was conceded that Hitler probably saw it.
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No. That is not my recollection.
    19&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I will have to check this and I have to do it
    20  quickly because otherwise we are going to be here—-
    21  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Interrupt, if you would, again when you have
    22  the reference, but I think it is the sort of thing that we
    23  must have a reference on. Carry on, if you would,
    24  Mr Irving, unless and until you are interrupted.
    25  MR IRVING:  Very briefly, from your knowledge, if you had seen
    26  an Einsatzgruppen report which had indicated in the
    .           P-154

      1  distribution list that it had been shown to Hitler or to
      2  Hitler’s staff, or to his Adjutants, then you would have
      3  mentioned it, would you not?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can you just say geographically where was the Party
      6  chancellery situated?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Party Chancellery, the main office, was in Munich, but
      8  they had of course a liaison office in Berlin, or wherever
      9  Hitler was. Bormann was, after he became secretary of the
    10  Fuhrer, almost constantly a member of Hitler’s personal
    11  entourage. He also made sure that the Party Chancellery
    12  was always represented in Hitler’s entourage if he was not
    13  able to be present there.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You have seen documents where Bormann is on
    15  the distribution list for these anmeldung?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have found one. These distribution lists are not
    17  complete. In 128 it says among 55 copies there is one
    18  copy going to the Party Chancellery.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would that have been the Munich office?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it only said Party Chancellery, and it says Party
    21  Chancellery in the main well ….
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Let me ask another specific follow up. On all the copies
    23  that you have seen, are there any handwritten annotations
    24  like “has been submitted to the Fuhrer” or anything like
    25  that?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: As far as I have seen, no, there is nothing like that.
    .           P-155

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: No. Again if you had noticed that, you would have brought
      2  it to our attention?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is not impossible they were shown to Hitler, but we
      5  have no evidence, is that right?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would phrase it much stronger. I would think it is
      7  inconceivable that Hitler was not informed about these
      8  reports because they were so widely circulated, and there
      9  was a specific order on 1st August actually that materials
    10  should be shown to him.
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: What period are you talking about now? Before December
    12  1941 or after December 1941?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: We are talking about what?
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: The Einsatzgruppen reports where you say it is
    15  inconceivable that he was not shown them?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The reports started in June and ended in March ’42, and
    17  I think this would apply to the whole period because this
    18  letter actually from Muller which says it should be shown
    19  to him is from the early stages, from 1st August 1941.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: The fact that the letter from Muller says that the Fuhrer
    21  wants to be shown them does not necessarily mean to say
    22  that it was acted upon?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I assume that this was acted upon because, in
    24  general, orders by Muller were carried out as a very
    25  efficient head of the secret police. I think —-
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: One example is that I requested that I should be shown
    .           P-156

      1  proof of where this document is and that has not been
      2  acted upon either?
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Mr Irving, I think we have gone through this
      4  enough. I hear what the witness says. He says it is
      5  inconceivable that Hitler would not have known.
      6  MR IRVING:  One further question on the Muller document. The
      7  subject of the Muller document is the provision of visual
      8  materials, is it not?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. Well, it says, in particular, visual material, it
    10  does not include — it does not exclude, of course, other
    11  material. It says [German – document not provided] so
    12  they should be continuously informed and, in particular,
    13  he is interested in visual material.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: Will you read out what the topic line of the telegram is?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, the topic line is [German – document not provided].
    16  So the topic line is the visual material. But, of course,
    17  if you look into this, I mean, if you really look into the
    18  text here, [German – document not provided] So you can
    19  read it as it is an established fact that Hitler should be
    20  on a continuous basis provided with reports, and for this
    21  purpose he needs, in particular, with the material, so it
    22  could be that this refers to an older, to an older,
    23  earlier order, and this is kind of common practice,
    24  established practice.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: What were the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen that are
    26  referred to in this?
    .           P-157

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, the tasks were basically the same, I would say, like
      2  the [German]. So they were, in particular, I mean, they,
      3  of course, had the explicit orders to execute enemies or
      4  potential enemies of the Reichs, particularly including
      5  the Jews, but also they had other tasks, in general, one
      6  could say intelligence work, for instance, to trace
      7  documents from the Communist Party, for instance. But
      8  also you can see from the reports that they were dealing
      9  with all kind of matters; they were dealing with the
    10  situation of the churches in the Soviet Union and with the
    11  food situation, and so on.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: So these reports were sometimes, what, nine or 10
    13  paragraphs long of which only one paragraph concerned the
    14  killing of Jews?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: One is, I think, in general, they had a kind of scheme and
    16  there is one paragraph concerning the fate of Jews and the
    17  other paragraphs were concerning other issues.
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: So from the Muller telegram of 1st August 1941, is it
    19  plain what Hitler asked to be shown?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Visual material.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Everything, visual — would there have been visual
    22  material about the killings?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, it refers to posters. We know that there were
    24  posters, for instance, demanding the Jews had to — my
    25  English is running out.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: “Concentrate”?
    .           P-158

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — concentrate somewhere a place. It refers to other
      2  documents; photographs, there were definitely photographs
      3  of mass executions. So from this, from this list of
      4  things, I would say, yes.
      5  Q. [Mr Irving]: Have you seen any photographs of mass executions in German
      6  files?
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I have not seen photographs of mass executions in German
      8  files like the Ministry or something like that.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can I take you now to page 62 and we will move forwards
    10  from there? This is the Goebbels diary entry of December
    11  12th 1941. We keep coming back against it again. The
    12  first two and a half lines on page 62: “As concerns the
    13  Jewish question, the Fuhrer is determined to make a clean
    14  sweep. He had prophesied to the Jews that if they once
    15  again brought about a world war they would experience
    16  their own extermination”. That is Goebbels reporting
    17  Adolf Hitler, is it not, what he said in the speech?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: “This was not just an empty phrase. The World War is
    20  there, the extermination of Jewry must be the necessary
    21  consequence. This question must be seen without
    22  sentimentality. We are not here in order to have sympathy
    23  with the Jews”, and so on. The rest of that paragraph
    24  could be Hitler speaking, but it could equally well be
    25  Dr Goebbels’ gloss on it, could it not?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think it is — I read this as a summary of Hitler’s
    .           P-159

      1  speech. If you compare the words of Goebbels, the way he
      2  put it, if you compare it with the speech Frank gave four
      3  years, four days later in Krakau, you can see that they
      4  actually use the same words. They both refer to the fact
      5  that one should not have compassion with them, that they
      6  both refer to the prophecy. So I think this is a, I would
      7  interpret it as a summary of Hitler’s speech which is
      8  quite detailed here.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: As you are a German, Dr Longerich, it is proper to put
    10  this question to you. Would not that second part of that
    11  paragraph be in the subjunctive if it was referring to
    12  Adolf Hitler?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, if one would assume that Goebbels always used the
    14  subjunctive when he refers to Hitler’s speeches, but if
    15  you look into the Goebbels’ diaries, we know that there is
    16  a mixture of the subjunctive and the present tense. So he
    17  did not use this in a — it was not…
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Consistent?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Consistent, exactly, yes.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: If it had been subjective, then that would have been a
    21  clear clue that he was quoting Hitler, would it not?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It would be a clue, yes.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: So we are not sure either way?
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  When you say subjunctive, you mean reported
    25  speech?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    .           P-160

      1  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: Well, in German, for reported speech they use the
      2  subjunctive?
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Because we do not and that is why I was a bit
      4  confused.
      5  MR IRVING:  They do in various other languages too, I think the
      6  Spanish also do and…
      7&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Can I intervene? I have not all the references
      8  I want, but I suspect this may be sufficient. On day 4
      9  which is, because I think we can put a stop to all this
    10  now —-
    11  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think, unfortunately, we have moved past
    12  it .
    13&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am so sorry.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  It is not your fault, but I asked for
    15  reference.
    16&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It is not my fault, no, because, as a matter of
    17  fact, I do not have time to read the transcripts in this
    18  case at the moment. I will have to do that in due course.
    19  17th January, page 95 — this reflects and earlier
    20  concession which I have not presently found — line 1,
    21  question by me: “The probability that Hitler saw that
    22  report”, that is report No. 51, “and was, therefore,
    23  implicated in the murder of all these 363,000 Eastern Jews
    24  is confirmed, is it not, by a subsequent knowledge of this
    25  document, by which I mean the Himmler note of the 18th
    26  December of that year?” Answer by Mr Irving: “Yes, there
    .           P-161

      1  is no contention between us on that point”.
      2  Then if one turns to page 106 on the same day,
      3  we find your Lordship asking some questions, and at line
      4  19, Mr Irving says: “What authorized, my Lord? The
      5  killing of Jews, the partisans?” Question by your
      6  Lordship: “Yes, you accepted that, I thought, a few
      7  minutes ago”. Answer: “The Jews to be liquidated as
      8  partisans, 16th December, the conversation, yes. If we
      9  can expand that very meagre note, that skimpy note, into
    10  that interpretation which I think is a legitimate
    11  expansion, certainly Hitler sanctioned the killing of the
    12  Jews on the Eastern Front, all the rest of the Jews, the
    13  non-German Jews, and that has never been a contention for
    14  me.”
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Well, that looks fairly clear.
    16&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It is fairly clear. The next day it becomes even
    17  clearer at page 10, day 5, again it is your Lordship, this
    18  is line 12 on page 10: “Let us just keep an eye on the
    19  reality. You did accept yesterday, as I understood it,
    20  the shooting of Jews and others on the Eastern Front was a
    21  programme which was systematic and co-ordinated by Berlin
    22  and Hitler was aware and approved of what was going on?”
    23  Mr Irving: “The shootings of Russian Jews, my Lord, yes”.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Russian Jews?
    25&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes. That means everybody but the people who were
    26  coming from Germany. In other words, he is not conceding
    .           P-162

      1  that the shooting of the Berlin Jews in Riga was
      2  authorized, but he is conceding that there was systematic
      3  mass shooting by the Einsatzgruppen of the Jews in the
      4  East which was authorized and approved by Hitler.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, well again that does look to be fairly
      6  clear, Mr Irving. This is difficult for you because you
      7  are in the middle of your cross-examination, but I think
      8  you must pause and reflect about this because it seems to
      9  me that Mr Rampton is probably right in saying, although
    10  I recollect a lot of cross-examination going the other
    11  way —-
    12  MR IRVING:  My Lord, I have made a note of the —-
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  — Mr Rampton may be right in saying you
    14  ultimately did concede it.
    15  MR IRVING:  I have made a note of the page number of the
    16  transcript and I shall certainly attend to it, but I do
    17  not think this is the time or place to do it. Certainly
    18  I cannot do it on the hoof like this.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, I think that is right. The problem, of
    20  course, is that we do not want a lot of cross-examination
    21  which strictly really is not really relevant because it is
    22  a point you have conceded, but I think you have really
    23  moved on beyond the issue of whether Hitler had these
    24  reports about the shootings on the Eastern Front, have you
    25  not?
    26  MR IRVING:  It is not a vitally important point.
    .           P-163

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Well, leave on one side whether it is
      2  important.
      3  MR IRVING:  But I am certainly entitled to ask this witness who
      4  has seen the reports whether he has seen any evidence that
      5  they were shown to Hitler in detail, and I would certainly
      6  have to look and see what I had said or m alleged to have
      7  concede.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
      9&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I just read it out.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  But, Mr Rampton, he is in the middle of
    11  cross-examining. I think it is difficult for him to —-
    12&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I know that, but I am anxious to save time.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So I am but —-
    14&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I really am.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  — I think and hope Mr Irving has moved
    16  beyond now whether Hitler knew through the reports of the
    17  shooting of Jews in the East.
    18&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I just which I had been able to find this a bit
    19  more quickly and then I could have saved some time, but
    20  never mind.
    21  MR IRVING:  Then we would have missed out on some very
    22  important information which is that there is no evidence
    23  that Hitler saw the Einsatzgruppen report.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, but you have to take the witness’s
    25  answer that it is inconceivable that he did not know which
    26  would mean that if you did concede the point you were
    .           P-164

      1  right to have conceded it.
      2  MR IRVING:  My Lord, with the utmost respect to both yourself
      3  and to the witness, the fact that something seems
      4  inconceivable is not evidence or proof. It is interesting
      5  and has to be put into the scale pans against which has to
      6  be set the fact that all the evidence is there, the
      7  documents are now in 55 years later and the evidence is
      8  still not there.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I know you have a lot of other things to do,
    10  but if you would be good enough to look at those passages
    11  overnight and perhaps indicate tomorrow morning what your
    12  considered stance is in relation to Hitler’s
    13  knowledge —-
    14  MR IRVING:  I will make a little written statement on it.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  — of the shootings by the Einsatzgruppen.
    16&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am a bit cautious about that, if I may say so,
    17  because what it involves, if Mr Irving should back track
    18  on what I have just read, or tried to back track,
    19  Professor Browning has now gone. I cannot bring him back
    20  without enormous expense and inconvenience from America to
    21  go through what he would have said if I had known that
    22  that position was challenged. It means that I have to
    23  rehearse my quite long cross-examination of Mr Irving on
    24  this question. I do not believe that in the interests of
    25  what one might call justice and proportionality that
    26  Mr Irving ought to be, if I am right about where I got him
    .           P-165

      1  to in cross-examination. In the face of the documents and
      2  what I might call common sense, I do not believe it is
      3  right that he should be allowed to reconsider his
      4  position.
      5  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let us wait and see what his position finally
      6  turns out to be, and then we can argue about it if needs
      7  be. But let me know, please, in the morning and now carry
      8  on with your cross-examination.
      9  MR IRVING:  I do not think it is an enormously vital point
    10  actually in the whole Holocaust denial issue one way or
    11  the other.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  If it is not a vital point, it may be you
    13  will keep with your concession.
    14  MR IRVING:  Mr Rampton is yelping before he is hurt actually.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Do not let’s denigrate his motives.

    Section 166.16 to 178.11

    16  MR IRVING:  Yes. Page 62, if you look at footnote 157, please,
    17  you quoted there a document, a wartime document, in the
    18  last three lines of that footnote there, a very
    19  confidential information report: “The number of Jews in
    20  this entire area is estimated at 6 million and in the
    21  course of the coming year they are going to be brought
    22  across the Urals or otherwise got rid of”?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: Does that not also indicate that the primary German
    25  intention was the geographical movement, dumping them
    26  across the Urals?
    .           P-166

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, it says —-
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: Chased across the Urals?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, it says two things. First of all, it is referring to
      4  the biological eradication of the entirety of Jewry in
      5  Europe — sorry, I am confused now. Sorry, those are two
      6  different documents, yes. You are looking here at this
      7  confidential report which are the notes of the reporter,
      8  so this is from a press conference, from a press
      9  conference, and under the heading “strictly
    10  confidential”. So somebody in the press conference said
    11  that, you know, a way to solve the problem is to bring
    12  this estimated 6 million across the Urals.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. But does that not indicate that there were two
    14  things being spoken of at that time, the geographical
    15  chasing across the Urals, generally spoken of at that
    16  time?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think it is quite —-
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: “Failing which we are going to have to liquidate them”?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: This refers to — yes, somebody in the press conference
    20  said in November ’41, “It is still a feasible way of
    21  solving this problem to bring these people over the
    22  Urals”. So that is all I can say.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is a press conference by Rosenberg, right?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is not a vitally important point, but there does
    26  appear, even at that time, to have been a degree of
    .           P-167

      1  uncertainty as to what was going to happen?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but one should then also, if one speaks about this
      3  press conference, one should not leave out the words, you
      4  know, Rosenberg’s words, “biological eradication of the
      5  entirety of Jewry”.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: They are both second-hand reporting, are they not? One is
      7  by the [German]?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Who is that? I forget who that was, Rosenberg, but,
    10  anyway, it is a second-hand report, is it not?
    11  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: Over the page, of course, page 63, we have something that
    13  is very first-hand. This is the vital Heinrich Himmler
    14  note of 18th December 1941.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: You probably know what I am going to ask you, if you have
    17  the phrase Judenfrager als partisan and ausurotten, what
    18  does that mean? How would you translate that into
    19  English? Als partisan and ausurotten?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, to be extirpated as partisans.
    21  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes. I think there is no question in this case that it
    22  has a homicidal meaning, does it not?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    24  Q. [Mr Irving]: And what does one normally do with partisans in warfare?
    25  Are they shot?
    26  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not know what one normally does, but from the — the
    .           P-168

      1  orders were here clear. I mean, I refer to this orders at
      2  the beginning. The orders here were clear that a civilian
      3  who would, you know, actually — a civilian who —-
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: “Who takes guns up”?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — who takes guns up, yes, would be shot on the spot.
      6  Q. [Mr Irving]: That is the basic laws of war, the Frank tireur(?) are
      7  shot. The Americans did it, we did it.
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I only can answer this question as far as the German
      9  Army and the war on the East is concerned. It was, you
    10  know —-
    11  Q. [Mr Irving]: If it had said the partisan and ausrottung, that would
    12  have been to be shot like partisans —-
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, it would be different.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: That would have been a totally different meaning, would it
    15  not?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: It would be different, yes.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Does the meaning of that sentence as it stands imply that
    18  these were Jewish partisans who were to be shot as
    19  partisans?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. “Juden to be extirpated as partisans”. It does not
    21  mean that only Jews have recognized as partisans were
    22  shot, they are just Jews were shot as partisans.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  “As if they were partisans”, that is what it
    24  comes to?
    25  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    26  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: That is your evidence?
    .           P-169

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      2  MR IRVING:  Although it does say “as partisans” and not “like
      3  partisans”, if I can put it in English. I do not want to
      4  hang that on the big bell, as you say in German, but there
      5  is a difference between the two words “als” and “wie”, is
      6  there not?
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, but I think the witness is not accepting
      8  your interpretation, Mr Irving.
      9  MR IRVING:  Well, the translation is specific, but he may not
    10  accept the interpretation of it, of course, the
    11  conclusions from it. Paragraph 17.7, you have Adolf
    12  Hitler, on the fifth line of that, on 30th January 1942,
    13  saying that it is clear the war can only end with either
    14  the Aryan peoples being extirpated or the Jews
    15  disappearing from Europe”, “Das Judentum aus Europa
    16  verschwindet”. That again implies a geographical
    17  solution, does it not? This is 10 days after the Wannsee
    18  conference.
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, “das Judentum aus Europa verschwindet”, I think that
    20  this expression, “aus Europa verschwindet”, could be seen
    21  as a camouflage language that actually disappeared from
    22  the German, from the area under German control, by, you
    23  know, anyhow. There was actually no chance how, you know,
    24  6 million Jews could disappear at this stage from the
    25  German, from the territory under German control.
    26  Q. [Mr Irving]: As you point out just three days earlier in one of the
    .           P-170

      1  table talks, this is now the following page, the second
      2  indented paragraph: “The Jew must get out of Europe. The
      3  best would be if they went to Russia! I have no sympathy
      4  with the Jews. They will always remain an element which
      5  stir up the peoples against one another”. Again he is
      6  talking of a geographical solution even in private, to his
      7  own private staff? So why would camouflage be necessary
      8  there?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, when you refer to the so-called [German], the table
    10  talks, one has to take into account that the table talks,
    11  you know, there were various people present on the table,
    12  so you could not, you cannot just assume that this is what
    13  Hitler really thought, that this really, you know, you are
    14  getting deep insight into his real world. This is always
    15  addressed to all kinds of people who were just present
    16  there. So he would be very cautious to speak about his
    17  real intentions, as far as the Jews are concerned. So
    18  I would hesitate to draw this conclusion from that.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: He never had any outsiders at these table talks, did he?
    20  They were always members of his private staff.
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but the members of his private staff, I mean, for
    22  instance, his secretary and others were not to, you know,
    23  Hitler has very specific rules about keeping secrecies and
    24  they were not, you know, just because they were his
    25  coworkers, they were not allowed to share all the secrets
    26  with him.
    .           P-171

      1  Q. [Mr Irving]: But on occasion in his table talks he speaks pretty
      2  tough. He talks pretty violent language, does he not, in
      3  the table talk?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, that is true, but I do not think that the table talks
      5  are the best, the ideal source to find out, you know, what
      6  was really going on in Hitler’s mind because Hitler was
      7  very careful, particularly as far as the Holocaust is
      8  concerned, very careful what he was saying there.
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Well, the only justification for saying that kind of
    10  thing, of course, is if you have anything explicit
    11  anywhere else and there is not, is there? Is it not
    12  possible that he is just saying what is in the table talk
    13  and in Goebbels’ diary and elsewhere is an accurate
    14  reflection of what Hitler really knew? Is that not a more
    15  logical explanation?
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think the Goebbels diaries are different from the
    17  table talks but I —-
    18  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can I take you to paragraph 18.7 which is two pages later,
    19  page 56? The last paragraph there, you do not quote it in
    20  full, but this is the paragraph, my Lord, that we were
    21  looking at yesterday which is —-
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, I remember.
    23  MR IRVING:  — the deportation to Siberia.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Central Africa too.
    25  MR IRVING:  Central Africa, yes. Is that also more camouflage
    26  and even with Dr Goebbels sitting there who knows very
    .           P-172

      1  well what is going on or suspects what is going on?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you know, if we look at the situation what was going
      3  on in April ’42, we know that probably three quarter of a
      4  million or one million Jews in the Soviet Union were
      5  shot. They had started to systematically kill Jewish
      6  women and children in Serbia. They had opened the — if
      7  this is the right way to say it — extermination camp in
      8  Chelmo in December, they had just opened the extermination
      9  camp in Belzec and were carrying out mass extermination
    10  there. So one has to take this into account.
    11  Really, I have difficulties, I have to say, to
    12  find, you know, an easy answer to this document because, I
    13  mean, they are in the middle of mass extermination and
    14  Goebbels is quite aware of that, and they are still
    15  talking about the idea that they could force the Jews out
    16  of Europe. I find this really difficult to explain.
    17  Q. [Mr Irving]: Can you not see any possible explanation?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Possible explanation —-
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: That Hitler did not know?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The possible explanation would be that they just used
    21  among themselves this kind of camouflage language because
    22  they did not, they did not — I mean, I have no trace, no
    23  evidence, that they spoke among themselves really about,
    24  “We are going, we are about to kill 6 million people. We
    25  are going to kill men, women, children, everybody”, so
    26  they would use this kind of, this kind of language among
    .           P-173

      1  themselves, and, yes, that is the explanation which seems
      2  most plausible to me.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: They were in a state of denial then, they were doing these
      4  things but pretending they were not?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Among themselves, I think, you know, they were in a way or
      6  Hitler was in this way using double standards. He was,
      7  I think, I am convinced that he was quite aware what was
      8  happening —-
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: You keep saying that.
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — but among one of his best friends, so among themselves
    11  they would use a different language, they would not speak
    12  about, they would not say, you know, “We are actually
    13  killing so many children per month”. They would just —-
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  But if he knew, supposing, assuming that
    15  Hitler knew all about the death camps and all the rest of
    16  it, what puzzles me a little bit about this camouflage
    17  theory is I do not quite see why it was necessary to talk
    18  about the Jews at all. Would you not keep your mouth shut
    19  rather than have this pantomime going on?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, if you look into the conversation between, you know,
    21  Goebbels and Hitler, this was a constant, you know, a
    22  topic which was constantly raised among them. It was a
    23  kind of tour de raison. They would cover every
    24  interesting, evert aspect which looked interesting from
    25  their point of view. They would speak about the war, the
    26  conduct of war, they would speak about the — the
    .           P-174

      1  situation, the foreign policy, and they would cover this
      2  topic, the Jews, the Jewish question, and they would —
      3  this is my reading of this — they would encourage
      4  themselves, “Yes, they are dangerous, we have to do
      5  something against them, we have to carry on with our
      6  policy”.
      7  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: That does not really explain why you then talk about it in
      8  camouflage language at the table talk; why not keep your
      9  mouth shut?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I think, if you remember the speech Himmler gave on 4th
    11  October, he said, “Well, actually we do not speak among
    12  ourselves about this. It is a question of taste. We do
    13  not speak about this”. It is a history which has not been
    14  written which will never be written, and I think they went
    15  so far that even among themselves they would, you know,
    16  hesitate at this wonderful day in spring 1942 actually to
    17  say, “Yes, actually we are killing them”. So that is the
    18  best explanation I can offer. It is clear from the
    19  documents that it stood in clear contrast to what they
    20  were doing.
    21  MR IRVING:  Dr Longerich, in the Institute have you read the
    22  memorandum by Karl Wolf who was Himmler’s adjutant and
    23  liaison officer to Himmler for sometime?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Which?
    25  Q. [Mr Irving]: There were several handwritten memoirs by him, SS General
    26  Karl Wolf. Can I put to you one passage from them which
    .           P-175

      1  might help to explain this kind of conversation and ask
      2  you if you remember it?
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Where Karl Wolf says: “I am certain that Hitler did not
      5  know what was going on. I think it was kept from him. We
      6  had to keep the Messiah of the coming 2,000 years clean of
      7  this matter”?
      8  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think one has to again —-
      9  Q. [Mr Irving]: Do you remember that passage?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — I have to look at the document. I do no think — they
    11  are not published. I do not think they are accessible to
    12  everybody.
    13  Q. [Mr Irving]: I have seen them.
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but I think —-
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: And they are in my discovery.
    16  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: — as far as I am aware of, this is not a source which is
    17  accessible to every historian. They are not in a public
    18  archive on a library. If we, I mean, I would be happy to
    19  see them, but I think I would have to be in front of —-
    20  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think that is fair. It is very difficult
    21  to comment on an extract like that.
    22  MR IRVING:  But can I just put it this way? Is the suggestion
    23  that Karl Wolff or the SS were anxious to do the dirty
    24  deed without getting Hitler, the Messiah of the coming
    25  2,000 years implicated himself, would that explain how
    26  this situation would arise?
    .           P-176

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Wolff was sentenced in, was it, 199 — 1965 or something,
      2  I think he was sentenced to a 15-year prison sentence,
      3  I think, so, really, he was — his main occupation after
      4  the war was, actually his main problem after the war was
      5  to distance himself from these murderous actions. He did
      6  not want to spend the rest of his life in prison, so I
      7  would be very, very cautious to take this as face value,
      8  to, you know, what he knew, what Hitler knew. The whole
      9  attitude of Wolf is to say, “I was just a military man.
    10  I had nothing to do with these things. This was even not
    11  mentioned in my presence”.
    12  So I am really, first of all, I have not seen
    13  the document, but really, in general, would be very, very
    14  hesitant to draw — to follow him.
    15  Q. [Mr Irving]: Would that not explain Heinreich Himmler’s later remark on
    16  October 4th 1943, that this is a matter about which we
    17  never talk, if they wanted to keep it away from Hitler,
    18  would that not be the explanation?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I do not think he said in the speech, “We kept it away
    20  from Hitler”. He says, basically, “We do not mention
    21  it” —-
    22  Q. [Mr Irving]: Among others?
    23  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: ” — among ourselves”. If you go to the Himmler speech
    24  and if you do it in a more systematic way, you can see
    25  that actually he refers to higher orders which were given
    26  to him. So I think you can link this speech with Hitler.
    .           P-177

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  That is the awful responsibility?
      2  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, for instance.
      3  MR IRVING:  On page 66 near the end of that, five or six lines
      4  up, you say: “Even talking to his closest associates
      5  Hitler avoided speaking openly on mass killing”. This is
      6  your kind of gloss you put on paragraphs like that, that
      7  you are trying to explain how it is that in the documents,
      8  contemporary documents there are these baffling passages,
      9  if I can use the word “baffling”?
    10  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. I have only seen one, this is the one in 1985, and
    11  I think we do not have many examples of that.

    Section 178.12 to 192.24

    12  Q. [Mr Irving]: On 69 there is I think the one you were just referring to
    13  in paragraph 19.3, July 28th 1942, Himmler wrote to
    14  Gottlegberger, an SS General, saying: “The Fuhrer has
    15  placed on my shoulders the implementation of this very
    16  difficult order and the responsibility cannot be taken
    17  away from me in any case.” What order was that?
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: That is left out in the translation unfortunately.
    19  One had to add the first sentence in German. The first
    20  sentence of this quotation is: “The occupied Eastern
    21  territories will be free of Jews”, and then he goes on:
    22  “The Fuhrer placed on my shoulders the implementation of
    23  this very difficult order.”
    24  This is in July 1942. I think that quite
    25  clearly Hitler gave Himmler the order to kill every Jew in
    26  the occupied Eastern territories, and Himmler saw this a
    .           P-178

      1  particularly unpleasant and difficult task, but he was of
      2  course, as obedient as he was, prepared to carry on. So
      3  this is my reading of the document.
      4  Q. [Mr Irving]: Of course the document does not reply to another letter
      5  referring to the killing of the Jews, does it?
      6  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: No. It is mentioned in a letter to Berger, but I think
      7  this is one of the clearest statements we have.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: It is indeed very clear.
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: “The occupied Eastern territories will be free of Jews”,
    10  it is, “The Fuhrer placed on my shoulders the
    11  implementation of this very difficult order, the
    12  responsibility cannot be taken away from me in any case”.
    13  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  “Detesbefehl” must refer back, you would say,
    14  to making the Oskabitte free of Jews.
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I explain this just for the minute. In the
    16  translation I left unfortunately out the first sentence.
    17  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: I follow that.
    18  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: And the first sentence is: “The occupied Eastern
    19  territories will be free of Jews”. It is in the German
    20  text but not in the English text.
    21&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  My Lord, the full text, in case anybody thinks it
    22  is important, which it may well be, is in the new bundle N
    23  whatever it is.
    24  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  You mean the words before the omitted words?
    25&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes. There are two paragraphs and this is a
    26  microfilm.
    .           P-179

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think this is worth looking at.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I think it might be important for this witness in
      3  particular. 261, my Lord, we have reproduced
      4  Dr Longerich’s short English translation of two sentences,
      5  and, as he says, defective translation of two sentences.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Not defective but deficient.
      7&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, but the whole of the German text is in a
      8  microfilm copy on the right-hand side.
      9  MR IRVING:  My Lord, just for the record, I have no objection
    10  to any of the extracts this witness has made. He has left
    11  nothing out of any importance.
    12  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  No, I accept that. Should we just have a
    13  look. Did you say 261, Mr Rampton?
    14  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: 261, yes.
    15&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  261 I think I was told to say.
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I see, it is paragraph 1.
    17&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  It is in paragraph 1. It is the second part of
    18  paragraph 1.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can you just translate?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The whole thing?
    21  Q. [Mr Justice Gray]: The first sentence on paragraph 1.
    22  MR IRVING:  Yes: “I urgently ask you not to have any ordinance
    23  about the concept of the word “Jew” issued. With all
    24  these stupid determinations we are just tying our own
    25  hands. The occupied Eastern territories will be free of
    26  the Jews. The execution of this very difficult order has
    .           P-180

      1  been placed on my shoulders by the Fuhrer. So nobody can
      2  take that responsibility from me.”
      3  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: I would agree.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So there has been some sort squabbling about
      5  what comes within the definition of a “Jew”.
      6  MR IRVING:  Who is a Jew.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: He did not want them to issue a regulation about the
      8  definition of the Jew because it was not necessary any
      9  more, because the problem has —-
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  And Himmler is saying: “I have been ordered
    11  to sort the problem out by getting rid of the Jews and get
    12  on with it.”
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
    14  MR IRVING:  Yes. So the question which arises from that,
    15  Dr Longerich, is does this not fit in with the scenario
    16  that I suggested, that Hitler had said to Himmler: “You do
    17  the job, keep me out of it, I will keep people off your
    18  back, just get on with it, but don’t bother me with it”?
    19  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, it says here, this is my reading, that Hitler has
    20  given Himmler the order that the occupied territories
    21  shall be free of Jews. So which way this happened I do
    22  not know, whether this was —-
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: So, “I can do what I want and buzz off”?
    24  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you can speculate about this, but I do not have the
    25  minutes of the conversation between Hitler and Himmler.
    26  It could be a very explicit order, a very clear order. It
    .           P-181

      1  could also be something general. Why should I speculate
      2  about it? I do not have the text in front of me.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: Now let me take you ahead to page 72, please, the first
      4  indented paragraph, and we get a little bit closer to what
      5  I am asking for. This is the second closing speech on
      6  October 6th 1943.
      7  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: “I ask you that which I say to you in this circle be
      9  really only heard and not ever discussed. We were faced
    10  with the question “What about the women and children?”
    11  I took the decision to find a very clear solution to this
    12  problem here too.” “I took the decision”. Now is Himmler
    13  saying Hitler took the decision or is Himmler saying “I,
    14  Himmler, took the decision”?
    15  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, you answered the question yourself I think.
    16  Q. [Mr Irving]: Yes, and that is pretty clear, is it not?
    17  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but he did not say in this, he does not say in this
    18  speech that he took the decision without having the
    19  consent of Hitler.
    20  Q. [Mr Irving]: Oh, yes, he has been given the overall blank cheque by
    21  Hitler, has he not?
    22  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, I think it is fair to argue — I think he is
    23  referring here to the extension of the shootings in the
    24  Soviet Union, the extension of the shootings to women and
    25  children, which happened between the end of July 1941, end
    26  of October 1941, where actually the various killing units
    .           P-182

      1  extended their shootings to include in the mass executions
      2  also women and children, shot also women and children.
      3  I think, as far as I am concerned, as I tried to
      4  reconstruct as precisely as possible the decision-making
      5  process, that clearly there is some kind of initiative
      6  coming from Himmler, but I have no doubts that this was in
      7  full consent and that Himmler acted under the — that
      8  Himmler was convinced, deeply convinced that he acted with
      9  full consent of Hitler. I have no doubt about that. Also
    10  in this he says for the organization which had to execute
    11  this task. I think also this organization, it could be
    12  read as a reference to a higher order, an order which was
    13  given from, well, somebody above Himmler.
    14  Q. [Mr Irving]: I strongly disagree, Dr Longerich. If he says, “I am the
    15  one who took the decision that the women and children had
    16  to be killed too”, and that the people who had to do this
    17  job, it was very unpleasant for them, there can be no
    18  doubt at all what job he is talking about and who gave the
    19  order, he Himmler?
    20  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Well, I think you can read this sentence, it also can be
    21  read as that the SS, a reference to a higher order, but
    22  I cannot dispute, I do not want to dispute, that Hitler is
    23  referring here to his own initiative, but I on the other
    24  hand, looking at the whole history in 1941, in the second
    25  half of 1941, I have no doubts that he came to this
    26  conclusion with the deep conviction that he acted
    .           P-183

      1  according to the wishes of Hitler. I mean this idea to
      2  separate in a way Himmler from Hitler and to insinuate
      3  that Himmler would have carried out this operation behind
      4  Hitler’s back, I really have to say that this looks quite
      5  absurd to me, because if you look at Himmler’s
      6  personality, for instance, Himmler was obedient, he was as
      7  loyal as he could be to Hitler. He was an anxious
      8  person. I think the whole personality, Himmler can only
      9  be explained as somebody who, it is really a remarkable
    10  example of somebody who really did the utmost to carry out
    11  the wishes of Hitler. The whole died of idea that this
    12  whole operation, this enormous operation, killing
    13  operation of 6 million people could be started and could
    14  be carried out on a large scale with implications, you
    15  know, transportation, the building of extermination camps,
    16  the involvement of 10,000 people who had to carry out this
    17  programme and the ramifications as far as the foreign
    18  policy was concerned, the policy towards the German Allies
    19  was concerned, all this, that this could be carried out by
    20  Hitler not asking, not being sure that he actually acted,
    21  you know, on Hitler’s, according to Hitler’s wishes, this
    22  whole notion seems absolutely, I hate to say this in a
    23  very strong way, absurd. I think we cannot build this
    24  case on three or four documents you find in the archives.
    25  I think you have to look at the whole system. You have to
    26  look at the relationship between Hitler and Himmler. You
    .           P-184

      1  have to look at the way this was carried out. I simply
      2  cannot follow this line of argumentation.
      3  Q. [Mr Irving]: So Himmler was a weak man?
      4  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: In a way Himmler had — in a way Himmler had some
      5  weaknesses. You are quite familiar, you wrote biographies
      6  about the leading Nazis, and you I think are quite aware
      7  of the fact where are his weakness.
      8  Q. [Mr Irving]: Himmler’s brother Gebhardt told me that Heinreich was such
      9  a coward that he would never have done this without
    10  Hitler’s orders. So he backs you. But the fact remains
    11  that we are faced with these baffling documents, are we
    12  not?
    13  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes. The question is now whether these documents are
    14  really sufficient enough to prove the case that the
    15  Holocaust was carried out by Himmler behind Hitler’s back,
    16  you know, without his knowledge, without his approval.
    17  Generally speaking, my impression is that it is impossible
    18  to prove this case.
    19  Q. [Mr Irving]: You mention the transportation, that this could not have
    20  been done without Hitler’s orders?
    21  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: All this, not only transportation but the whole magnitude
    22  of this operation.
    23  Q. [Mr Irving]: But Himmler referred specifically to the fact that this
    24  movement of the Jews from the West to East is going to
    25  proceed stage by stage, is the Fuhrer’s orders, September
    26  1942 I think is the document?
    .           P-185

      1  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes.
      2  Q. [Mr Irving]: So that was covered by Hitler’s orders, the actual
      3  transportation movement. That was clearly covered by
      4  Hitler’s orders?
      5  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: Yes, but all the over — I can accept that, but it is not
      6  only the transportation. It is the involvement of 10,000
      7  people in police units, in SS units.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  The whole. You do not need to spell it out?
      9  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The whole operation.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  One can imagine how logistically complicated
    11  it was.
    12  A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich]: The Holocaust became known in 1942 to the Western world,
    13  and of course it was used in the Allied propaganda, for
    14  instance, they dropped leaflets on Germany, and so on. So
    15  the whole idea that this process could be kept as a secret
    16  when, you know, 22 officials in the Foreign Ministry alone
    17  read one of the activity reports of 1941 which quite
    18  clearly states that thousands of people are shot, and 22
    19  diplomats were officially allowed to read this. Then to
    20  argue that this was done behind Hitler’s back, it seems to
    21  me it defies reason.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. I have your very clear and full answer
    23  on that. Mr Irving, I do not know whether you are going
    24  to move on now?
    25  MR IRVING:  I have now reached effectively my planning for the
    26  first report. I will conclude the cross-examination on
    .           P-186

      1  the second report tomorrow, and then I shall be finished
      2  with Dr Longerich tomorrow, if I may.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, you are really saying you would rather
      4  break off now?
      5  MR IRVING:  Quite simply because we did zip through the
      6  glossary. I think it does fall naturally in two stages.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am not sure about that, but if you say you
      8  would like to break off now then I am perfectly happy with
      9  that. Can we just see where we are going from here.
    10  Mr Rampton, are we expecting to have any other witness on
    11  Thursday? I suppose that depends on Mr Irving.
    12&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No. I can start re-cross-examination Mr Irving on
    13  Thursday, if we go short with Dr Longerich. If not I will
    14  do that on Monday. I am expecting Professor Funke to be
    15  here on Tuesday.
    16  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Have you got a whole day’s further
    17  cross-examination, do you think?
    18&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Probably.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am not surprised.
    20&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Probably, because I have not done the political
    21  association. Considering the volume of material there is,
    22  I am going to keep it short, but it is still bound to take
    23  a bit of time.
    24  MR IRVING:  My Lord, ought I to question this witness about the
    25  Schlegelberger document which he has not referred it in
    26  his report?
    .           P-187

      1  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  He has not, you are quite right, and
      2  I personally think there is absolutely no need, because if
      3  there is one topic that has been investigated exhaustively
      4  it is certainly that one.
      5  MR IRVING:  I do not want to be criticised for not having done
      6  so.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I will not criticise you and I do not think
      8  Mr Rampton will either.
      9  MR IRVING:  Your Lordship is aware I attach great importance to
    10  it.
    11  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes, I realize you do.
    12&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I would point out, therefore, that it is likely
    13  that I will place reliance on what Dr Longerich has
    14  already said about that, which is that, in effect, he
    15  thinks it is a document of no historical significance.
    16  MR IRVING:  Yes.
    17  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. The trouble is you cannot nibble at
    18  these issues. I hope Mr Irving will not take that as an
    19  invitation to open the whole issue.
    20&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  No, but it is only fair that I should say that.
    21  I would use as corroboration for reliance on that what
    22  Professor Evans has said about it.
    23  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Professor Evans?
    24&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes.
    25  MR IRVING:  If Professor Evans wishes to have a chance to
    26  amplify the reason why he considers it to be insignificant
    .           P-188

      1  or less significant than do I, then this would be the
      2  opportunity.
      3  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think the answer to that is that he will
      4  not want to.
      5&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  He is in Cambridge.
      6  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I think you meant Dr Longerich, did you not?
      7  MR IRVING:  That was the correct inference, yes.
      8  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I am sure he will not want to, but Mr Rampton
      9  is entitled to rely on his commentary about it. Since
    10  I know so clearly what the issues are each way on it,
    11  I really see very little benefit to be derived from going
    12  through all the points all over again.
    13  MR IRVING:  I have no desire to.
    14  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  If you want to I am not stopping you.
    15  MR IRVING:  But I thought it would only be fair in view of the
    16  fact that he did express that negative opinion on it, if
    17  he wished to have the opportunity to amplify on that that
    18  he should, but if he does not so —-
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Just so it is clear, I am not for a moment
    20  stopping you from cross-examining fully on your reasons
    21  for saying why the Schlegelberger memorandum is a very
    22  important document, but I will not hold it against you
    23  that you did not cross-examine if you do not. I want to
    24  be absolutely clear what my position on that is.
    25  MR IRVING:  If your Lordship will not then I shall not.
    26  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Good. I think that is a sensible outcome,
    .           P-189

      1  because otherwise it is just a waste of time.
      2&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Can I give your Lordship two more references to
      3  close the day.
      4  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes.
      5&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Day 2, page 262, lines 11 to 17, I will read it
      6  out for Mr Irving’s benefit so he knows exactly.
      7  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Of what?
      8&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Of my cross-examination in the transcript.
      9  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Day 2?
    10&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes, page 262. Again I am afraid for some reason
    11  best known, perhaps it is that I merely lay the ground and
    12  all the bright questions seem to be asked by your
    13  Lordship. Maybe your Lordship has a better facility for
    14  getting straight answers, I do not know. Anyway, page
    15  262, line 11, Mr Justice Gray asks Mr Irving:
    16  “Do you accept that means,” this is about report
    17  No. 51, “since it is addressed to the Fuhrer that it was
    18  shown to him?”
    19  Answer: “On a high probability, yes, my Lord.
    20  I would have accepted that as being evidence that it had
    21  probably been shown to Hitler, but I would also draw
    22  attention to one, two or three details, if I may, since we
    23  are looking at the document.”
    24  Then bottom of page 264, which is on the same
    25  physical sheet of paper, line 23, again your Lordship is
    26  asking the question:
    .           P-190

      1  “To be asked what you think this would have
      2  conveyed to Hitler, which is I think what Mr Rampton was
      3  asking?”
      4  Answer: “Firstly, I accept the document was in
      5  all probability shown to Hitler. Secondly, I think in all
      6  probability he paid no attention to it, the reason being
      7  the date, the height of the Stalingrad crisis”.
      8  If there is going to be a retreat from that
      9  position, it is going to have to have, in submission,
    10  quite a good reason.
    11  MR IRVING:  Well, my response is that I think documents are
    12  often shown to learned counsel which learned counsel
    13  sometimes pay no attention to. I think Mr Carmen is an
    14  example of that.
    15&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I am not Mr Carmen for one thing, and I shall not
    16  say what I feel about that.
    17  MR IRVING:  Also your Lordship will remember —-
    18  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Let Mr Rampton tell us more about it.
    19&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  For another thing, that is only to say that it
    20  seems that that concession, and I advisedly use that word,
    21  seems to remain in place.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Indeed it is fortified, because Mr Irving is
    23  there saying that, all right, it may have been shown to
    24  Hitler, but he paid no attention to it, well, that is
    25  almost the same as saying it was not shown to him. But he
    26  goes done in day 4 and 5 in the passages that you have
    .           P-191

      1  referred to I think to accept that Hitler knew and
      2  approved.
      3&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  Yes, knew about the systematic mass shootings in
      4  the East.
      5  MR IRVING:  Your Lordship remember that I produced evidence to
      6  you a day or two later showing that on precisely that day
      7  or the day before one document of exactly the same nature
      8  was shown to Hitler on two successive days, submitted to
      9  him and obviously not read by him.
    10  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Yes. I suspect the position will emerge that
    11  you have slightly shifted your ground backwards and
    12  forwards in the course of your answers to Mr Rampton.
    13  MR IRVING:  It is highly possible that one learns as one goes
    14  along, and one would be incorrigible if one did not.
    15  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  I will not comment about that, but you have
    16  now put your case actually in considerable detail to
    17  Dr Longerich and we have now had his answers.
    18  MR IRVING:  Yes.
    19  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So tell me what your final stance is, because
    20  I would like to know, but the evidence is all in now.
    21&nbsp MR RAMPTON:  I would like to know too.
    22  MR JUSTICE GRAY:  So 10.30 tomorrow morning.
    23  < (The witness withdrew)
    24  (The court adjourned until the following day)
    .           P-192