Irving v. Lipstadt


Holocaust Denial on Trial, Trial Transcripts, Day 22: Electronic Edition

Pages 151 - 155 of 207

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    Did he on September 14th 1945 -- I am now on the second
 1judgment". Is that a self-serving statement, do you
 2think, a man describing that the conference was conducted
 3in these uncouth terms?
 4 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     I think, if he had been really self-serving, he would not
 5have said not "one man", he would have said he protested.
 6 Q. [Mr Irving]     Yes, but why did he have to put in these ugly details
 7about a conference that he attended?
 8 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     If I had been Boley and wanted to exculpate myself,
 9I would have that I was the man who objected. I would
10have said, "I said one cannot proceed against Jews that
11have behaved correctly, and I raise objections to all
12this," but he does not do that, does he?
13 Q. [Mr Irving]     His final statement on June 10th 1947 in the final
14paragraph, where he says that Kritzinger sent him to the
15conference, Eichmann was in the chair, there were 20 or 25
16participants, and he then testifies at this conference
17there was no talk of "really grim things", but of the
18preliminaries, the evacuation and sterilization.
19 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Exactly so.
20 Q. [Mr Irving]     You have read those interrogations in full, have you not,
21or your researchers have?
22 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     We have read them, yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving]     Did they find anything which contradicts the impressions
24he gives there?
25 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Let us take one step back. The March 6th meeting was
26about so-called Mischlinge and Jews married to non-Jewish

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 1Germans, and the discussions there, as I tried to
 2summarize them, when you asked me to earlier, Mr Irving,
 3were precisely about evacuations, sterilization,
 4preliminaries, presumably meaning legal, the passing of
 5laws to do with divorce, and so on. That seem to have
 6been fairly accurate.
 7 MR JUSTICE GRAY:     I am not sure where this all goes, Mr Irving.
 8 MR IRVING:     I am trying to pin down what actually happened at
 9the conference and to find out whether the ambit of the
10conference is wider than just sterilization issues or
11whether it was on a broader field, whether really ugly
12matters were discussed and apparently they were not, and
13also to establish the credibility of these witnesses, in
14particular the first one, who says that afterwards
15somebody took the memorandum, Lammers took this minute to
16the Fuhrer and returned with precisely the wording of this
17memorandum, in fact, and here he is remembering it in June
181947 in very much the same terms as the document itself.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY:     Why do you say that Boley was talking about
20the 6th March meeting in that little extract you have on
21your page 12? That could have been Wannsee, could it
23 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     He was, my Lord.
24 MR IRVING:     It is all March 6th.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY:     Why do you say that? Was this conference not
26at the RSH?

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 1 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     I do not think Boley was at the Wannsee conference.
 2 MR IRVING:     I do not think he was either. No, he was not
 4 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     But he was at the March 6th conference and he is talking
 5about that. The point is once more that the minutes of
 6the March 6th conference are all about Mischlinge and Jews
 7in mixed marriages. Schlegelberger in his testimony in
 8his trial at Nuremberg said that is what the conference
 9was about, and the fall out from it in this set of
10documents is clearly about those questions.
11 MR IRVING:     Professor, if we can pause to draw breath here, one
12point that divides us on the Schlegelberger memorandum,
13apart from the possible discrepancy on the date, you think
14there may be a possibility it was 1941, is that you would
15believe that the Schlegelberger document refers only to
16the mixed race issue.
17 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving]     And the bureaucratic red tape connected with that?
19 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Yes, if you date it to March 42.
20 Q. [Mr Irving]     I say that the significance of the document shows a
21general reluctance on Hitler's part to be sucked into talk
22about the Final Solution?
23 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     No, it is not that. Let us remind ourselves of what it
25 Q. [Mr Irving]     Yes.
26 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Lammers says the Fuhrer had repeatedly explained to him

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 1that he wanted the solution of the Jewish question put
 2back until after the war. Now you have to ask yourself in
 3this context what does the solution, losung, of the Jewish
 4question, Judenfrager, in this memorandum actually mean?
 5It can mean one of three things. It can mean
 6extermination. Well, if Hitler is talking about
 7extermination being put back until after the war, he must
 8have known about the extermination at this point, and you
 9said, I think, that if Hitler knew about the extermination
10between the end of 1941 and October 1943, when you admit
11that he did know about it, then he would approved of it.
12I do not think it means that.
13     Then does it mean evacuation? Well, evacuation
14has already been going on. They started pushing the Jews
15out of Berlin the previous autumn, as we saw this
16morning. So why is he suddenly turning round now? Have
17people been disobeying him? That is an absurd supposition
18as well. So, if we date it to March 1942, the only
19reasonable context that a historian would put it in would
20be the series of discussions about Jews and mixed
21marriages, which comes under the general heading of
22solution of the Jewish problem, because it is one aspect
23of that.
24 Q. [Mr Irving]     These are the theoretical discussions, are they not?
25 A. [Professor Richard John Evans]     Yes, all this stuff about the Mischlinge and so on,
26sterilization or other terrible things that they want to

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 1do to them, they are saying it is too difficult
 2classifying people, perhaps there are too many problems,
 3we know it in early 1943, for example, when they finally
 4did try and deport the Jewish husbands of non-Jewish
 5German women from Berlin to Auschwitz, there was a mass
 6protest by these very brave women in public in Berlin ,
 7which stopped it, so there was a fear that this would
 8raise trouble. There are all kind of reasons why they
 9should have wanted, Hitler and others, this solution to be
10put off.
11     As I said, the Justice Ministry was particularly
12concerned about the legal implications of trying to deal
13with this. There were problems about the resource
14implications of having a mass sterilization programme.
15There were many reasons why they want to put this off.
16Decisions about what was going to be done about the great
17mass of Jews who were not in this situation were neither
18Mischlinge nor in mixed marriages, they had already been
19discussed at great length in the Wannsee conference.
20Indeed, what was left over from the Wannsee conference was
21precisely this problem, what to do with these marginal
22problematical minority groups.
23 Q. [Mr Irving]     Can I bring you down to earth now with the actual content
24of the memorandum? If we look at the second sentence,
25Lammers says in the first sentence, that the Fuhrer has
26repeatedly said he wants the solution to the Jewish

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